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7Executive summary and key messages
Since the adoption of the Millennium Declaration, total 
development assistance for health (DAH) has more than 
doubled and has saved the lives of millions of individuals 
and protected the livelihoods of their families. But most 
low-income countries are failing to make much progress 
towards the child and maternal mortality MDG targets, and 
the financial crisis threatens to increase infant deaths in 
developing countries by 200,000-400,000.  
Progress towards all the health MDGs is impeded by 
insufficient funding, poor use of resources, and fragmented 
financing flows. Low-income countries currently spend 
only US$ 25 per capita on health; of this $10 comes from 
out-of-pocket payments, and only $6 from DAH. There 
is unbalanced support for different services, with more 
than 50% of DAH provided directly to countries in 2006 
supporting MDG 6, and less than 20% supporting basic 
health care and nutrition.
Everyone should have access to guaranteed health benefits*. 
The extent of these guaranteed benefits would be determined 
by individual countries, but as a minimum in order for 
the health MDGs to be achieved, services should include: 
universal coverage of interventions proven to reduce mortality 
among mothers, newborns and children under 5; childbirth 
care; reproductive health services; prevention and treatment 
of the main infectious diseases; diagnosis, information, 
referral, and relief of symptoms for those presenting at 
the primary care level; and health promotion. Effective 
service delivery requires a health system platform that can 
train and supervise the necessary health workers, provide 
essential drugs and supplies, channel money, and ensure 
accountability and transparency.  
Much more money is needed from domestic and external 
resources to ensure that rapid progress is made towards 
the health MDGs, and that health systems in low-income 
countries can make the guaranteed benefits available to all.
Better use of domestic and external resources is needed 
to maximize the impact of all investments in health, 
whether existing or new, and address current problems of 
inequity, inefficiency and poor quality. Countries need to 
develop a technically sound country health strategy and 
plan for scaling up coverage of high-priority services and 
strengthening the health system platform. The country 
strategy must set out how health system governance, 
financing and service delivery will be improved, as follows.
•	 	Governance	arrangements	are	critical	for	maximizing	the	
impact of health spending and ensuring poor, vulnerable 
and marginalized groups benefit most from increased 
resources; strengthened leadership is vital in public 
organizations, backed by stronger management systems 
including financial and human resources management. 
•	 	Financing	arrangements	must	ensure	sustainable	and	
equitable domestic financing structures, predictable 
external finance, improved risk pooling over time, and 
effective purchasing of priority services.
•	 	Service	delivery	arrangements	should	reflect	the	most	
cost-effective ways of providing services that are 
accessible, responsive to users and equitable, taking 
advantage of both public and private providers where 
appropriate.  
There is no fixed and agreed approach that countries must 
follow to scale up interventions to meet the health MDGs. 
Countries are very diverse, and follow diverse paths. Two 
sets of analyses were undertaken to calculate costs and 
health impacts, reflecting two different views of how best 
to scale up services to meet the MDGs. The first was 
undertaken by WHO with collaboration from UNAIDS and 
UNFPA, and the other by an interagency group coordinated 
by the World Bank and UNICEF, with collaboration from 
UNFPA and the Partnership on Maternal, Newborn and Child 
Health, and using the Marginal Budgeting for Bottlenecks 
(MBB) tool. Both project the annual increase in capital and 
recurrent funding needed between 2009 and 2015 in order 
to adequately fund the interventions and supporting health 
system platform required to make substantial progress 
towards the health MDGs. 
The WHO normative approach considers the amount  
of resources required to scale up country health systems 
to a level that is considered “best practice” by experts and 
practitioners. It reflects a more facility-based approach to 
service expansion and prioritizes rapid scaling up. The MBB 
identifies the critical constraints of existing health systems 
(bottlenecks) for scaling up effective interventions, and then 
identifies the strategies to overcome them. It assumes  
a delivery strategy that emphasizes full scale up of 
community-based services prior to expanding clinical 
services in 2014-15.   
* As stated in UN conventions.
8Strengthening the governance, financing and delivery of the 
health system to ensure rapid progress towards the health 
MDGs would cost, by 2015, an additional $36-45 billion* 
($24-29 per capita) per annum, on top of the estimated 
$31 billion that is spent today in low-income countries. 
Between 2009 and 2015 some additional financing will 
become available in any event, so the funding gap in 
2015 is the difference between the financing need (costs) 
and the additional financing. The table below shows 
the funding gap for 2015 under two different scenarios 
on additional financing: commitments met (donor and 
recipient governments increase support as reflected in 
public statements†); and no change (maintaining current 
relationships between GDP and health expenditures). Private 
expenditures are assumed to grow in line with GDP growth, 
and a share is assumed to be available to support health 
MDG achievement.
If commitments are met, there is on average, across all 
countries, no financing gap in 2015∆. However, donors 
and recipient governments are currently far from delivering 
on agreed targets, and the economic recession is making 
this more difficult. If current relationships of health spending 
to GDP remain unchanged, the financing gap is $28-37 
billion in 2015. For sub-Saharan Africa, there is a funding 
gap under the “commitments met” scenario of $3-5 billion. 
However, non-SSA countries would be more than able 
to cover additional costs under the “commitments met” 
scenario, and a small shift of DAH from non-SSA to SSA 
would reduce the SSA gap. In the “no change” scenario,  
the funding gap for SSA in 2015 is $26-24 billion#, and 
for non-SSA $2-13 billion.  
The figure below shows the total expenditure in 2015 under 
the two scenarios relative to estimated baseline levels of 
expenditure in 2008 and the financing need (WHO normative 
costs). It highlights the shortfall of expenditure under a 
“no change” scenario. It also highlights the importance 
of increasing government funding for health, and of 
encouraging private funding to support priority services.
If spent on high priority services and the necessary systems 
platform, it is estimated that the target level of health 
expenditure in 2015 would save the lives of around 4 million 
children and babies in both the WHO and MBB approaches. 
The WHO approach would avert up to 322,000 maternal 
deaths, 193,000 HIV deaths, and 265,000 tuberculosis 
deaths. The MBB numbers are estimated to be 259,000 
(maternal), 177,000 (adult HIV), and 235,000 (TB). The 
WHO approach would protect more than 30 million children 
aged 12-59 months from stunting, and reduce unwanted 
births by nearly 11 million. Millions of children and adults 
would have their illnesses prevented or treated, averting a 
massive amount of morbidity. In the WHO approach an 
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9extra 22 million women would have access to safe birth 
attendance and antenatal care, and their babies would 
receive quality care at birth and during the neonatal period. 
In the MBB approach an additional 17 million women would 
receive antenatal care in 2015, and 16 million would benefit 
from safe birth attendance.
Health systems would be put in place that would enable 
sustained health improvement into the future. Just as 
important, the sustained health improvement in low-income 
countries would increase human capital and remove the 
health barriers to economic growth, stimulating long-term 
economic development and enabling countries increasingly 
to fund their health systems themselves.
Capital expenditures are important for increasing system 
capacity to absorb more funding and would take up 
40-48% of the investment, with the remainder required 
for ongoing health system support, including the health 
workforce and drugs and supplies. Health facilities would 
increase by 74,000-97,000, and health workers by 2.6-3.5 
million. This would more than double the current numbers 
of facilities and workers. For additional funds to be used 
as intended to expand health spending, governments must 
agree to prioritize health within national budgets, and devote 
the additional resources to high impact interventions and the 
necessary systems support.   
The country health strategy, backed by high-level political 
commitment, is critical for deploying external funding in 
ways that ensure country ownership, donor alignment with 
strategies, and harmonization of donor actions1. There must 
be a focus on managing for results for which countries and 
donors are mutually accountable, backed by systems for 
monitoring and evaluating progress; there also needs to be a 
focus on building capacity for the long term, using national 
systems as the first option to channel money, purchase 
drugs and supplies, recruit technical assistance, and 
report on use of funds2. Approaches must be tailored to the 
specifics of each country context; the pace of change must 
be agreed locally to ensure absorption of additional funding 
and a long-term, sustainable approach to strengthening the 
health system. 
The cost of not raising additional funding is dire: 4 million 
children dying each year who would otherwise have been 
saved, and 780,000 avoidable adult deaths, including 
322,000 women dying as a result of giving birth.
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At a high-level event in New York on 25 September 2008, 
world leaders called for an additional US$ 30 billion to save 
10 million lives: 3 million mothers and 7 million children. 
Stronger health systems are critical to saving these lives, 
and building these systems will require more resources 
from the international community. For this reason a High 
Level Taskforce on Innovative International Financing 
for Health Systems (the Taskforce) was announced. Its 
objectives are to contribute to filling national financing gaps 
to reach the health Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
through mobilizing additional resources for health systems; 
increasing the financial efficiency of health financing; and 
enhancing the effective use of funds. 
Two technical working groups were established to present 
analyses and recommendations to the Taskforce: the focus of 
Working Group 1 was on constraints to scaling up and costs 
(see Annex 1 for the terms of reference) and the focus of 
Working Group 2 was on raising and channeling funds. 
The purpose of this report from Working Group 1 is to 
address the health systems strengthening needed in 49 
low-income countries (listed in Annex 2) to achieve the 
health MDGs, with a special emphasis on redressing gaps in 
services related to those MDGs considered to be neglected, 
namely MDGs 4 and 5. 
Since the adoption of the Millennium Declaration, total 
development assistance for health (including that from 
private foundations) has more than doubled, from 
$6.8 billion in 2000 to $16.7 billion in 20063. Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) increased from $5.5 billion 
in 2000-1 to $13.58 billion in 2006-7. The largest share of 
ODA has flowed to support specific disease control efforts, 
especially for HIV, malaria and immunization4,5 and has 
greatly helped to increase the take-up of health technologies. 
Millions of AIDS patients now receive antiretroviral treatment, 
and the incidence of malaria is falling in many countries. 
Within the health ODA increase, there has been an increase 
in the funding of the maternal, newborn and child health 
(MNCH) services needed to achieve MDGs 4 and 5. A recent 
analysis of all types of aid flows (including allowance for 
sector and general budget support) found that disbursements 
to MNCH had risen by 63% between 2003 and 20066. 
Child mortality has been significantly reduced in all regions 
except sub-Saharan Africa, and even here child mortality fell 
by an average of 11% between 2000 and 20057 and some 
countries have seen marked declines. 
However, health gains in low-income countries still fall well 
short of those desired. Evidence on country progress towards 
MDGs 4 and 5 shows that the majority of low-income 
countries are doing poorly (Annex 3). 
As many as 22 of 43 low-income countries for which data 
are available have made insufficient progress in reducing 
child mortality, and 16 have made no progress at all (Figure 
1). In five countries the average annual rate of reduction in 
under-five mortality since 1990 has been negative (Central 
African Republic, Chad, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe) 
indicating that child mortality has increased. For each 
newborn baby who dies, 20 more face illness or disability 
from conditions such as birth injury, infection and the 
complications of premature birth.
Of the 43 low-income countries, 42 have either high (over 
300 maternal deaths/100,000 live births) or very high 
(over 500) maternal mortality rates. Only one country 
(Tajikistan) has a moderate maternal mortality rate (Figure 
2). For every woman who dies in childbirth, around 30 suffer 
short- or long-term consequences including a broad range 
of acute and long-term disabilities, such as chronic pelvic 
pain, damage to reproductive organs, kidney failure, uterine 
rupture and infertility. Lack of access to family planning 
means that many women unnecessarily and involuntarily 
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Figure 1: Poor progress towards MDG 4 (reduce  
child mortality)8
Countries with under-five mortality rates of less than 40 per 1000 live 
births or an average annual reduction rate (in under-five mortality from 
1990-2006) of at least 4.0% are considered “on track”.
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incur the risks of pregnancy and childbirth, including unsafe 
abortion which is responsible for an estimated 13% of all 
maternal deaths.
Most countries are also struggling to meet the MDG 6 targets 
of achieving universal access to treatment for HIV by 2010 
and halving and reversing the spread of HIV by 20159. 
Malaria still kills more than 1 million people annually, 80% 
of whom are children under five in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Tuberculosis (TB) incidence rates are falling very slowly and 
TB deaths are still rising*.  
Despite improvements since 1990, progress in reducing 
hunger is insufficient to achieve the MDG 1c target. 
The proportion of children aged under five who are 
undernourished declined from 33% in 1990 to 26% in 
2006, but the number of underweight children in developing 
countries still exceeded 140 million in 200610. Furthermore, 
the recent increase in food prices is likely to mean that 1 
billion people in the world will go hungry and another 2 
billion will be undernourished11; the current financial crisis 
will further accentuate the problem of nutrition.
Figure 3 shows the most recent data on coverage levels in 
low-income countries for selected interventions crucial to 
achieving the health MDGs. This visibly demonstrates the 
weaknesses of the primary care systems that are needed to 
respond to acute infections in children, ensure safe delivery 
for women and babies, and support women’s reproductive 
choices, as well as the grossly inadequate coverage of some 
preventive measures such as insecticide-treated nets. 
Within countries there are gross inequalities in access to life-
saving interventions, with clear differences in antenatal care 
and skilled birth attendance, for example, between the rich 
and the poor12, as well as continuing inequalities by gender 
and for marginalized groups.  
Funding for health falls well short of the levels needed 
to achieve the MDG targets. The Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health’s estimate of the cost of a 
package of 49 essential health interventions in low-income 
countries was about US$ 38 per person per year13 but 
current spending on all health activities is only about $25 
per person per year. 
Furthermore, there are imbalances in the way that money is 
spent. Most noticeable is the pattern of external assistance 
across different types of health programmes. For example, 
between 2002 and 2006 more than 50% of all health aid 
provided directly to countries was absorbed by commitments 
relating to MDG 6, leaving only $2.25 per capita per year for 
MDGs 4 and 53. 
Despite an overall increase in MNCH funding, 16 of the 
68 Countdown† priority recipient countries experienced 
a fall in MNCH support in 2006, on average by 22%6. 
The prioritization of development assistance for specific 
programmes has meant that funding for cross-cutting 
systems support, such as building clinics, has been very 
much neglected. 
Geographic imbalances in ODA are also clearly apparent. For 
example, health ODA per capita between 2002 and 2006 
ranged from $20 in Zambia to $1.6 in Chad3.  
Funding imbalances are aggravated by fragmented 
funding patterns, multiple disbursement mechanisms and 
unpredictable flows of funding. In health there are more than 
40 bilateral donors and 90 global initiatives, which compete 
for attention and scarce country resources, especially 
human resources. This skews country priorities, increases 
transaction costs, and encourages piecemeal solutions to 
problems of service delivery14. In the case of MNCH funding, 
the analysis quoted above found that 95% of ODA for MNCH 
was channeled in the form of project funding rather than 
general budget support or health sector support6.
The problems of fragmentation, unpredictability and targeting 
of development assistance to the delivery of specific 
technologies have become so visible that they have resulted 
in a universal call for a coordinated effort to support the 
country health systems that all disease and programme-
specific efforts must ultimately rely on. 
* http://www.stoptb.org/resource_center/assets/factsheets/factsheet_april08.pdf, accessed 16/04/09.
† The Countdown is a collaboration between individuals and institutions which aims to stimulate country action by tracking coverage of interventions related to 
achieving MDG targets for mothers, newborns and children.
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Figure 2: Poor progress towards MDG 5 (improve 
maternal health)8
Very high: maternal mortality ratio of 550 or greater; high: maternal 
mortality ratio of 300-549; moderate: maternal mortality ratio of 100-
299; low: maternal mortality ratio of less than 100 per 100,000 live 
births.
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As defined by the Taskforce: 
  “Within the political and institutional framework for 
each country, a health system is the ensemble of all 
organizations, institutions and resources mandated to 
improve, maintain or restore health. Health systems 
encompass both personal and population services 
and activities to influence policies and actions of other 
sectors to address the environmental and economic  
 
determinants of health. Key subcomponents of health 
systems include: delivering health services through a 
primary health-care approach; financing and social 
protection; the health workforce; logistics and supply 
chains; information and knowledge; and governance†.” 
The health system is made up of publicly financed and 
provided services, and the activities of the private sector, 
whether in financing, service provision or the supply of 
inputs such as pharmaceuticals and equipment. Most 
important, it encompasses not only the service delivery 
activities, but the supervisory, management, outreach and 
governance activities needed to ensure efficient, effective and 
equitable service delivery; the participatory and accountability 
mechanisms needed to ensure that services are responsive 
to population needs and demands; and the policies needed 
to promote healthy environments and lifestyles.
Efforts to strengthen health systems in low-income countries 
are not new (see Box 1). But the global financial crisis 
makes it even more important that health systems receive 
greater attention and support. The crisis is threatening 
to reduce the income of rich and poor countries alike, 
potentially affecting their ability and willingness to increase 
or even maintain funding for health. A reduction in economic 
growth threatens tax receipts and hence government income; 
it also threatens household incomes and hence ability to 
spend on health care. Increased unemployment in the formal 
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* Early initiation of breastfeeding, 4+ antenatal care visits and prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV do not include data 
 from Comoros, Kyrgyzstan, Sa˜o Tomé and Principe, Solomon Islands, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.
** Missing data for 28 countries; in some of these malaria may not be a public health problem.
Figure 3:  Median coverage levels for priority maternal, neonatal and child health interventions for 49 low-income 
countries8,15 
† http://www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/pdf/IAWG/WG1/Taskforce%20WG1%20TOR%20Jan19%202009.pdf, accessed 16/04/09.
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sector will reduce insurance coverage, and in the informal 
sector it will reduce the purchase of care from the private 
sector. Decreasing economic activity in the rich world is 
reducing employment, which will in turn reduce remittances 
from migrant workers, further increasing rates of poverty.
All these trends will increase demands on public health 
services, as well as directly leading to adverse health 
consequences. The World Bank has forecast that in all 
developing countries an additional 200,000 to 400,000 
infant deaths per year may result from the financial crisis†. 
Thus it is even more vital that support is increased to protect 
and improve the health of the poorest and most vulnerable, 
especially women and children, and that domestic and 
external resources are used in ways that ensure maximum 
health benefit. A financial crisis can be turned into an 
advantage, and enable major reforms to be introduced. 
For example, the Thai financial crisis in the late 1990s 
helped stimulate progress towards universal coverage and 
influenced its design23. 
The case for increased health spending does not depend 
on the health benefits alone. As argued by the Commission 
on Macroeconomics and Health, improving the health 
of the poor is not only an end in itself but also a means 
of achieving other development goals relating to poverty 
reduction and economic growth13. The burden of disease 
and ill health, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, is a barrier 
to economic growth. Unhealthy and undernourished children 
do less well at school and grow up to be less productive 
members of the workforce. 
The global impact of maternal and newborn deaths has been 
estimated at US$ 15 billion a year in lost productivity24. The 
economic burden on poor households of paying the costs 
of treating frequent illness, and the costs to households 
of pregnancy and childbirth, absorb money that could 
otherwise be spent on basic necessities such as food. This 
affects households’ ability to save and invest, and reduces 
the productivity of the agricultural, manufacturing and 
services sectors. Money that governments would spend on 
treating illnesses could, by successful prevention, be diverted 
to other pressing needs. 
In the long term, investment in children’s health increases 
the proportion of the population that survives to working 
* http://www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/ihp_plus_about.html, accessed 16/04/09.
† http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22068931~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html, accessed 10/04/09.
Box 1:  Milestones in health systems strengthening
Upon independence in the 1960s and 1970s many developing countries embarked upon a phase of health system strengthening, 
characterized in particular by efforts to expand their networks of basic health services through public sector investment. Such efforts were 
underpinned by national reports such as the Bhore report in India and the Titmuss report in Tanganyika.
This focus on basic health services, supported by community involvement, was further developed in the 1978 Alma Ata Declaration, 
which called for the launch and sustaining of primary health care “as part of a comprehensive national health system”16. However, the 
approach to strengthening the health system as a whole was superseded by the emergence of selective primary health care17 which argued 
that in the context of limited resources it made most sense to focus efforts on specific high-priority diseases and highly cost-effective 
interventions. The tension between broad support for systems strengthening, as compared with more focused support to specific diseases, 
has persisted, although the two approaches are best seen as complementary.
A renewed focus on health systems was stimulated in the late 1980s through World Bank publications, most notably “Financing Health 
Services in Developing Countries: An Agenda for Reform”18 which argued that “continuing gains [in health outcomes] depend largely on 
the capacity of health systems to deliver” and proposed a series of market-oriented reforms. Several of the messages in “An Agenda For 
Reform” were elaborated in the World Development Report of 1993 “Investing in Health”19.
These reports, combined with efforts by some bilateral donors and the influence of the new public management philosophy popularized in 
industrialized countries at the time, led to a wave of health sector reforms in developing countries. In subsequent decades, however, many 
health sector reform policies became discredited, partly because of the negative consequences of some specific policies (such as user fees) 
on equity, but also because of the lack of clear evidence that such policies had positive effects20. 
The next major international publication, “Health Systems: Improving Performance - World Health Report 2000” thus focused on providing 
a clear analytical approach and indicators for measuring health system performance. 
Nevertheless, the perceived failures of the health sector reform movement and the growing focus on HIV had led back to a stronger focus 
on tackling specific priority diseases, with the GAVI Alliance established in 2000 and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria 
established in 2002. A rapid increase in funding for global health, particularly HIV/AIDS services, ensued. In some heavily affected 
countries HIV funding exceeded 150% of government health budgets21 and was perceived as placing a burden upon already weak health 
systems, most notably in terms of scaling up services in the context of scarce human resources. In 2005, in response to these concerns, 
the GAVI Alliance Board launched a dedicated health systems window, and the Global Fund began to accept proposals for strengthening 
health systems.
In 2007, the launch of the International Health Partnership marked a renewed focus on health systems, with a call to “action to scale-
up coverage and use of health services, and deliver improved outcomes against the health MDGs and universal access commitments”*. 
The 2008 G8 summit in Toyako, Japan, produced a strong commitment for collective action to strengthen health systems in developing 
countries, and the Japanese Government undertook follow-up activities by working with an external experts committee which produced 
three policy papers22 (on financing, human resources and information) with recommendations for G8 action.
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age, and so contributes to economic growth. Some 30-
50% of Asia’s economic growth between 1965 and 1990 
has been attributed to favourable demographic and health 
changes, which stemmed largely from reductions in infant 
and child mortality, improvements in reproductive health and 
reductions in fertility rates25. Finally, a healthier population 
is not just a more productive population but one that will 
enable people to live more socially fulfilling lives.
The remainder of this report addresses, in turn:
•	 	the	interventions	that	need	to	be	provided	and	the	
necessary health system platform;
•	 	common	health	system	constraints	in	low-income	
countries;
•	 	policies	and	approaches	that	offer	solutions	to	these	
constraints;
•	 financial	needs	and	resulting	health	benefits;
•	 how	financial	assistance	should	flow.	
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Working Group 1 supports the goal that a country’s health 
system should be capable of providing guaranteed benefits 
that all citizens should enjoy. The definition of a universal set 
of entitlements has deep ethical and political implications, as it 
reflects the actionable items of the universal right to health and 
health care, as specified in UN conventions and declarations. 
The specification of guaranteed benefits also helps to hold 
governments to account for their performance in ensuring 
universal access to health care for all their citizens.  
Identifying the interventions needed to achieve the health 
MDGs and the health system support required to provide 
those services efficiently, effectively and equitably is the first 
step in defining the benefits. Further work remains to be done 
to specify clearly the content of those interventions, how 
countries should adapt them for differing contexts, and the 
health system arrangements required to finance and deliver 
them in an efficient and equitable manner. Also, benefits 
need to be dynamic so that, as certain goals are achieved 
and new challenges emerge, they are revised through the 
application of transparent and contestable criteria.
Substantial prior analytical work has led to agreement  
on the interventions necessary for achieving the health 
MDGs26. These comprise interventions proven to reduce 
mortality among mothers, newborns and children under five, 
childbirth care, reproductive health services, and prevention 
and treatment of the main infectious diseases. In addition, 
benefits need to include elements to respond to the conditions 
with which people present in primary care, and health 
promotion. The main services are shown in Table 1.
These interventions need to be combined at different levels 
of care in ways that exploit synergies and efficiencies, and 
eliminate missed opportunities (such as failing to check 
on immunization status when a sick child is brought 
2.  Guaranteed benefits and the health  
system platform
Table 1:  Listing of key guaranteed benefits
Groupings of services Include the following interventions
Maternal and newborn services  Antenatal care (four visits)
 Quality facility births (maternal care during labour, delivery and immediate postpartum)
 Newborn care (care of the newborn at birth and immediate postnatal care, including exclusive breastfeeding)
 Postnatal care (care provided to the mother up to six weeks after birth, and visits at home for the newborn)
 Emergency obstetric and neonatal care (specialized care, including treatment of complications during pregnancy, 
childbirth and the postnatal period)
Safe abortion (where legal) and post-abortion care
Family planning
Child services Oral rehydration therapy
Case management of pneumonia
Vitamin A supplementation, vitamin A fortification
Zinc supplementation, zinc fortification
 Access to processed food, provision of supplementary food and counselling on nutrition
Full and permanent coverage of immunization programmes
Exclusive breastfeeding for children under six months
HIV Prevention, treatment and care programmes for HIV
Prevention of mother-to-child transmission
Malaria Preventive and curative interventions for malaria
Tuberculosis Diagnosis and treatment of tuberculosis
Noncommunicable diseases Health promotion and early detection of noncommunicable diseases
Presenting conditions  Diagnosis, information, referral and relief of symptoms for any presenting conditions
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for treatment). For example, treatment of tuberculosis, 
malaria and childhood illnesses, immunization and family 
planning need to be integrated at the health centre level. 
Other interventions lend themselves to delivery through 
other channels, such as social marketing approaches to 
encouraging purchases of insecticide-treated mosquito 
nets or condoms. Table 2 provides examples of which 
interventions can be integrated at the point of delivery, and 
which are less dependent on a health service infrastructure.
The health system is vital for ensuring that services function 
efficiently, effectively and equitably. It trains and supervises 
the necessary health workers, ensures the availability of 
drugs, vaccines, diagnostics and other supplies, determines 
how money is collected and how it is spent, and ensures 
accountability and transparency. It supplies the multipurpose 
infrastructure needed to provide services for mothers, 
babies, children and adolescents, and to treat infectious and 
noncommunicable diseases. 
It is well known that health services are not the only 
influence on health outcomes, and that there are multiple 
other important determinants, such as female education, 
the environment and transport. It is important to address 
these as part of a broad view of development. One of the 
critical functions of an effective health system is to provide 
leadership to other sectors and thus to influence policies 
across government to ensure that they help promote health.
Table 2:  Examples of intervention delivery by level of care for four priority areas
Level of care Malaria HIV Childhood diseases Maternal/ neonatal
Hospital Treatment of complicated 
malaria
Blood transfusion to treat HIV
Treatment of severe  
opportunistic infection  for 
AIDS
Integrated management of 
childhood illnesses: severe 
cases
Emergency obstetric  
and neonatal care
Safe abortion  
(where legal)
Health centre/health post Treatment of uncomplicated 
malaria
Intermittent preventive 
treatment of malaria during 
pregnancy
Prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission
Prevention of  opportunistic 
infection, and treatment of 
uncomplicated opportunistic 
infections  
Voluntary counselling and 
testing
Antiretrovirals
Treatment of sexually 
transmitted infections
Integrated management of 
childhood illnesses
Immunization
Treatment of severe anaemia
Quality facility births
Antenatal and postnatal care
Family planning
Treatment  of mild 
complications; pre-referral 
management of serious 
complications
Outreach services Epidemic planning and 
response
Indoor residual spraying
Peer education for vulnerable 
groups; needle exchange
Specific immunization 
campaigns
Outreach IMCI: home 
management of fever
Outreach for: micronutrients 
and deworming
Support for family during 
pregnancy, childbirth and 
postpartum 
Support for breastfeeding and 
referral
Outside health sector or 
not  involving direct service 
delivery
Social marketing of 
insecticide-treated mosquito 
nets
Social marketing of condoms
School youth programmes 
for HIV
Improving quality of private 
drug sellers
School deworming and 
micronutrients
Social marketing of 
contraceptives
School sexual, reproductive 
and health education
Community transport schemes
Note: Interventions are allocated to the level that will be the predominant service provider; other levels will often also provide specific interventions  
(e.g. skilled birth attendance at hospital). Source: adapted from 13
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Low-income countries are in many ways highly diverse.  
The severity of constraints to scaling-up health services 
differs widely, as do the solutions to those constraints.  
The 49 countries range from an income level of US$ 100 
in Burundi to $860 in Côte d’Ivoire (Annex 4). Twenty-six 
of them are included on the list of fragile states*, which are 
home to only 20% (1 billion) of the world’s population, 
but contain a third of the world’s poor, a third of the world’s 
maternal deaths and a third of those living with HIV27. 
About 80% of fragile states have been or are still engaged 
in conflict. Conflict-affected fragile states have some of the 
worst health indicators in the world and are farthest from 
meeting the MDGs28. Low-income countries thus encompass 
both countries with a reasonably well functioning state, and 
those with no effective state. 
With respect to the health system, low-income countries 
range from those with a reasonably widespread network 
of public and non-state health services, to those where 
public health services either have never been built up or 
have been largely destroyed by war and the informal private 
sector dominates. In conflict-affected fragile states, the 
health service infrastructure is often severely damaged, with 
few skilled staff, scarce drug supplies, weak management 
systems, and a Ministry of Health with severely limited 
capacity. Compared with more stable states, there is often 
a proliferation of poorly coordinated nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and vertical health programmes29. 
Nonetheless, even if the degree of the severity of constraints 
varies by country, all low-income countries experience 
multiple constraints in seeking to increase coverage of 
priority interventions. Lack of money is a fundamental 
constraint, but unless other constraints are recognized and 
addressed countries will find it difficult to absorb and use 
additional finances effectively13. Constraints can be analysed 
in a number of ways, including the various levels of a health 
system and in the context of the main health system building 
blocks, especially financing, the health workforce, drugs and 
information.
3.1 Constraints to improving access to benefits, 
by level
Table 3 summarizes the main constraints to improving 
access to health benefits at the levels of: community and 
household; health service delivery; health sector policy and 
strategic management; public policies cutting across sectors; 
environmental and contextual characteristics; and at the 
global level. This approach to conceptualizing constraints 
makes it apparent that long-term solutions to inadequate 
coverage of health services demand action not just at that 
level but also at other levels: in other words, they demand a 
health system response. For example, in a specific country 
setting, low uptake of facility-based care during childbirth 
may be due to a combination of the following factors:
•	 	low	status	of	women	affects	their	ability	to	access	
services; 
•	 	pregnant	women	and	their	husbands	are	not	aware	 
of the benefits of the services;
•	 	services	are	not	oriented	to	caring	for	pregnant	
adolescents;
•	 	services	are	not	sufficiently	near	to	people’s	homes;
•	 	the	quality	of	care	is	inadequate	in	terms	of	the	service	
environment (e.g. drugs, equipment, cleanliness, 
privacy) and provider skills;
•	 	unaffordable	charges	(formal	and	informal)	are	levied;
•	 	health	workers	are	inadequately	paid,	supervised	
and supported, resulting in absenteeism and poor 
relationships with patients;
•	 	regulations	are	poorly	enforced,	resulting	in	widespread	
private delivery practice which, although of poor 
technical quality, is more responsive to women’s 
preferences;
•	 	inadequate	numbers	of	obstetricians	and	midwives	
due to international migration, AIDS and insufficient 
investment in retention strategies, and the absence 
of other cadres who could have been trained and 
authorized to provide skilled care.
3.  The main constraints that hamper scaling up of 
effective, efficient and equitable services
* The World Bank’s definition of fragile states covers low-income countries scoring 3.2 and below on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). 
They are classified into four groups: (1) prolonged crisis or impasse; (2) post-conflict or political transition; (3) gradual improvement; and (4) deteriorating 
governance. The lists are revised annually, so fragility is a temporary status, not a permanent classification.
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Table 3:  Constraints to improving access to health benefits, by level
Level of constraint Examples of types of constraints
Community and household level  Lack of demand for effective interventions due to knowledge, perceptions, culture, language 
Barriers to the use of effective interventions (physical, financial, social) 
Health services delivery level Shortages and inadequate distribution of appropriately qualified staff
 Weak information systems, technical guidance, programme management and supervision
Inadequate drugs and medical supplies
Lack of equipment, infrastructure and referral system
Health sector policy and strategic 
management level
Weak and overly centralized planning and management systems
Insufficient use of evidence in decision-making
Weak drug policies and drug supply system
 Weak transport, communication and referral systems, especially for emergencies
 Ineffective policies for engagement with and regulation of pharmaceutical and private sectors, and improper industry 
practices
 Lack of interministerial and intersectoral action, and weak partnerships for health between government and civil society
 Weak incentives to use inputs efficiently and to respond to users’ needs and preferences
Reliance on aid agency funding, which reduces flexibility and ownership
Aid agency practices that overload country management capacity
Public policies cutting  
across sectors
 Government bureaucracy (civil service rules and remuneration, centralized management)
Limited fiscal space for additional public expenditure
Poor availability of communications and transport infrastructure
Environmental and  
contextual characteristics
Governance and overall policy framework
 Corruption, weak government, weak rule of law and unenforceability of contracts
Political instability and insecurity
Low priority attached to social sectors
Weak structures for public accountability, including lack of a free press
Physical environment
Climatic and geographic predisposition to disease
Physical environment unfavourable to service delivery
Global level Number of global initiatives and misalignment of reforms
 Reliance on project funding modes and limited use of country public financial management systems 
Poor quality reporting on DAH flows to countries
Demand for skilled health workers in other countries
Source: adapted from 30
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At the community and household levels demand for  
effective interventions can be low because people: lack 
information on how they will benefit from services; may be 
intimidated by health-care providers and do not know how 
to negotiate access; lack decision-making rights over health 
service use within their household; and/or feel their local 
health services do not recognize their needs, receive them 
well, or provide services of good technical quality. Financial 
barriers can also be a significant deterrent, whether in the 
form of fees, both formal and informal, or the costs  
of transport and time.  
At the facility level the key issues are the availability, 
distribution and motivation of appropriately skilled staff, 
sufficient expert and supportive supervision, the availability 
of drugs, medical supplies and equipment, and the 
maintenance of the infrastructure. Often facilities are run 
down, lack drugs, and experience absenteeism by staff 
whose wages are insufficient to live on so that they need to 
earn income in other ways. In some countries the national 
pool of trained workers is insufficient to staff all facilities; 
the most remote facilities, and those serving the poorest 
populations, are most likely to be inadequately staffed. 
Services offered may be segmented, meaning that women 
attending for antenatal care may not be offered advice  
on family planning or prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV.
At the health sector policy and strategic management 
level, multiple constraints affect performance. Decision-
making cultures where information and evidence play an 
appropriate role are rare, and in any case the volume of 
health systems research is tiny relative to the need for good 
evidence (see Box 2). The planning system often does 
not translate priorities into plans and budgets effectively. 
Ministries of health the world over tend not to be regarded 
as the most politically important or competent, and hence 
can face difficulties in arguing their case within government, 
especially with ministries of finance, for additional money. 
Relationships with the private health sector are often poorly 
developed, despite its widespread use, and opportunities are 
neglected for working with the private sector to improve the 
services they provide. 
Ministries of health also tend to ignore the importance of 
interministerial and intersectoral action. Obvious areas 
of common interest include involving schools to promote 
health messages and to provide treatment, upgrading rural 
infrastructure to improve physical access to both health 
services and safe water, and ensuring that statistics bureaus 
collect essential health information.
At this level Table 3 identifies aid agency practices as a 
constraint33. Weak country capacity can be further reduced 
by aid fragmentation, which is especially large in the health 
sector34. In 2002, Vietnam, a fairly typical aid recipient 
receiving around 5% of GDP as aid, dealt with 25 bilateral 
donors, 19 multilateral agencies and 350 international 
NGOs, and on average had one project per 9,000 people35. 
One study found that the median recipient government 
interacted with 23 official donors and categorized the 
transaction costs of the numerous aid channels as direct  
and indirect35. 
Direct transaction costs arise from the separate negotiation, 
management and reporting requirements that absorb the time 
of politicians and bureaucrats, and the energy needed  
to maintain relationships with so many agencies.
Indirect transaction costs stem from: the superior purchasing 
power of externally funded projects, which can attract 
the best staff away from national employers; excessive 
expenditure on project-specific technical assistance and 
training (in 2006 technical cooperation in DAC 
Box 2:  Health systems strengthening - more research 
needed
Since the 1970s there have been calls to strengthen the field of 
health policy and systems research so as to improve the evidence 
base supporting health systems strengthening. For example:
•  In 1972 it was proposed to the World Health Assembly that 
greater emphasis be placed on (a) studies on the economics 
of health, (b) studies dealing with manpower resources 
and development, (c) community participation and (c) the 
selection, specification and standardization of medical 
procedures and techniques. 
•  The 1996 report of the Ad Hoc Committee relating to Future 
Intervention Options identified four “best buys” in global 
health research, of which health policy and systems research 
was one. 
•  The 2004 Ministerial Summit on Health Research in Mexico 
called for a major increase in investment in health policy and 
systems research, and this call was subsequently reflected in a 
World Health Assembly resolution.
Despite these frequent calls for greater investment in health 
policy and systems research, the field remains neglected. The 
report of the Ad Hoc Committee gave rise to the creation of 
the Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research*, which 
supports advocacy, knowledge generation and capacity building, 
but its resources are tiny relative to the need for funding for such 
research. A study of the pattern of grant awards concerning child 
health in developing countries found that, for the largest public 
and largest private health research funders, 97% of their grants 
were for the development of new technologies, rather than to 
enhance the access to and delivery of existing technologies31. 
Consequently the evidence used to identify crucial health 
systems solutions is often very weak. 
Weak support for health systems research can be explained 
by the lack of clarity in the scope and nature of the field, the 
perceived lack of rigour in methods employed, and challenges 
involved in generalizing from one country context to another. 
But without scaling up funding for health systems research 
from its very low base, it is difficult to tackle these issues and 
generate robust, generalizable findings.
Source: 32
* http://www.who.int/alliance-hpsr/en/, accessed 16/05/09.
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statistics* constituted 41% of total health ODA, and had 
tripled in real terms since 199914); distortion of public 
budgetary processes and fiscal statistics since much 
aid is not accounted for in official statistics; competition 
between donors for both attractive projects and the time of 
bureaucrats and politicians, which encourages hoarding 
of information and less than enthusiastic participation in 
coordination efforts; and a reduced collective sense of 
responsibility among the donor community in a country for 
the outcomes of aid, given the multiplicity of donors. While 
global health partnerships are increasingly providing funding 
for health systems in addition to disease-specific funding, 
the separate nature of their decision-making process can 
create many difficulties at country level, as shown in a recent 
analysis of the GAVI Alliance’s early experiences36.
Weak government government management systems, 
together with aid fragmentation and broader institutional 
weaknesses, can affect the capacity to absorb aid† at both 
macro and micro levels. Few of the global health initiatives 
use country financial management systems, reducing 
incentives to strengthen them. Disbursement rates are likely 
to be strongly influenced by donor processes and regulations 
with respect to funding modality and disbursement channels. 
For example, an analysis of Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) disbursement rates 
suggests that low-income countries are able to absorb major 
increases in health assistance37. However, 50% of principal 
or sub-recipients in round 7 were non-state actors38 and 45-
49% of the funds (depending on the round) has been spent 
on drugs and commodities∆. Different spending patterns 
may face different constraints on spending. A second notable 
finding of this analysis was that the implementation of grants 
was strongly related to political stability, with less stable 
states facing greater problems of implementation. 
Another study analysing the relationship between per capita 
donor disbursements for MNCH and child and maternal 
mortality rates, found that a group of countries with the 
highest mortality rates and lowest per capita DAH were all 
fragile states, suggesting either that these states received 
lower priority and/or that anticipated or actual absorptive 
capacity was low39. Hence absorptive capacity is likely to 
vary greatly across low-income countries.
At the cross-sectoral public policy level, ministries of health 
face major constraints relating to public service employment. 
In many countries health workers are part of the civil 
service, making it very difficult to deal with issues of pay 
and conditions of service separately from those of staff in 
other sectors. Another constraint can arise from concerns 
of ministries of finance relating to fiscal space, which is 
the scope in a government’s budget to provide resources 
for a desired purpose without prejudicing the government’s 
financial position40.  
Some ministries of finance have been unwilling to support 
additional public health spending, especially where it 
increases long-term budgetary commitments and where they 
lack faith in the ministry of health’s ability to spend additional 
money effectively. This may be one reason why increases in 
expenditure on health may not match stated commitments. 
An analysis in 2005 covering the period 1998-2002 
suggested that an increase in aid of 10% of GDP was 
associated with an increase of 0.36% of GDP in public 
expenditure on health, which means that only 3.6% of 
aid was spent on health41. This is much less than the 
stated share of health in total aid commitments (17%) 
and suggests that governments responded to increases in 
health aid by shifting some of their own resources out of the 
health sector. A recent audit of the European Commission’s 
development assistance to health in sub-Saharan Africa 
found that, in most countries examined, general budget 
support did not lead to increased resources being channeled 
through the national health budget42.
Finally, while the low-income country health sector alone 
can do little about them, the environmental and contextual 
characteristics of a country, as well as global influences and 
structures, affect the functioning of a national health system. 
3.2 Constraints by four key health system 
building blocks
Four health system building blocks are so important that they 
require specific mention: financing of country health systems, 
the health workforce, drugs and other essential supplies, and 
health information and evidence. 
3.2.1 Financing of country health systems
Financing entails three sub-functions: revenue generation, 
risk pooling and purchasing. In low-income countries, 
total health expenditure is $25 per capita (range $5-$58), 
government health expenditure is $12 ($1-$42), and 
private expenditure $13 ($3-$31) of which out-of-pocket 
expenditure is around $10 per capita (see country data 
in Annex 4a). External assistance, included according to 
WHO reporting definitions within government and private 
categories, is on average $6 ($0.50-$27.77). These figures 
show that national financing structures are fragmented and 
that domestic sources dominate external ones.
* DAC statistical reporting under “technical cooperation” includes only free-standing technical cooperation, i.e. activities financed by a donor country whose 
primary purpose is to augment the level of knowledge, skills, technical know-how or productive aptitudes of the population of developing countries.
† Absorptive capacity refers to the ability of countries to utilize DAH efficiently and effectively. Capacities are determined by a range of macroeconomic, 
microeconomic and institutional factors.
∆ http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/distributionfunding/?lang=en, accessed 10/04/09.
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Out-of-pocket expenditure accounts for nearly half of total 
health expenditure, so a significant share of health financing 
does not permit risk pooling. As a result, a significant 
proportion of households face a burden of expenditure 
that is catastrophic for household welfare, and can lead to 
households falling into poverty43. Equally important, many 
individuals lack capacity to fund their care at all and, as a 
result of not seeking treatment, their health condition may 
deteriorate, leading to an increased chance of dying.
Another important implication of the lack of pooling of 
health funds is that it makes it difficult to ensure effective 
purchasing, namely targeting domestic financing to the 
most cost-effective services and to those most in need, 
and to channel funding in ways that create incentives for 
providers to perform well. Because out-of-pocket expenditure 
in absolute terms tends to increase with household income 
level, it finances health care more for the rich than the poor, 
and often purchases ineffective or unnecessary services and 
products44. The poorer the household, the more likely it is to 
purchase from the poorer quality, more informal end of the 
private health-care market45. Pharmaceuticals account for a 
major share of private out-of-pocket payments, and in turn 
such payments are a significant component of total health 
expenditure in low-income countries (19% according to 
WHO data46).  
Although the 2001 Abuja Declaration committed all 
members of the Organization of African Unity to ensuring 
that at least 15% of domestically financed government 
expenditure went to health* few countries have achieved 
this. Government expenditure should be more susceptible 
to prioritization on cost-effective services, but in practice 
a high proportion of government health expenditure goes 
to hospitals, and within that a high share is absorbed by 
higher-level hospitals47. 
One study found that all levels of public hospitals in 
developing countries absorbed a mean of 60% of recurrent 
public health expenditures, and across five countries 
(Belize, Indonesia, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe) tertiary 
hospitals accounted for 45-69% of total public expenditure 
on hospitals48. A more recent study in South Africa found 
that tertiary and regional hospitals accounted for nearly 60% 
of total public hospital expenditure, and tertiary hospitals 
alone accounted for nearly one fifth of total public health 
expenditure49.  
DAH disbursements can be analysed by the purpose codes 
in the Creditor Reporting System for that part of DAH which 
can be associated with country recipients (Annex 5). Of total 
country-specific DAH, population and reproductive health 
services in 2006, countries received on average 30% for 
sexually transmitted diseases and HIV, 10% for malaria, 4% 
for tuberculosis and 16% for basic health care. However, 
these means disguise great variation. At one extreme, over 60% 
of DAH was given for HIV in Eritrea, Haiti, Uganda and Zimbabwe. 
At the other extreme, basic health care absorbed 70% of 
DAH in Afghanistan and 47% in Tajikstan, but otherwise 
no country’s share for basic health care was greater than 
35%. Figure 4 shows the breakdown of DAH by purpose for 
sub-Saharan African low-income countries and all other low-
income countries. In sub-Saharan Africa 62% of country-
specific DAH was allocated for a disease-specific purpose.
Basic health infrastructure 1.1%
Basic nutrition 1%
Infectious disease control 6.2%
Basic 
health 
care 
10.5%
Malaria control 
10%
Tuberculosis control 1.9%
Other health
18.6%
STD control
including HIV/AIDS
44.3%
Other population and reproductive health care 3.7%
Reproductive health care 2.8%
Basic 
health care 
27.4%
Basic health infrastructure 1.9%
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Infectious disease control 7.3%
Malaria control 2.1%
Tuberculosis control 2.4%
Other health
21.9%
STD control
including HIV/AIDS
20.1%
Reproductive health care 8.2%
Other population and reproductive health care 7.7%
Low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa
Other low-income countries
Figure 4: Distribution of DAH to specific purposes of 
health, population, and reproductive health in low-
income countries in 2006
Source: data in Annex 5
* http://www.un.org/ga/aids/pdf/abuja_declaration.pdf, accessed 16/04/09.
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3.2.2 The health workforce
The health workforce is fundamental to both the delivery 
of care and its management. In 44 of the 49 low-income 
countries there are a grossly inadequate number of health 
workers to provide essential health services. 
There is a direct relationship between the ratio of health 
workers to population and the survival of women during 
childbirth and children in early infancy50. An estimated one 
third of pregnant women in developing countries do not have 
contact with health personnel prior to giving birth, while in 
sub-Saharan Africa, where most maternal deaths occur, 
70% of women have no contact with health personnel 
following childbirth. 
In some of the 49 low-income countries the problem is that 
inadequate numbers of health workers are being trained. 
In other countries there are unemployed trained workers 
and the problem is primarily one of funding, recruitment 
and imbalances in the staffing mix51. The retention of and 
performance by health workers are common concerns 
across all low-income countries.
There are often great inefficiencies in how governments 
allocate and manage their health wage bill52. Many countries 
do not fully utilize the health wage bill due largely to capacity 
constraints within the government, and to complicated 
processes of recruitment involving several governmental 
departments and levels of administration, which can be 
plagued by delays. For functions over which the Ministry of 
Health has a high degree of autonomy, limited capacity and 
the fact that policies are simply not followed are important 
factors limiting the strategic use of wage bill resources.
Retention is challenged by both internal and international 
migration, especially from public to private employment 
within countries, and from poorer to richer countries. 
Performance encompasses aspects such as availability 
for work, competence, responsiveness and productivity. 
Low remuneration, poor working conditions and lack 
of supportive supervision all contribute to suboptimal 
performance by the workforce. 
Managers are a grossly neglected cadre of the health 
workforce, with few countries paying much attention to the 
need for professionally trained managers at all levels of the 
health system, from the district level upwards. 
Finally, there is commonly weak leadership of the health 
workforce and lack of opportunities for its development at all 
levels, i.e. the community, clinical, public health and policy-
making levels.
3.2.3 Drugs and other essential supplies
Drugs, as recognized in the MDG targets, are a critical 
element of health services. They also provide a mirror to the 
functioning of a health system, reflecting many of the critical 
weaknesses. Drugs and other supplies are usually widely 
available for sale, but often through unregulated outlets or 
even open marketplaces, and at substantial price markups. 
A study in three districts in Tanzania found, for example, 
that none of the drug stores had staff with the required 
minimum of four years’ health-related training; the stocking 
of drugs that should not have been on sale in such a shop 
was common; unregistered, imported antimalarials were 
found in the majority of shops; and all shops sold tablets 
loose, not in the necessary unit packs53. In the same areas, 
although there was little difference between the different 
socioeconomic groups’ likelihood of seeking some form of 
care for fever, the poor were significantly less likely to receive 
an antimalarial54. In general, the poor are more likely to 
purchase drugs from the informal sector, while richer groups 
can afford to purchase them from the formal sector. 
Drug quality, both poor quality and fake drugs, is also a 
widespread problem55. Of samples from 35 pharmacies in 
Nigeria, 48% were of poor quality56. In mainland South-East 
Asia it has been reported that 38-52% of artesunate blister 
packs contained no artesunate and that there were at least 
12 different types of fake artesunate57. 
Despite several decades of efforts to ensure the regular 
provision of drugs and other supplies in government health 
facilities, stock outs are still common, and government 
supply systems frequently function poorly. As a result, 
externally funded programmes often institute their own 
purchasing and distribution systems; while these provide an 
immediate solution specific to the programme, they cause 
major difficulties in standardization and management for the 
system as a whole, as well as ignoring the long-term issue 
of reform. In many cases they do not address underlying 
capacity constraints on ministries’ and the private sector’s 
ability to forecast, plan, manage and distribute within the 
context of a national system for drugs and supplies.
Pricing is yet another problem, for private and government 
sectors alike. Mark-ups are often high in the private 
sector, because of both complex, lengthy distribution 
chains and lack of competition. In the areas in Tanzania 
referred to above, the market for antimalarials was strongly 
geographically segmented and highly concentrated, with 
prices varying even for the same drug58. Drug prices can 
increase substantially when a currency is devalued because 
of the dependency on imported finished products or raw 
materials, for which foreign currency must be paid. This 
happened in Indonesia in the late 1990s59.
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3.2.4 Health information and evidence
Health information and evidence are critical underpinnings 
for virtually all aspects of public health. They support policy-
making, planning, programming and accountability, and 
are particularly important for decision-making in resource-
constrained contexts. Sound information systems also 
form the foundations for effective disease surveillance and 
response. Health information must to be readily available, 
timely and accurate, and analysts and decision-makers in a 
country need the skills to analyse and interpret health data. 
The reliability of health information systems is particularly 
important in the current context of growing levels of 
development assistance for health and a stronger focus on 
tracking performance and measuring results. In addition to 
sound local health data, decision-makers need to be able to 
draw upon relevant and timely research evidence, whether 
from international literature or locally commissioned studies.
The policy paper for the G8 Toyako follow-up identifies a 
number of problems that limit the availability, timeliness 
and quality of evidence for decision-making22. First, the 
quantity and quality of data for monitoring progress and 
assessing health systems is poor and has had not received 
priority in investment decisions. Second, responses to data 
scarcity have led to a proliferation of indicators, inconsistent 
frameworks and fragmented activities. Third, work is 
duplicated across agencies, which compete to fill the same 
gaps rather than coordinating their efforts. Fourth, progress is 
slow towards making data openly accessible. Fifth, political 
factors and relationships influence the collection, reporting 
and use of data and contribute to poor data quality. Finally, 
many countries lack both the incentives and capacity to 
collect, share, analyse and interpret good quality data. 
Additional constraints, noted elsewhere, include the lack of 
standardization across countries in definitions, data sources 
and methods for many essential health indicators, and the 
fact that health information systems rarely capture data from 
private sector providers although they may be a primary 
source of care in many countries60. Data capture and use is 
still seen as a cost rather than as an essential investment to 
enable effective and efficient decision-making. Fragmented 
health information systems and excessive reporting 
requirements can add to the overload of already over-worked 
health staff.
With respect to evidence and research, while there have 
been repeated calls for investment in operational research, 
such as the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health’s 
recommendation that 5% of country programme funding 
go to operational research61, nowhere near this level of 
investment actually takes place. Both the lack of incentives 
to invest in evaluations, and bureaucratic and political 
barriers to doing so, undermine the evidence base on the 
effectiveness of health policies and programmes62. 
Further, funding for in-country research is often dominated 
by external funding agencies only weakly coordinated 
by government, if at all, and thus there is likely to be a 
mismatch between evidence needs and the research projects 
actually funded. 
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3.3 Dealing with constraints
The list of constraints in this section is a familiar one, 
which both disease-specific and broader health systems 
initiatives have sought to address. However, as in the case 
of drug purchasing and distribution, a solution that resolves 
the problem for a disease-specific programme may be 
suboptimal for the system as a whole. Table 4 contrasts 
disease-specific and health system remedies for common 
constraints.  
Clearly, a multiplication of disease-specific remedies would 
lead to fragmented initiatives that risk skewing the overall 
system, whereas a systems response promises greater 
efficiency by making improvements to a number of areas at 
the same time. However, some donors have taken the view 
that returns have been poor from investment in broad system 
strengthening in low capacity settings, and that investment 
in disease-focused initiatives is likely to be more effective, 
with quicker returns, than for systems strengthening where a 
long time horizon is required. The following section reviews 
the state of knowledge on selected policies and approaches 
that might strengthen the overall health system and make 
effective use of additional health systems funding.
Table 4: Dealing with constraints
Constraint Disease-specific remedy Health system remedy
Financial inaccessibility Allowing exemptions from or reducing prices for treatment of 
focal diseases
Developing risk-pooling strategies
Physical inaccessibility Providing outreach for treatment of focal diseases Building local primary care clinics
Inappropriately skilled staff Organizing in-service training workshops to develop skills in 
treatment of focal diseases
Ensuring that basic medical and nursing curricula include 
skills needed on priority topics 
Poorly motivated staff Offering financial incentives for the delivery of particular 
priority services
 Instituting performance review systems, creating greater 
clarity about roles and expectations, reviewing salary structures, 
promotion and incentives 
Weak planning and management Providing ongoing education and training workshops to 
develop planning and management skills
Restructuring ministries of health, recruiting and developing 
a cadre of dedicated managers
Lack of information Introducing a special data collection system Improving the overall information system
Lack of intersectoral action and 
partnership
Creating disease-focused, cross-sectoral committees and 
taskforces at the national level
Building systems of local government that incorporate 
the various sectors; promoting accountability of local 
governance structures to the people
Poor quality care among private-
sector providers
Offering training for private-sector providers Developing accreditation and regulation systems
Source: adapted from 63
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Money alone will not suffice to help countries reach the 
health MDGs; better policies and institutional change are 
needed to improve efficiency and productivity, as well 
as approaches which ensure that the poor benefit from 
additional funding. Given the scope of the health system, 
there are many different ways to strengthen its various 
elements and address the above constraints. However, 
especially in low-income countries, as identified in Box 2, 
the evidence base on the effects of different approaches is 
limited64. 
The conceptual framework employed by a comprehensive 
database of management- and policy-relevant systematic 
reviews* is applied here to structure the discussion, and the 
database, as well as other sources, has been searched for 
relevant reviews†. The presentation is structured around the 
three main functions of governance, financing, and delivery 
(including non-financial resource generation, such as 
training). Strengthened governance addresses the constraints 
identified earlier at higher levels of the health-care system, 
especially those at the policy and strategic management 
and cross-sectoral levels. Strengthened financing addresses 
constraints at all levels and strengthened delivery addresses 
constraints at the delivery level. 
Within these overall headings, subjects have been chosen for 
review on the grounds that:
•	 	empirical	evidence	suggests	that	they	are	key	elements	
of health system strengthening (e.g. strengthening the 
stewardship role of a Ministry of Health); 
•	 	they	are	being	suggested	as	key	elements	of	a	systems	
strengthening agenda (e.g. results-based financing).
Given the limited evidence, the text below seeks to highlight 
for each policy/approach:
•	 	whether	there	is	consensus	on	solutions;	
•	 	whether	there	is	controversy;
•	 	whether	no	promising	solutions	are	available	and	
therefore more evidence generation is required.
However, it should be kept in mind that while broad 
approaches can be discussed, they must be adapted to the 
specific contexts of different country settings if they are to 
have a chance of working well. 
4.1 Governance
Governance of the health system is a function in and of 
itself, and it also incorporates governance in relation to 
financing and delivery. In this sense good governance is a 
fundamental prerequisite for all parts of the health system 
to work well. Indeed, countries with higher quality policies 
and institutions have been shown to be more effective in 
achieving health impact from government health spending, 
for example lower maternal mortality rates65. Governance 
includes setting the strategic direction of the health system, 
designing how the system is managed, arranging for user 
and other stakeholder involvement, ensuring accountability 
and transparency, implementing regulatory arrangements, 
and gathering intelligence and information (Box 3). Despite 
its importance, this is one of the least researched areas of 
health systems, but some countries have taken successful 
steps to improve health system governance. 
Leadership and strategic direction are important for any 
health system, but especially for low-income countries 
since clearly expressed and maintained country priorities 
are needed to ensure that external assistance can follow the 
principles affirmed in the Paris Declaration of alignment with 
country strategies. Country leaders must be supported and 
nurtured so they can develop and maintain both leadership 
skills and technical abilities. 
A coherent policy framework is required to provide the basis 
for mobilizing all public and private players within the health 
system. A technically sound country strategy, including a 
clear financing strategy, provides the focus for coordinating 
external and internal resources towards common goals. In 
4.  How to strengthen the overall health system 
and its various elements
Box 3: The scope of governance arrangements
•  Providing leadership and strategic direction, including priority 
setting, and coordinating and aligning all health-related actors
•  System design including balance between centralization and 
decentralization, public and private
•  Intersectoral advocacy to mobilize the various tools of public 
policy to support health
•  Mechanisms for promoting accountability, transparency and 
user involvement
•  Regulation of health-related activities to protect the health of 
the public, including regulation and accreditation of health 
services, pharmaceutical products, food, the environment, etc.
•  Systems for intelligence and information gathering and analysis
* The database includes reviews that employed systematic search methods of multiple literature databases; at 22/01/09, 30% were reviews of health effects that 
met Cochrane standards of evidence; in total 80% were reviews of effects; the remainder addressed questions other than effects. 
† http://www.researchtopolicy.ca/Search/Reviews.aspx, accessed 16/04/09.
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Ethiopia, for example, the health compact on scaling up for 
reaching the health MDGs outlines specific commitments and 
obligations on the part of both government and development 
partners, including targets for the minimum level of total 
aid for health, and future practice for managing external 
assistance including increasing use of government systems 
to procure, disburse, implement, report, monitor, account 
and audit3. 
In Tanzania, the health SWAp (Sector Wide Approach) 
introduced in 1999 has supported a government-led 
health sector development programme to improve access 
to and delivery and quality of health services. An external 
evaluation found that it has delivered improvements, 
including reductions in infant and child mortality, greater 
drug provision and improved services3. In India, the National 
Rural Health Mission represents a step-change in political 
commitment to health and to improving the health status of 
the rural population, and has recently been supplemented 
by a Ministry of Labour initiative to roll out a nationwide 
hospitalization insurance scheme for poor families (Box 4).
System design is crucial. It encompasses organizational 
arrangements, the relative roles of the public and private 
sectors and of different financing sources (considered in 
subsequent sections) and ensuring government capacity 
to fulfil its governance function. Regardless of whether a 
government takes all responsibility for public-service provision, 
or contracts out service provision to others, governance, 
managerial leadership and capacity are needed in the 
public sector. Indeed, managing arms-length relationships, 
as required in contracting and regulation, may be more 
demanding of capacity than managing direct service 
provision71. Yet, as identified earlier, managerial capacity is a 
major constraint in low-income country health systems. 
While there is consensus that there is a problem, evidence 
on what works is limited. Since the mid- to late-1990s 
substantial resources have been devoted to reforming 
the core functions of the state, including those needed for 
improved health-sector performance, such as the civil service 
and public financial management. OECD data indicate that 
more than $4 billion was spent in 2005 on “improving 
government administration”, but there is a general 
perception in the development community that public-sector 
reforms have generally fallen short of expectations72. The 
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) report on public-sector 
reform found that performance usually improved for financial 
management, tax administration and transparency, but not 
for the civil service, and that reform projects tended to be less 
successful in low- than in middle-income countries73. 
Many health reform projects have sought to put in place 
structural reforms to decentralize management, separate 
purchasers from providers, stimulate competition (often 
on both demand and supply sides) and increase provider 
autonomy. Evidence about their success is very mixed, with 
reforms often not fully implemented, reversed (as in the case 
of the national and district boards of health in Zambia) or 
having damaging side effects (for example reduced access 
for the poor resulting from increased hospital autonomy)74. 
Attempts to move health workers from civil service to local 
authority or health authority employment contracts have 
only rarely succeeded74. The recent IEG evaluation of 
health-related World Bank projects has argued that reform 
designs need to be better related to the local country context, 
preceded by adequate diagnosis of problems and of issues 
of political economy, and that blueprint reform designs 
should be avoided75. 
It has also been argued that complex managerial reforms 
are ill-suited to the low capacity settings of low-income 
countries71 and that new approaches are needed. 
These should start from specific country settings, and 
analyse the context for change in relation to the content 
Box 4: The National Rural Health Mission in India
The National Rural Health Mission of India, launched in 
2005, provides a striking example of the highest level political 
commitment to increasing domestic resources for health and 
redressing rural and urban inequalities. The NRHM seeks to 
provide effective health care to rural populations throughout 
the country with a special focus on 18 states with weak health 
outcomes and infrastructure66-68. A central element of the 
initiative is the declaration of the Government’s commitment to 
increase public spending on health from 0.9% to 2-3% of GDP 
over the next five years, and to introduce reforms to ensure the 
additional funding is effectively used66. About $2 billion was 
budgeted to be spent in 2008.
The key components being funded include: integrated district 
health planning; partnership with NGOs; flexible funds for 
state and local governments; strengthening of public health 
infrastructure; and the appointment of an Accredited Social 
Health Activist (ASHA) in each village to act as a link between 
the health centres and the villagers67. Some 250,000 women 
volunteers are being training as ASHAs to advise village 
populations about sanitation, hygiene, contraception and 
immunization; to provide primary medical care for diarrhoea, 
minor injuries and fevers; and to escort patients to medical 
centres. They are also expected to deliver directly observed 
short-course therapy for tuberculosis, as well as oral rehydration, 
folic acid and chloroquine, and to alert authorities to unusual 
outbreaks68,69. 
The success of the NRHM is likely to depend largely on the 
development of state and local institutional capacity, including 
strong partnerships with civil society organizations and private-
sector actors70.
In a parallel government initiative, the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima 
Yojana (RSBY) has been launched by the Ministry of Labour and 
Employment to provide health insurance coverage for families 
living below the poverty line and to provide protection from 
financial liabilities arising out of health shocks that involve 
hospitalization. Beneficiaries are entitled to hospitalization 
coverage up to Rs. 30,000 for most of the diseases that require 
hospitalization, and pay Rs 30 registration fee, the cost of the 
premium being borne by state and federal governments*.
* http://www.rsby.in/about_rsby.html, accessed 17 May 2009.
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of an intervention76. For example, the introduction of a 
performance management system might be assessed 
in terms of the characteristics of the context into which it 
would be introduced, how it might be made relevant to that 
context, and whether there are ways in which the context 
can be changed to make success more likely. A recent 
comparison of governance reforms in Brazil, India and 
Uganda found that successful reforms require a combination 
of political commitment, technical capacity and gradual 
implementation77. Lessons for donors were that governance 
reform is best promoted through incremental, small-scale 
and flexible responses to domestically driven reform 
agendas, rather than by complex structural reforms.
The issue of technical assistance requires specific 
consideration. Technical assistance ought to be a means to 
address problems of leadership and managerial capacity, 
and to build long-term, sustainable capacity. Its magnitude 
(42% of all health ODA from 2002-20063) suggests that it 
should provide important support to the functioning of health 
systems. However, the high level of fragmentation in health 
aid, with much technical assistance associated with project 
aid and HIV support (in 2006 the latter almost equalled 
technical assistance funding for all other health areas) 
suggests that much technical assistance is not used to 
build up core capacity. This represents enormous scope for 
efficiency gains if greater emphasis were placed on south-
south collaboration and strengthening regional institutions. 
There are some positive experiences of donor coordination in 
pooling technical assistance funds for capacity development, 
as in Bangladesh where Dutch technical assistance is 
usually pooled with Asian Development Bank funds and 
increasingly uses local expertise78. 
Intersectoral advocacy is vital to address the intersectoral 
determinants of health, and this demands effective leadership 
from the health sector. National Aids Commissions (NAC) 
chaired by a country’s president or leader provide a 
frequently successful example of multisectoral coordination, 
and demonstrate how health concerns can be positioned at 
the very heart of government. A recent evaluation of NACs 
in sub-Saharan Africa indicates that, to varying degrees, 
they have been able to catalyse and spearhead strong 
leadership and advocacy in support of national AIDS policy 
and action frameworks, and to provide effective multisectoral 
coordination, especially among non-governmental actors 
and development partners. However, most NACs still require 
greater power and incentive structures to hold line ministries 
accountable, a key requirement for coordinating and 
mainstreaming HIV-related activities across the  
public sector79.
Accountability mechanisms are very important for effective 
health system functioning. Mechanisms for user and citizen 
involvement at all levels, from village health committees, 
hospital boards, civil society groups and citizen charters, to 
parliaments, help to improve services, hold the health system 
accountable and transparent, and reduce corruption. For 
example, a participatory intervention with mothers’ groups 
in Nepal increased the uptake of care and was associated 
with reduced maternal mortality80; the introduction of 
community-based monitoring of public primary health-
care providers in nine districts in Uganda resulted in large 
increases in utilization and improved health outcomes81; 
structures for community involvement in Burkina Faso 
increased the coverage of primary care services74; and NGOs 
have played an important role in holding governments to 
account for scaling up treatment for HIV. Encouraging user 
and citizen involvement is especially important where states 
are weak, and “voice” mechanisms for accountability need 
to compensate for weak accountability of lower-level staff to 
their superiors and weak accountability of the government 
to the public at large. Accountability mechanisms are also 
important to hold officials accountable for how they spend 
their budgets. In Rwanda, for example, districts in effect 
compete to demonstrate how well they are using their funds.
Regulation of health providers is a critical area for action 
since, among other things, it offers ways to improve the 
effectiveness of the large volume of expenditure on services 
purchased from the private sector. A systematic review has 
shown that regulation can improve the quality of pharmacy 
services82. For example, a ban on a dangerous drug in 
Nepal resulted in its complete removal from retail outlets, 
and a regulatory intervention in the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic to improve the supervision of pharmacies, apply 
sanctions and provide information led to improved process 
quality, such as the availability of essential materials for 
dispensing and the provision of information to clients83. 
Management information systems need reform and 
strengthening, especially for finance and personnel. 
Sufficient levels of public financial management capacity 
are critical for the efficient, effective and accountable use 
of resources. Moreover, specific budgeting, control and 
reporting competencies may well be a precondition for the 
sustainable strengthening of public health systems. Health 
information systems are important, not only to manage 
the health system, but also to make information available 
to the general public and other government sectors. The 
widely quoted example of the Tanzanian Health Interventions 
Project, later rolled out by the government across the country, 
demonstrates how better information, combined with a 
decentralized planning and management system, enabled 
district managers to improve the prioritization of resource 
use, putting the districts on target to achieve MDG 474.
4.2 Financing
The financing function comprises the crucial steps of 
raising money, pooling risk across individuals, and 
purchasing services (Box 5). In addition, whatever financing 
arrangements they select, governments must also allocate 
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adequate finances to support a national health systems 
institutional framework which includes health system 
management education and training, health policy and 
systems research, food and drug safety, regulation for 
public and private sectors, laboratory networks, information 
systems, collection of national health accounts, and so forth. 
A financial strategy needs to be part of the national health 
strategy, and external assistance and domestic financing 
should be considered together. 
4.2.1 Strengthening domestic financing and risk 
pooling
The overall principles of health financing are widely 
accepted. While the evidence base is stronger than that for 
governance arrangements, it is still quite limited, especially 
with respect to certain specific elements*. A “good” system of 
domestic financing is one that raises sufficient revenue and 
provides universal financial protection against the costs of 
illness. In addition, financing sources should raise revenue 
efficiently (i.e. with low administrative costs) and should 
minimize adverse micro- and macroeconomic consequences 
(such as excessive increases in the cost of labour or goods). 
Equity principles would generally require that household 
contributions be in relation to ability to pay, with the poor 
paying less and the rich more. Out-of-pocket payment would 
be regarded as the least desirable form of revenue raising, 
except at a token level or for discretionary service elements 
(e.g. a hospital bed in a private ward). 
These principles stand in sharp contrast to the current pattern 
of health financing in low-income countries where, as noted 
earlier, out-of-pocket payments are a significant source of 
funding. The debate on financing sources arises in relation to 
three issues: (i) whether, in a second-best situation, retaining 
user fees in public services as a source of revenue is better 
than removing them; (ii) whether financial risk protection 
(also called social health protection) is better achieved by 
general taxation or through social health insurance; and 
(iii) whether either community-based or private voluntary 
insurance schemes have a role to play in a national 
financing mix, in either the short to medium term or in the 
longer term.
Out-of-pocket payments 
Evidence on the adverse consequences of user fees is 
strong. These arguments apply not only to government 
health services, but also to private not-for-profit services  
such as those of faith-based providers, which in many 
African countries essentially form part of the public network. 
A recent systematic review84 concluded that:
  The reduction or removal of fees at point of use appears 
to increase utilization, while the level of evidence is 
weak for the effects on poorer groups. Some study 
findings suggest that if fees are introduced and quality of 
care improved simultaneously, this can improve access 
and utilization for poorer groups. However, consistent 
evidence shows that introducing or increasing user fees 
has detrimental effects on levels of health service uptake. 
Exemption polices are seldom well managed enough to 
mitigate such negative impacts.
The controversy therefore does not concern the effect of user 
fees, but rather how they can be effectively removed, given 
that health facilities often depend on user fees to help cover 
recurrent expenditure. An analysis of country experiences 
suggests that five strategies need to be in place in order for 
fee removal to lead to strengthened health service delivery 
(Box 6)85.
Box 5: The scope of financial arrangements 
•  Raising money - raising revenue for the health system (such as 
through tax, community-based insurance schemes, user fees)
•  Pooling risk - the accumulation and management of revenue so 
that the risk of paying for health care is borne by all members 
of the pool 
•  Purchasing services - how funds are allocated to lower levels 
of the health system, how health providers are paid for the 
services they provide (e.g. global budgets, capitation, fee-for-
service, specific incentive payments)
•  Financing the institutional framework of the health system. 
* http://www.researchtopolicy.ca/Search/Reviews.aspx, accessed 16/04/09.
Box 6: Strategies to ensure fee removal improves health 
services
1.  Give a specific government unit the task of coordinating  
fee removal and the other actions necessary to strengthen the 
health system.
2.  Communicate clearly with health workers and managers about  
the policy’s vision and goals, as well as about what actions will 
be taken, and when.
3.  Establish new funds at local level, controlled by managers, to 
allow them to make small-scale spending decisions.
4.  Before the policy change, start a wide-ranging public 
information campaign to communicate to the general public 
both the policy’s vision and goals and what users can expect 
to experience at facilities.
5.  Plan for adequate drugs and staff to be available to cope 
with increased utilization, and plan how to tackle wider drug 
provision and staffing problems in the longer term.
6.  Improve physical access to health services.
7.  Establish monitoring systems that cover utilization trends, 
including the relative use of preventive versus curative care, 
and give health workers and managers opportunities to 
contribute feedback on health facility experiences.
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General taxation and social insurance
Much of the debate concerning general tax and social 
health insurance relates to the two issues of pooling and 
channeling funds to providers. Traditionally, a national health 
service (general tax funding, public provision of services) 
has been contrasted with a social insurance system (payroll 
taxes, contractual model of service provision). However, 
either general taxation or social health insurance can 
be associated with a contract model, as recent country 
experiences demonstrate. What is important is that the way 
of raising revenue is evaluated in terms of standard public 
finance criteria. In these terms, efficient performance of 
revenue collection systems is a major problem for low-
income country tax authorities and social insurance agencies 
alike, although some forms of tax are less difficult to collect 
than others. 
Enrolment in social health insurance schemes can fall well 
below the size of the target population, and in addition 
non-payment can be a major problem86, although in 
some countries, such as the Philippines and Tanzania, 
schemes are beginning to reach out to informal sector 
workers through group insurance. Casualization of the 
workforce, and unemployment resulting from economic 
slumps can both threaten coverage for some in the formal 
labour market. It can be argued that public care free at the 
point of use and funded by general tax revenues is a less 
costly and less managerially intensive way of collecting 
and spending money for the provision of health care than 
insurance arrangements, since the former avoids the 
need for enrolment, premium collection, eligibility checks 
at facilities and monitoring compliance with insurance 
regulations. Moreover, social insurance contributions can 
only realistically be collected from those in the formal sector, 
a small minority of the workforce in low-income countries, 
and they increase the cost of labour in the formal sector. 
However, political acceptability is also a key consideration, 
as well as potentially greater efficiency and quality of service 
provision resulting from the often greater autonomy enjoyed 
by social insurance agencies. This probably explains why 
many middle-income countries who recently achieved 
universal coverage did so using social health insurance 
as a core strategy87. But given the nature of employment 
in low-income countries, social insurance contributions 
would be paid by only a small minority of the population, 
so substantial funding from general tax revenues, other 
earmarked taxes or external assistance would be required 
to provide financial protection for those outside the formal 
sector. Ultimately, the question of the relative importance of 
general taxation and social health insurance is a matter for 
each individual country and their domestic constituencies; 
most countries employ a financing mix. The most critical 
issues are to pool risks as far as possible and to ensure fair 
financing.
Funding the health system through some form of compulsory 
tax, and aggregating small risk pools of community or 
private insurance into larger ones, are generally regarded as 
preferred end-points88. However, voluntary contributions to 
an insurance scheme can be argued to represent a way of 
improving financial protection in the short to medium term, 
as well as potentially facilitating longer-term progress to 
universal insurance-based coverage.
Community-based health insurance
Several reviews of community-based health insurance 
(CBHI) schemes are available89-92 and present evidence 
of how they affect financial protection, utilization of care, 
health service quality, total funding and equity, as well as 
empowerment and institutional development. There are 
some examples of well-functioning schemes, but also many 
examples of schemes which appear to have made little 
difference to financial protection or access to good quality 
health care, for a variety of reasons.
•	 	In	many	resource-poor	settings,	contributions	can	have	
only a limited impact on the direct cost of health care so, 
without external support, schemes struggle to survive or 
be effective. 
•	 	Schemes	are	generally	small	(70%	of	schemes	covered	
by an International Labour Organization (ILO) review 
had 2000 members or fewer92) so their contribution 
towards overall health systems goals is limited. 
•	 	Schemes	usually	have	difficulty	enrolling	the	poorest.	
•	 	Direct	costs	of	care	are	only	part	of	the	total	cost	of	
health care, and only one of the barriers to use of 
services.
•	 	From	a	systems	perspective,	such	schemes	may	result	
in poorer groups contributing to their health-care costs 
to a greater extent than richer groups who are able to 
access public services, and thus may be inequitable 
with respect to payment.
It is difficult to draw firm general conclusions from the studies 
because they lack common definitions of CBHI, evaluate 
different objectives, and often lack methodological rigour (the 
ILO review of 127 studies of CBHI schemes found that only 
one of these studies had internal validity).
Recent experiences in Rwanda and Ghana suggest that 
more organized forms of voluntary non-profit insurance, 
particularly those where external assistance is channeled 
to pay the premium for the poorest, should be regarded in 
a more positive light. In Rwanda, schemes are organized 
at the community level with pooling at district and central 
levels; members contribute the equivalent of $2 a year and a 
10% copayment. Membership by the very poor is subsidized 
by external funds. By 2008, 85% of the population was 
reported to be enrolled93, although the premium is relatively 
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expensive for the rural poor and yet is still insufficient to fund 
comprehensive health care94. 
In Ghana, a national health insurance scheme has been 
introduced, encompassing a scheme for the formal sector 
and a network of district-based mutual health organizations 
to encompass the informal sector95. By the end of 2006, 
enrolment was 37.6% of the total population; more than 
60% of the membership was made up of those exempt from 
payment of the premium (children, the elderly, the indigent 
(2%), and those making social security contributions 
(10%)). A 2.5% levy on VAT finances the scheme, in 
addition to payroll and voluntary contributions. The scheme 
is intended to form the basis for the long-term financing of 
the Ghanaian health system, and will take many years to 
establish fully, so judgments on performance at this time are 
premature. 
The distinguishing characteristic of these two experiences 
is that, while they rely on community contributions and 
management, this occurs within a clearly defined and 
government-supported policy framework. This goes a long 
way to explaining the relative success and rapid expansion 
of the schemes.
Private health insurance
Private health insurance is distinguished from CBHI in that it 
is not managed by a social institution, such as a community 
or cooperative. The commercial private health insurance 
market in low-income countries is extremely small, limited by 
the size and wealth of the formal sector and the complexity 
of the products on offer. Some experiments are beginning to 
extend the private insurance market among lower-income 
employed or self-employed, through microfinance banks or 
schemes such as the donor-subsidized Hygeia Community 
Health Plan in Nigeria. Like CBHI, such schemes usually 
have small risk pools and are voluntary, leaving them 
vulnerable to adverse selection and low coverage rates. 
Effective purchasing arrangements are vital if enrolees 
are not to be exposed to greater costs when financial 
coverage ceilings are limited. In China there is evidence 
that those insured are more rather than less exposed to 
catastrophic payments, given the supply-side incentives for 
over-treatment96. The policy paper on financing for the G8 
Toyako follow-up concludes that neither CBHI nor private 
insurance are viable pathways for social risk protection22, 
although they may offer some limited risk pooling for specific 
population groups. 
It has been argued that if private insurance can protect 
higher-income groups then public funding can be devoted 
to lower-income groups, but there is little good evidence yet 
to support this argument, and it could establish the risk pool 
segmentation seen in South Africa, where there is very little 
cross-subsidy between richer and poorer groups97. 
Some voices are now calling for at least some of the 
externally financed subsidies to the supply side (channeled 
through government or NGOs) to be diverted to funding 
households to purchase insurance and use services (public 
or private) of their choosing, within a designated network98. 
The Rwanda and Hygeia schemes mentioned above are 
examples of this approach, but there is currently insufficient 
evidence to support firm recommendations in this area, and 
no analysis of the relative returns to investment in demand-
side financing versus supply-side financing. 
4.2.2 Purchasing and results-based financing
Pooled funds allow purchasers of health-care services (e.g. 
governments, insurance agencies) to implement their priorities 
through financial allocations and to put in place incentives to 
encourage the efficient, equitable and responsive provision 
of care. Incentives may be transmitted through resource 
allocation processes in hierarchical management structures, 
or through more market-type approaches, such as contractual 
agreements. Purchasing principles can be applied both 
within the public sector (e.g. between a local health authority 
and providers) and to contracts with non-state providers. 
Purchasing in theory enables the purchaser to focus funding 
on a cost-effective package of services. However, in practice, 
governments with very restricted health budgets have found 
it difficult to maintain restrictions on the share of funding 
going to higher-level hospitals over many years. Zambia, 
for example, managed to restrain the share of government 
health expenditure going to higher-level hospitals for a few 
years, but eventually cost pressures within these hospitals, 
pressures from the health professions and public complaints 
of poor service quality forced expenditure increases99. Shifts 
in expenditure patterns may be easier to achieve within 
growing budgets; for example in recent years and with the 
help of budget support and sector funding, both Uganda 
and Tanzania have managed to increase the share of their 
government budget going to the district level (Uganda 32% to 
54%, Tanzania 50% to 60%)100. 
Ensuring that funding increases flow to priority services is 
important, but it is also important to ensure that increased 
funding is translated into efficient service provision and 
health impact. Results-based financing (RBF) has recently 
attracted considerable attention as a potentially effective way 
of implementing agreed priorities through purchasing services, 
stimulating demand, and encouraging improved health 
worker productivity and service quality. It can also be used, as 
discussed later, to influence health worker distribution, and to 
make use of resources in the private sector. 
RBF is defined as the transfer of money or material goods 
conditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a 
predetermined performance target101,102 and can operate 
on either the demand or the supply side of health systems. 
Incentives can be targeted at: (i) recipients of health care 
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(e.g. through vouchers or cash payments linked to use 
of services); (ii) individual providers of health care (see 
also next section); (iii) health-care facilities; (iv) private 
sector organizations; and (v) governments or public sector 
organizations. On the supply side, payments can be in the 
form of block grants, capitation payments, payment for 
specific services such as delivery, or combinations of these, 
in all cases with agreed performance levels.
Reliable evidence on the effectiveness of RBF in low-income 
countries is still sparse and there is almost no evidence of the 
cost-effectiveness of RBF relative to other ways of improving 
performance102. The use of RBF has commonly been as 
part of a package of health interventions, making it difficult 
to isolate the effects of RBF from other components of the 
intervention. Systematic reviews suggest that, with some 
exceptions, financial incentives targeting recipients of health 
care and individual health-care professionals appear to be 
effective in influencing provider and patient behaviours and 
increasing the uptake of health-care services102,103. 
Latin American experiences in conditional cash transfers 
(CCT) show considerable promise for improving the uptake 
of effective interventions and services for poor populations 
in middle-income countries84,104,105. Evaluations suggest 
that RBF has contributed to improvements in: the number 
of mothers delivering at accredited institutions in India, 
NGOs delivering basic health care in Haiti, and tuberculosis 
detection and cure rates in low- and middle-income 
countries. At the national government level, however, the 
mechanisms through which financial incentives can improve 
performance are less clear106.
RBF schemes can create undesirable responses, including 
motivating unintended behaviours, distortions, gaming, 
corruption, cherry-picking and demoralization102-104. RBF 
design therefore needs to be based on an understanding of 
underlying problems in order to motivate the desired behaviours. 
A number of reviews identify the importance of considering 
the context in which RBF schemes are introduced84,104,105. 
For instance, the approach of CCT seems relevant primarily 
in settings where there are accessible and functional primary 
health care systems; where this is not the case, concomitant 
strengthening of the supply side is necessary. 
RBF schemes can also create unintended outcomes. For 
example, preliminary evidence from Nepal indicates that less 
poor women benefited much more than poor women from 
the demand- and supply-side subsidies in the Safe Delivery 
Incentive Programme because of the various barriers to 
accessing care107. Similarly, while a recent evaluation of fee 
exemption for delivery care in Ghana found that the incidence 
of catastrophic out-of-pocket payments for the poorest quintile 
fell from 55% to 46% of households paying more than 2.5% 
of their income, the proportionate decrease in out-of-pocket 
payments was greater for the richest households (22%) as 
compared with the poorest (13%)108. 
A key need is for better evidence from rigorous evaluation of 
both pilot and larger-scale arrangements on the effectiveness 
of RBF in low-income settings, including its cost-effectiveness 
relative to other approaches, and the conditions that need to 
be in place for schemes to function effectively, such as the 
independent verification of levels of services provided, and 
effective arrangements for quality assurance of services.
4.2.3 Paying the public sector health workforce
A large proportion of the trained health workforce in 
developing countries is formally employed in the public 
sector (although often also engaged in private practice of 
some sort) and paid from the government’s overall wages 
budget. To redress the major inefficiencies in public-sector 
management of the health workforce, lines of accountability 
need to be strengthened, the information base improved, and 
capacity within the ministries of health developed to bring 
human resources management practices closer into line with 
stated policies. Unfortunately, this is an area where ministries 
of health struggle to improve their efficacy. 
One successful example is Kenya’s Emergency Hiring 
Programme, where a computerized, just-in-time system 
with regular staff monitoring reduced the time to fill a post 
by half, compared with routine civil service recruitment52. 
In Indonesia, a Clinical Performance Development 
Management System created clear job descriptions 
outlining responsibilities and accountability, provided 
in-service training consisting primarily of reflective case 
discussions, and introduced a performance monitoring 
system. Participating staff reported that the new system 
had given them greater confidence about their roles and 
responsibilities51.
Where a ministry of health has the necessary flexibility, 
allowances can be used strategically and alternatives or 
additions to salary payment can be offered to strengthen 
incentives for good performance52. Payment mechanisms 
such as performance-based pay have the potential to 
provide stronger incentives to health workers to improve 
performance and efficiency, as indicated above. The balance 
of evidence shows that pay for performance (or supply-side 
RBF), at both the individual and the facility level, can be an 
effective way of improving health workforce performance 
in the public sector109. In Cambodia, for example, a study 
found that performance contracts with individual health 
workers successfully reduced absenteeism and informal 
payments while improving drug provision and operational 
transparency110. Box 7 summarizes the promising 
experience of Rwanda. 
Performance-based pay schemes require careful selection 
of performance indicators, appropriate design of the mix 
of financial and non-financial incentives so that health 
worker behaviour is aligned with the goals of the health 
system, and avoidance of side-effects such as unnecessary 
34
provision of care111. Where performance is expressed as 
quantity-of-service provision, performance-based pay risks 
approximating the fee-for-service payment system, which 
many middle- and high-income countries have abandoned 
due to its stimulus to provide unnecessary care. 
Performance-based pay may lead to neglect of valuable 
services that are difficult to measure or monitor or are 
not included in the payment terms. Many countries in the 
developed world have experimented with performance-based 
pay and it is clear that monitoring capacity, management 
capacity, and a flexible institutional and legal framework are 
important factors for success109. A recent suggestion is that 
a “social contract” granting privileges rather than financial 
incentives in exchange for a commitment to actively maintain 
and enhance the quality of services, may be a viable course 
of action in some settings112. 
4.3 Delivery arrangements 
Delivery is the defining function of a health system: all 
other functions provide back-up for the delivery of services. 
The goal of delivery is to improve health outcomes by the 
provision of services that are accessible, technically effective, 
responsive to users, efficient and equitable. For convenience, 
generating the necessary resource inputs (such as education 
and training of health workers) is also considered in this 
section. Service delivery arrangements need to be laid out 
in the national strategy, and follow from the package of 
guaranteed benefits. They encompass: the types of provider 
needed (e.g. self care, public and private providers), 
integration of services, numerous issues concerning the 
health workforce, quality of care, and ensuring the provision 
of drugs and information systems (Box 8). 
The evidence base on service delivery arrangements in low-
income countries has been improving in recent years, but 
there is a scarcity of research into health delivery in fragile 
states, and how to deliver services effectively within their 
governance and resource constraints28. How best to improve 
health outcomes and the efficiency and effectiveness of 
service delivery in these highly resource-constrained settings 
should be a research priority. 
4.3.1 Service infrastructure
In the words of the Commission on Macroeconomics and 
Health: 
 “ All [priority] interventions can be delivered through 
what we have chosen to call the close-to-client health 
system, by which we mean the outreach services, 
health centres and local hospitals to which the poor  
are most likely to have access13.” 
In other words, most of the service delivery network is 
multifunctional, addressing a number of health needs at the 
same time, and must be available close to people’s homes. 
The efficiency of the delivery system is critical to achieving 
good health outcomes at low cost. Some countries have 
managed to expand coverage while reducing unit costs115; 
this may be possible in countries that have unused service 
delivery capacity due to lack of funding for complementary 
inputs such as drugs. However, often the underfunding of 
service delivery is such that unit costs need to increase, 
especially where services are already used to capacity and 
health worker remuneration needs to be increased in order to 
stimulate improved performance. 
Funding the general infrastructure of service delivery has 
been neglected for a number of years as external assistance 
has focused on priority diseases, and domestic financing 
has prioritized recurrent financing, especially for salaries. 
Implementing the set of guaranteed benefits will require 
extension of the service delivery network through building 
new facilities and renovating existing facilities to ensure, for 
example, satisfactory emergency obstetric services. 
Where the public sector fails to manage the activities of 
capital construction and maintenance well, there may be 
a role for the private sector to be contracted to build and 
Box 7: Performance-based pay in Rwanda
Performance-based pay for health workers in Rwanda, which 
commenced in 2001 with pilots in two districts, has been scaled 
up across the country since 200594. Currently, the scheme covers 
23 of 30 Rwandan districts, with the seven excluded districts 
being considered as controls113. This initiative links measurable 
indicators with financial incentives for health workers who are 
paid according to their actual performance, rather than with fixed 
bonuses. The scheme aims to increase staff motivation and help 
staff retention through performance-based pay, and to increase 
the quantity and quality of health services provided, for both 
primary health care and HIV-related treatment.  
A technologically advanced health surveillance system is 
essential for the implementation of the scheme; the system, 
which is supported by PEPFAR, involves computerization of 
health centres and district hospitals94. Recent evaluation of the 
impact of the performance-based pay scheme in Rwanda has 
highlighted a significant increase in the uptake of institutional 
deliveries and child preventive care, and improvement in  
prenatal care quality114.
Box 8: The scope of delivery arrangements
•  Where services are provided – e.g. in the home, community 
health facilities, hospitals
•  How services are packaged together – integration of care, 
referral systems
•  By whom services are provided – e.g. public and private, skill 
mix of health workers
•  Retention, motivation and distribution of the health workforce
•  Quality improvement
•  Provision of drugs
•  Information and communication technology
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maintain primary-care facilities and local hospitals. Using 
the private sector to manage facilities on behalf of the public 
sector is a further option116, considered below. 
4.3.2 Service integration
Although vertically organized programmes have had some 
major successes117 the fragmentation that they can cause 
has led to considerable interest in service integration. In 
several countries in the eastern WHO European Region, 
vertical programmes appear to have impaired the effective 
management of HIV, tuberculosis, substance abuse and 
mental health118-120. In other settings they have led to 
duplication of services, created high opportunity costs for 
health services and communities, and impaired effective 
resource use121. Evidence suggests that integrating 
approaches to health-service delivery can improve outcomes 
in specific areas including HIV, mental health and certain 
communicable diseases122, as well as maternal and 
neonatal care123. 
For example, the Haitian Study Group on Kaposi’s Sarcoma 
and Opportunistic Infections (GHESIKO) Centre in Port-
au-Prince provides a full range of clinical, sexual and 
reproductive health, malaria, tuberculosis, diarrhoeal disease 
and HIV services, utilizing voluntary counselling and testing 
(VCT) for HIV infections as an entry point. Results from the 
programme show that once sexual and reproductive health 
services were introduced there was a rapid increase in clients 
seeking VCT, including a large number of pregnant women, 
and increased contraception utilization and STI treatment by 
VCT clients124. An expanded community-based distribution 
programme in Zimbabwe was successful in integrating 
HIV and family planning in 16 health districts, resulting in 
improved family planning utilization, expanded condom 
distribution, greater HIV awareness and increases in referrals 
to VCT centres125. 
The lessons of many integration experiences are that 
integrated services are unlikely to be fully achieved unless 
government officials and key stakeholders support the 
approach. Measures are needed to ensure that: existing 
services are not overburdened (in order to maintain gains 
already achieved); staff are sufficiently trained to implement 
the integration; and workloads are appropriately managed 
to allow for staff to take on new responsibilities. It is 
also important to address any potential for stigma and 
discrimination and to create opportunities to implement 
innovative approaches. Initial increased costs, including both 
financial and transaction costs, need to be factored in at the 
beginning of the process. 
The evaluation of the implementation of the Integrated 
Management of Childhood Illness strategy showed how 
integrated approaches can challenge capacity in low-
capacity settings. Four of the five countries studied had 
difficulties in expanding the strategy to national level while 
maintaining adequate quality, and the implications of health 
system weaknesses had not been sufficiently appreciated126. 
Key needs were political commitment, human resources, 
financing, coordinated programme management and 
effective decentralization. 
As emphasized above, improved service delivery depends 
not just on action at the level of service delivery, but also 
on actions at higher levels. The weaker the health system 
the more likely this is to be the case. This argues for careful 
phasing of service integration, with a limited range of 
services being introduced especially at the community level 
in the weakest systems, and gradual expansion as health 
systems strengthen127. Prioritizing the community level can 
be feasible and cost-effective, and can also preferentially 
benefit the poorest128. However, community-based services 
will not function well without arrangements for supportive 
supervision, as discussed below with respect to lay health 
workers.
Since both vertical and integrated approaches have their 
strengths and weaknesses, the appropriate approach needs 
to be selected according to: the health condition being 
addressed, the group or groups being targeted, the health 
system capability, the urgency of service requirement and 
other contextual factors. Vertical programmes may be 
appropriate as a temporary measure if the health system 
(and primary care) is weak or if a rapid response is needed. 
In some contexts they may be the preferred option to gain 
economies of scale, to address the needs of target groups 
that are difficult to reach, or to deliver certain complex 
services when a highly skilled workforce is needed122. But 
they must be deployed in such a way that they support the 
longer-term development of more broadly based services, for 
example by strengthening generic system elements such as 
management skills. Disease-specific funders can do much 
to support a strengthened system. For example, UNAIDS has 
called for 37% of HIV investment to go on health system 
strengthening and cross-cutting activities. However, the 
planning and implementation of such investments must 
be integrated with broader systems planning, as the GAVI 
experience demonstrates36.
4.3.3 Public and private provision
Given the extensive availability of services offered by private 
providers, countries need to consider how best to improve/
extend coverage of priority services through all providers: 
government, not-for-profit (including faith-based providers) 
and for-profit providers. The question is whether the 
involvement with private providers is one of encouraging 
quality improvement, or financing their operations as well. 
In general, evidence suggests that it is not possible to make 
a blanket statement on which type of provider is more 
efficient45. Studies tend to show both government and private 
failures in technical quality, although private providers tend to 
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be perceived as more responsive to client preferences. 
Given that the poor generally use the lowest quality, most 
informal part of the private-sector spectrum (e.g. local 
drug sellers and unlicensed practitioners) approaches that 
improve quality are especially pertinent. A recent review 
found that approaches such as shopkeeper training, drug 
packaging and franchising can work successfully82, 
although experience is incredibly varied and most have 
been tried only on a relatively small scale. Such approaches 
need to be tailored to the type of intervention. For example, 
shopkeeper training is appropriate for drugs that can safely 
be sold over the counter. Where the technology requires 
a trained provider to judge what treatment is appropriate, 
and when, and the service is specific and can be defined 
and standardized, franchising may be appropriate; the 
franchisor provides a package of services to the franchisee, 
which includes not only products and training but also 
ongoing support and supervision and a guarantee of service 
standards129. 
Other than these quality improvement efforts, and with 
the exception of the contracting arrangements reviewed 
below, there is little good evidence one way or the other 
that investing in private-sector delivery will reap health-care 
benefits specifically for the poorest. Possible options that merit 
exploration and testing include private-sector involvement 
in supply-chain management for the public sector, private 
training schools, low-cost clinic chains for the low-income 
employed in urban areas130, and low-cost pharmacy chains 
and diagnostic labs131. Given the current lack of evidence, 
pilot schemes and rigorous evaluation would be the best way 
forward.
Many African governments have historically subsidized 
faith-based providers, with or without a formal contract, and 
such providers make an important contribution to rural health 
services in many African countries. More recently, NGOs 
have been contracted to provide services, often as a rapid 
way of extending service coverage in post-conflict settings 
where public services have collapsed or are very weak, as in 
Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
and South Sudan132-134. The contracts are usually funded by 
a donor in response to a need to extend services quickly. Such 
arrangements can be regarded as part of an RBF approach 
when the contract is explicit on performance and there is a link 
between payment and performance. 
A recent systematic review found evidence that NGOs working 
under contract and managing district services increased 
service delivery in previously underserved areas; a study in 
Cambodia for poorer groups came to a similar conclusion84. 
The option of contracting for-profit providers has been little 
studied, except in South Africa where there is some experience 
with firms willing to be contracted to manage public 
hospitals and clinics. Studies suggest that state capacity to 
manage such contracts, as well as appropriate payment and 
supervisory mechanisms, are very important in influencing 
contract outcomes135-137. Where capacity is weak there is 
greater risk of private companies exploiting the arrangements.
Further study is needed of certain specific issues: the capacity 
of non-state providers to deliver services on a large scale and 
in the long term; the relative merits of introducing contractual 
arrangements where public services already exist; the 
sustainability of such arrangements if they are dependent on 
external funding; and the implications of contracting out what 
might be regarded as core functions of the state. A common 
issue with contracting out service delivery is that when a 
government lacks capacity to provide services effectively 
itself, it also tends to lack capacity to act as an effective 
purchaser of services from others138. In fragile states, the 
creation of independent service authorities has been proposed, 
analogous to a central bank which is part of but independent 
from government, to provide an efficient and transparent 
mechanism to contract for service delivery139,140. This 
approach needs testing and evaluation.
4.3.4 Human resources and training
Although human resources are considered here under delivery, 
action within the governance function is important to ensure: 
political commitment and good governance (sustained 
government involvement and support, a country-led health 
plan for the health workforce, financial investment), health 
workforce planning (commitment to short- and long-term 
planning and to producing appropriately trained workers 
to meet needs, and expansion of pre-service education 
programmes), and an enabling environment (good 
information systems with monitoring and evaluation, effective 
management and leadership, merit-based recruitment and 
promotion systems, labour market capacity and policy to 
absorb and sustain an increase in health workers)141. With 
respect to human resource issues within the delivery function, 
the key issues are staff mix, internal retention and motivation, 
geographical distribution, international migration, and 
education and training. 
Staff mix
Given existing human resources imbalances, the scope for task-
shifting has received considerable attention. An examination of 
systematic reviews103 identified encouraging evidence for the 
effectiveness of task shifting from doctors to nurse practitioners 
for a wide scope of services, and likewise, shifting from health 
professionals to a broad range of lay providers with little 
training. Community health workers can rapidly increase access 
to many essential health interventions in rural and urban areas, 
and ensure that services reach poor communities128,142-145. 
Given the earlier experiences of community health-worker 
programmes, which were rarely sustained or scaled up146, 
effective linkages with local health facilities including regular 
supervision are likely to be critical to maintaining an effective 
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and motivated community-based workforce. Other elements 
of successful programmes are likely to include focused tasks, 
adequate remuneration, training and active community 
involvement128. In low-income countries emphasis should be 
placed on community- and mid-level health workers, while 
continuing to produce higher level professionals, and essential 
management and support workers.
Retention and motivation
Health worker retention is critical for health system 
performance, and successfully motivating and retaining health 
workers is a key challenge. A systematic review consolidating 
existing evidence on the impact of financial and non-financial 
incentives on motivation and retention in developing countries 
concluded that financial incentives, career development 
and management issues are core factors, but that financial 
incentives alone are not enough to motivate health workers 
and should be integrated with other types of incentives147. 
It was also clear that recognition for work performed was 
highly influential in health worker motivation. In Tanzania, for 
example, although inferior infrastructure and equipment were 
reported as demotivational factors, the need to feel valued 
and supported was considered more important to worker 
well-being. However, adequate resources and appropriate 
infrastructure could improve morale significantly. It was also 
reported in Tanzania that the trust of the community is a crucial 
component in motivation148.
With the increase in funding for disease-specific activities, 
donor-driven salary top-ups have become a source of major 
concern, given their potential to skew the mix of services 
delivered. In Rwanda, for example, top-ups were given by 
the global health initiatives for HIV and malaria, but not for 
maternal and child health. Rwanda has now forbidden top-
ups, but has created a basket fund into which donors can pay 
that provides support to Rwanda’s RBF scheme. This ensures 
that incentives serve local priorities, not donor priorities.
Geographical distribution
To improve the equity of the geographical distribution of the 
health workforce, governments can use combinations of 
incentives and regulatory policies149. Financial incentives, 
both direct (salaries, bonuses, hardship allowances and 
other monetary benefits) and indirect (loan repayment 
schemes, scholarships, allowances for childcare, housing, 
health insurance, travel subsidies and other benefits) are 
the most commonly used to address shortages in the rural 
health workforce150. As with other desired outcomes relating 
to health worker behaviour, evidence suggests that while 
financial incentives are important tools in rural recruitment and 
retention strategies, they are insufficient to address the problem 
fully147,150. Important non-financial incentives include: career-
related incentives (professional development opportunities, 
training, job security); improvements in the work environment 
(better management, flexibility of working hours, availability 
of supplies, reduced workloads) and family and lifestyle 
incentives (increased vacation time, housing provision, 
spousal employment). More rigorous research is needed to 
identify when, where and which incentives are effective150. 
Countries have experimented with a wide range of regulatory 
policies to improve the rural health workforce. Compulsory 
service, requiring doctors or nurses to work at a rural health 
facility for a number of years after graduation, has been 
instituted in many countries including Ecuador, Ethiopia, 
Myanmar, the Philippines, South Africa and Thailand. 
Compulsory service can assign new graduates to rural areas 
but this type of scheme may result in these areas getting 
the least experienced staff, and graduates being poorly 
supervised at a crucial stage in their career development100. 
In Thailand, as specialists tend to congregate in large cities, 
the government limited the annual number of positions for 
specialist training, but eventually discontinued the practice due 
to strong opposition from physicians151. Evidence suggests 
that regulatory policies are effective in reducing short-term rural 
shortages in health workers151-155 but have little impact on 
long-term retention150. The effectiveness of regulatory policies 
depends heavily on the capacity to monitor, the penalties 
applied for non-compliance and on cultural factors150.
An alternative to regulation and incentives is the creation of 
a pool of health workers willing for other reasons to work 
in rural and remote settings. Selecting students from rural 
regions for training, and exposing students to remote areas 
during their training, are two of the most effective methods to 
address rural shortages150. In addition, recent evidence has 
shown that some types of people require fewer incentives than 
others to locate in a remote area150. Policy-makers should 
explore ways of selectively targeting these individuals in job 
recruitment campaigns.
In general, evidence suggests that multiple levers are required 
to address the myriad reasons for avoiding rural work, and a 
multisectoral approach is needed to coordinate programmes 
across various ministries including health, education and local 
government. For instance, Malawi developed the Emergency 
Human Resources Programme, which uses financial (salary 
bonuses) and non-financial incentives, as well as regulatory 
policies (increased enrolment in medical and nursing schools) 
to address shortages in the rural health workforce156. The 
importance of the quality and skill level of workers should not 
be disregarded, since the rural workforce may be on average 
less skilled and less involved in continuing education, as was 
the case for rural obstetric care in Tanzania157. 
International migration
Recognizing the inevitability of international migration for 
certain cadres of health worker, managing attrition by building 
opportunities for professionals to work overseas for limited 
periods is possible through bilaterally negotiated agreements, 
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or through institutional arrangements. The United Kingdom 
and South Africa are trialing this type of scheme with some 
success and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has 
devised a scheme to encourage skilled professionals to 
work overseas on a rotational basis, with the goal of limiting 
the effect of skilled labour migration in the Caribbean158. 
While bilateral agreements promise mutual gain, and initial 
experiences are positive, the systems are in their infancy, and 
more information about their long-term effects is required159. 
Ethical codes of conduct relating to migration are being 
widely developed and advocated but they seem at best to 
have a transitory effect, and implementation remains a major 
challenge158. Agreements between countries could specify that 
the destination country will invest in institutions in the source 
country so that, in effect, source countries act as providers of 
health-care personnel by training a surplus of health workers. 
This type of system has traditionally been used in the Philippines, 
where private nursing schools train nurses who intend to migrate, 
although some critics now contend that the loss of nurses is 
becoming detrimental to the Philippine health system158. An 
alternative would be to establish formal “loan” schemes at the 
intergovernmental level, with lump-sum payments to resource 
providers in the event that a worker chose not to return home. 
Some proportion of professionals is likely to return home, and the 
source country will gain from the additional experience acquired. 
This type of arrangement was reached between Ghana and an 
NHS trust in the United Kingdom to allow migration of nurses 
for two-year periods, although it has not prevented nurses from 
migrating permanently100.
Education and training
The Task Force for Scaling Up Education and Training for 
Health Workers identified the guiding principles for building 
strong education and training systems: address national 
health needs and embed education and training in the health 
system; increase equity and efficiencies of scale through 
innovation in curriculum design and delivery; and enhance 
quality through leadership and collaboration141. Schemes 
successful in improving education and training of health 
workers are characterized by the ability to respond in a flexible, 
cost-effective and evidence-based way to population health 
needs and country health priorities. Education and training 
programmes should be designed to prepare health workers 
for responsibilities faced during employment. The Faculty of 
Health Sciences at Walter Sisulu University in South Africa was 
created in 1990 with the specific goal of producing health 
professionals for underserved areas160. The Barrio Adentro 
“micro-school” project in Venezuela carries out all education 
and training in supervised community settings, responding 
directly to patients’ needs161.
Effective education and training curricula are focused on 
the health needs of the country, are community- and team-
based, are an integral part of health service delivery, draw 
on the resources of the public and private sectors and the 
skills of international partners, and make use of innovative 
means to increase training capacity, such as information 
and communication technologies and regional approaches. 
Brazil’s PRO-SAUDE programme provides training institutions 
with financial support, through a competitive bidding process, 
for projects aimed at reorienting the health system to meet the 
needs of communities. In 2007, 90 medical, nursing and 
dental schools received funding for curricular changes that 
promoted interaction between the professions, primary care 
and action learning141.
Education and training systems need to be supported by 
policies and a regulatory system that foster quality. Quality 
assurance systems for education and training include 
accreditation and indicators of progress appropriate to the 
needs of the country, and the development of systematic 
methods for quality improvement, including quality standards 
for services and monitoring.
4.3.5 Quality of care
Quality of care is often suboptimal and varies widely within 
countries, but studies have shown that providing good quality 
care is possible, even in very resource-poor settings, either by 
directly acting on provider behaviour or by changing structural 
conditions through the approaches such as decentralization 
and contracting reviewed above162. Quality of care results 
from a combination of the skills and motivation of the health 
workforce, the physical environment in which they work, and 
the resources and support they are given to function. It can 
be divided into two main areas: technical quality refers to the 
extent to which services are performed to accepted standards, 
while interpersonal quality relates to how services respond to 
users’ expectations and values163. 
Effective supervision and lifelong learning seem to have 
the greatest influence on technical quality51. Conversely, 
interpersonal quality appears most influenced by norms and 
codes of conduct, such as professional identity and work 
ethic, supervision and basic amenities, such as privacy 
during consultations. Team-based interventions that make 
health workers feel valued and permitted to innovate can also 
boost service quality. The performance of health workers, 
from care providers to managers, has consistently been found 
to improve with supervision, especially when coupled with 
audit and feedback164,165. The nature of the supervision is 
important, with supportive, educational, consistent and specific 
supervision improving performance. In Ghana, for example, 
supportive supervision positively affected staff performance 
at public hospitals and autonomous quasi-government 
hospitals166. Challenges are faced by supervisors who often 
lack skills, useful tools and transport, and are burdened with 
administrative duties167,168. Drivers of supervisor performance 
need further study and strategies implemented to support 
supervisors and improve their performance165.
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System-level interventions, such as low-cost strengthening 
of decentralized district health-management teams and 
supervisors, and local control over budgets, can quickly 
improve performance of large numbers of front-line health 
workers. In Tanzania, managerial strengthening occurred 
through training in administration and management team-
building, delegation and community negotiation skills. When 
accompanied by practical managerial tools to assist in priority 
setting, resource allocation and supervision, the quality 
of health worker performance and delivery of health care 
improved169,170. 
An institutional approach that fosters the culture and practice 
of lifelong learning is considered more effective in changing 
practices than a sole focus on stand-alone, off-site training 
courses. Evidence also suggests that there is more probability 
of knowledge and skills transfer when training courses are 
interactive, with extensive hands-on experience. Interactive 
courses improve prescribing or dispensing behaviour171-174, 
improve specific clinical skills175,176 and positively affect 
health care utilization while promoting favourable patient 
responses177. E-learning approaches, and internet and mobile 
technologies more broadly, are likely to offer considerable 
potential for improving quality.
4.3.6 Drugs and supplies 
Drugs and other essential commodities such as contraceptives 
are a critical element in health service delivery. Countries need 
to be able to specify their needs, forecast, plan and procure 
drugs efficiently, and manage, store and distribute them 
to peripheral facilities. At facilities, appropriate prescribing 
and advice to patients on use are needed to ensure effective 
treatment. Systems for monitoring drug quality are critical 
given the widespread problems of fake and poor quality drugs. 
Action is also needed to influence dispensing practices in 
the private sector, given the large volume of drugs that are 
purchased from retail outlets, whether formal pharmacies, 
general shops or open marketplaces. 
There is good evidence that the quality of drug dispensing by 
private shops can be improved74. For example, accreditation 
processes can be used to “brand” drug shops that meet quality 
standards and where staff has been trained, as in the Strategies 
for Enhancing Access to Medicines project. In Kilifi, Kenya, 
a district-based programme to train and inform rural drug 
retailers and communities greatly improved selling practices for 
antimalarial drugs. Simple packaging and labelling of prices 
can improve compliance as well as affordability. 
There are various examples of successful improvements 
in public-sector procurement practices. In 1990 the new 
democratic government in Chile created an electronic bidding 
system and used the internet for information dissemination 
in order to make drug purchasing more transparent and 
accountable. The bidding system was designed to reduce 
collusion by subjecting suppliers to a competitive tender 
process and publicizing drug prices to all suppliers and their 
clients. By using the bidding process hospitals gained savings 
of 5-7%178. In Guatemala in 1999, the health sector saved 
43% by eliminating tender specifications for medicines that 
favoured a particular supplier179. Central bulk procurement for 
31 hospitals and 150 primary health care centres in the Delhi 
Capital Territory Essential Drugs Programme produced a 30-
40% reduction in drug prices180.
4.3.7 Information and evidence
Good information and evidence is another critical input into 
service delivery. Making information on facility performance 
publicly available may be of greatest value in influencing 
facility behaviour rather than that of the general public, at least 
based on evidence from developed countries181. Publicizing 
information on facility performance has been found to 
influence hospital behaviour in the United States, for example. 
Confidential audit of maternal and neonatal deaths can enable 
staff to understand failures in quality of care and how to 
improve systems and skills182. Beneficiary analysis makes it 
clear who is benefiting from public services, helping to create 
a demand for better access from disadvantaged groups. The 
actions of the Uganda Debt Network, which monitors the use 
of public resources to help ensure that they reach the people 
who need them most, have helped improve health services in 
four pilot districts3.
Recent advances in information and communication 
technologies including Personal Data Assistants (PDAs) and 
mobile phones offer great potential to improve health systems in 
developing countries. The Uganda Health Information Network 
(UHIN) Project, which distributed 200 PDAs to health workers in 
two districts, aimed for electronic compilation and transmission 
of MOH routine forms and to broadcast disease outbreak 
information and planned MOH activities. The districts obtained 
close to 100% compliance rates on weekly disease surveillance 
reporting, compared with a national average of 63% and a two-
way communication network serving nine health facilities was 
established183. In addition, district managers reported increased 
job satisfaction, reducing problems relating to staff retention. 
On the other hand the project illustrates a number of concerns, 
especially those related to the issue of financial sustainability 
and political commitment.
Many barriers inhibit the use of evidence by health 
professionals and policy-makers in developing countries, but 
there is also a rapidly emerging body of knowledge about 
how to address the evidence-to-policy gap184. Approaches 
include “one-stop shopping” providing optimally packaged 
high-quality reviews either alone or as part of a national 
electronic library for health, and rapid-response units which 
can answer practitioners’ questions on the state of knowledge 
in a particular area.
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Through the combined analytical efforts of many  
international agencies, the estimated costs of putting in 
place the interventions and health system support needed 
to accelerate achievement of the health MDGs in low-
income countries have been calculated, as have the likely 
increases in funding from 2009-2015 under three sets of 
assumptions, the resulting funding gap, and the likely  
health impacts of increased funding. 
Work has been underway for a number of years in both WHO 
and the World Bank, building up evidence on the costs of 
scaling up. The analysis done for Working Group 1 therefore 
drew on these two streams of pre-existing work, and further 
developed the calculations specifically for the 49 low-income 
countries. 
One team, led by WHO with collaboration from UNAIDS and 
UNFPA, expanded the work already done on the financial 
resources needed for the main health programmes, including 
HIV, tuberculosis, malaria, child health, immunization, and 
maternal and newborn health. This is termed a “normative” 
costing since the costs responded to the technical 
requirements for scaling up established by the various 
technical programmes. The team also drew on the expertise 
of the technical programmes linked to WHO to calculate the 
health impacts. 
The second team consisted of an interagency group 
coordinated by the World Bank and UNICEF, with 
collaboration from UNFPA and the Partnership on Maternal, 
Newborn and Child Health; it advanced the country costings 
calculated using the Marginal Budgeting for Bottlenecks 
(MBB) approach and assuming three scaling-up scenarios, 
of which the medium scenario is shown here. This model 
calculates both costs and health impacts. Annex 6 provides 
summary data for both the WHO and MBB approaches and 
for all MBB scenarios, and full details are provided in two 
background technical reports185,186.
Costing methods estimated the additional funding needed 
to expand the coverage of health interventions and 
programmes, and calculated the cost of providing the 
necessary health system support in terms of additional 
facilities at various levels of care, additional health workers 
and managers, strengthened procurement and distribution 
systems for drugs and commodities, better information 
systems, improved governance, accreditation and regulation, 
and health financing reforms. There are some relatively 
minor differences between WHO and MBB in the interventions 
included, such as the inclusion of sanitation in the MBB*. 
Payments to pregnant women to encourage take-up of safe 
delivery services, and improved remuneration of health 
workers, were included in both. Based on assumptions of 
the speed of expansion, additional capital and recurrent 
expenditures needed each year between 2009 and 2015 
were calculated. 
There is no fixed and agreed path that countries must follow 
to scale up interventions to meet the health MDGs. Countries 
are very diverse, and follow diverse paths. The two sets of 
analyses reflect two different views of how best to scale up 
services to meet the MDGs. 
The MBB is based mainly on country planning exercises, 
and assumes a delivery strategy that emphasizes full 
scale up of community-based services prior to expanding 
clinical services. Its scale-up targets are less ambitious, 
and probably more realistic, than WHO’s. Major capital 
investments for the provision of clinical services are not 
introduced until the final years of the period and so would 
not come fully into operation until the period after 2015. 
The WHO normative costs reflect a more facility-based 
approach to service expansion and the importance of rapid 
scaling up; they take a more optimistic view of the speed 
with which new infrastructure can be put into place and 
involve greater frontloading of capital. Capital investment 
would peak in 2012 and hence infrastructure would be fully 
operational before 2015. 
Table 5 shows the additional health facilities and health 
workers that would be in place, under each approach, for 
2015. It demonstrates the difference in the strategies, with 
the WHO approach emphasizing more mid-level facilities 
and nurses/midwives, and the MBB emphasizing more 
health posts and community-based workers. For example, 
27% of additional workers would be community-based and 
49% nurse/midwives in the WHO costs, while 64% would 
be community-based and 14% nurse/midwives in the MBB. 
These differences reflect real-life variation, and the different 
choices countries need to make when faced with decisions 
on how best to scale up. 
The final column of Table 5 also provides the estimated 
current number of facilities and workers. The total number of 
health facilities would approximately double, and the total 
number of health workers would more than double, with the 
greatest growth in numbers for community-based workers.
Table 6 shows the costs of scaling up of services required, 
over and above what is currently spent. In 2015 an 
5.  Financing needs for strengthening health 
systems and the resulting health benefits
* The appendices of Annex 6 provide a full list of interventions costed in the WHO and MBB approaches.
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additional $36-45 billion is needed, or $24-29 per capita. 
The WHO approach would devote 40% of total additional 
costs to capital investments, 13% to drugs and supplies, 
and 22% to human resources (or 37% of recurrent costs). 
Of the additional funds, 60% would be required in sub-
Saharan Africa. The MBB medium scenario would devote 
48% of total additional costs to capital investments, 21% to 
drugs and supplies, and 12% to human resources (23% of 
recurrent). 80% of funds would be required for sub-Saharan 
Africa. Two thirds or more of total costs would be devoted to 
general health system support, which includes multipurpose 
staff and facilities as well as the necessary investments at 
higher levels of the system for logistics, information systems, 
governance, financing systems and so on.
Between 2009 and 2015 some additional funding will 
become available, and needs to be subtracted from the 
projected additional costs in order to identify the financing 
gap. Estimation of additional funding is subject to a 
substantial degree of uncertainty, so two scenarios are 
reported here, as summarized in Table 7. Scenario 1 
assumes that the relationship of health expenditure to 
GDP remains unchanged for recipient governments, and 
that donors similarly maintain the current share of GDP to 
health aid. Scenario 2 assumes that donor and government 
expenditures rise in line with stated commitments*. 
As discussed above, domestically generated private 
expenditures make up a substantial proportion of total health 
expenditure, and they also tend to increase at a faster rate 
than GDP. Little is known about the services purchased by 
private expenditure, but it would be unrealistic to assume that 
such expenditure makes no contribution to services relevant 
to the health MDGs. Therefore both scenarios 1 and 2 
Table 5: Additional health facilities and health workers by 2015
WHO Normative Approach MBB Medium Scenario
Estimated 
Current 
(2008)†
 Total  %  Total  % 
Health Facilities 96,838 100 Health Facilities 73,695 100 85,112
Health post 57,816 79
Health centre∆ 88,960 92 Health centre 12,307 17 73,326
District hospital 6718 7 District hospital 2828 4 10,947
Regional hospital 1160 1 Regional hospital 744 1 839
Health Personnel 3,476,569 100 Health Personnel 2,585,894 100 2,121,054
Community health workers 950,701 27
Community-based health and nutrition 
promoters
1,441,929 56
295,963
Health extension workers 200,147 8
Nurse/midwives 1,699,107 49
Registered nurse/midwives 
(at least 3 years’ training)
203,013 8
1,190,333
Junior, assistant, assistant midwife nurse 
(1 year training)
160,478 6
Clinical officers 233,302 7 Health officer 23,226 1
Physicians 349,953 10 Physician/MD 35,879 1 499,544
Specialist  6236 0
Technicians (lab, X-ray, 
pharmacy, dental)
170,195 5 Technicians (lab, X-ray, pharmacy) 158,790 6 135,214
Orderlies 75,311 2 Administrative staff 356,195 14
† Data not available for all countries, cover various years, and categories may not be defined in a standardized way.
∆ Average size 230 sq m.
* Non-SSA countries have not set a target for the share of government expenditure going to health, and this was assumed to be 12%.
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Table 6: Additional costs
WHO Normative ($2005) MBB Medium ($2005)
Total additional costs 2009-2015 bn 
Capital
Recurrent
251 bn
101 bn
151 bn
112 bn 
54 bn
58 bn
Total additional costs in 2015 bn
Capital
Recurrent
45 bn
2 bn
43 bn
36 bn
19 bn
17 bn
Total additional costs in 2015 per capita
Capital
Recurrent
29
1
28
24
13
11
Capital as % of total 40% 48%
Human resources as % of total 22% 12%
Drugs and commodities as % of total 13% 21%
Programme and disease as % of total* 26% 38%
Health systems as % of total 74% 62%
Sub-Saharan Africa as % of total 60% 80%
* This figure includes only programme- or disease-specific resources; multipurpose health workers and facilities are included within health systems.
Table 7: Scenarios on additional financing
Scenarios (all in 2005 constant US$)
 Scenario 1: No change Scenario 2: Commitments met
GDP, 2008 WEO, IMF April 2009 update WEO, IMF April 2009 update
Annual GDP growth WEO, IMF April 2009 update WEO, IMF April 2009 update
Health as % of total government expenditure Constant 2007 GGHE (only that which is 
domestically funded1) as a share of GDP 
Reaches 15% GGHE/GGE in 2015 for  
sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries2, 
and 12% for others
Official Development Assistance for health 
(multilateral, bilateral and general budget support; 
does not include debt relief)
Constant proportion of ODA to donor’s GDP; constant 
patterns of allocation to countries and sector based 
on 2007 OECD-CRS data
ODA target as % of GNI from OECD DAC3; 50% of 
additional EU resources up to 2010 allocated to SSA
Doubling of Japan’s ODA to Africa by 20124
US$ 63bn from the USA by 20145
Private expenditure for health 50% of constant proportion of private health 
expenditures to GDP
50% of projected private funds, which were 
projected using elasticity to GDP (for every 1% GDP 
increase, private expenditure on health increases by 
1.033%)
1 GGHE general government expenditure on health; external funds flowing through the government are removed using shares obtained from NHA reports from the countries.
2 General government expenditure based on Abuja Declaration of African Union. 
3 Table 4 in www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/56/42458719.pdf 
4 http://www.ticad.net/presskit2008/Japan-initiatives-TICAD-IV.pdf.
5 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-Global-Health-Initiative/.
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assume that 50% of increases in private spending contribute 
to meeting the costs of guaranteed benefits. In both scenarios 
recent IMF projections for economic growth are used.
Finally, Table 8 shows additional financing available under 
the different scenarios, the financing need (additional costs), 
and the resulting financial gap, for the year 2015. That year 
has been chosen as representing the year when substantial 
scaling up of services and of the health system will have 
occurred. Details for the entire period 2009-2015 are 
available in Annex 6. 
If commitments are met then there is no financing gap in 
2015*. However, donors and recipient governments are 
currently far from delivering on agreed targets, and the 
economic recession is making this more difficult. If current 
relationships of health spending to GDP remain unchanged, 
the financing gap is $28-37 billion in 2015. The amount 
shown for increased private expenditure highlights the 
importance of developing domestic financing policies that 
can capture such spending, through insurance arrangements 
or increased domestic taxation. 
For sub-Saharan Africa there is a funding gap under the 
commitments met scenario of $3-5 billion. However, non-
SSA countries would be more than able to cover additional 
costs under the commitments met scenario, and a small shift 
of DAH from non-SSA to SSA would reduce the SSA gap. In 
the no change scenario, the funding gap for SSA in 2015 is 
$26-24 billion†, and for non-SSA $2-13 billion. 
Figure 5 shows the maximum total expenditure in  
2015 under the two scenarios relative to baseline levels 
of expenditure in 2008 and the financing need (based 
on WHO normative costs). It highlights the shortfall of 
expenditure under a no change scenario. It also highlights 
the importance of increasing government funding for health, 
and of mobilizing private funding for priority services.
In interpreting these figures, there are a number of important 
caveats:
•	 	due	to	lack	of	data,	it	has	been	assumed	that	interventions	
can be scaled up based on constant unit costs; in reality, 
unit costs may increase as services are extended to reach 
more remote and disadvantaged populations; 
•	 	conversely,	the	comprehensive	scale-up	and	system	
strengthening, along with a rationalization of aid flows, 
should enable considerable efficiencies to be gained, 
reducing unit costs;
•	 	aid	flows	would	need	to	be	managed	carefully,	to	avoid	
inflationary effects (which would increase unit costs);
•	 	the	speed	with	which	additional	funds	can	be	mobilized	
will affect the total financing gap in 2015; while some 
additional recurrent funding is required immediately,  
a part of the additional recurrent funding requirement  
is dependent on prior capital investment and health 
worker training;
Table 8: The financing gap in 2015 (US$ 2005 billion)
Sources of additional funding WHO normative MBB medium
All countries Government DAH Private Total Cost Gap Cost Gap
Commitments met 30 7 7 44 45 1 36 -8
No change 4 0.5 4 8 45 37 36 28
Sources of additional funding WHO normative MBB Medium
SSA Government DAH Private Total Cost Gap Cost Gap
Commitments met 16 6 3 25 28 3 30 5
No change 2 0.4 2 4 28 24 30 26
Sources of additional funding WHO normative MBB Medium
Non-SSA Government DAH Private Total Cost Gap Cost Gap
Commitments met 14 1 4 19 17 -2 6 -13
No change 2 0 2 4 17 13 6 2
* It should be noted that there is still a gap for the entire period 2009-2015 with the WHO normative costs, because costs increase earlier and faster than 
additional financing.
† The MBB cost for SSA is higher than WHO’s, so the gap for SSA is higher with MBB costs, unlike the all country numbers where the gap is higher for WHO’s costs.
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•	 	the	evidence	on	what	private	spending	purchases	is	very	
weak, and hence the assumption that 50% is available 
for the set of benefits does not have strong evidence 
behind it: it could be more or less.
The key health benefits of this expansion for 2015 are 
shown in Table 9, and a more complete list is shown in 
Annex 6. There are key differences between the WHO and 
the MBB approaches with respect to adult deaths averted, 
the lower numbers in the MBB reflecting the community-
based approach of MBB which achieves child health benefits 
similar to that of the WHO approach but with fewer maternal, 
adult HIV and TB deaths averted.
Selected health benefits are listed in Table 9 in terms of 
deaths averted, reduction in births and stunting, proportions 
of countries achieving MDGs 4 and 5, and proportions of 
countries achieving MDG 6 taking the target as halving 
the burden from a 2008 baseline. Other benefits include 
substantial reductions in morbidity, and improved individual 
well-being and quality of life benefiting billions of people. In 
the WHO approach an extra 22 million women would have 
access to safe birth attendance and antenatal care, and 
their babies would receive quality care at birth and during 
the neonatal period. In the MBB approach an additional 
17 million women would receive antenatal care in 2015, 
and 16 million would benefit from safe birth attendance. 
Moreover, the strengthened national health systems would 
enable sustained health improvement into the future, which 
post-2015 would be well positioned to cope with the 
increasing burden of noncommunicable diseases, and detect 
and respond to newly emerging infectious diseases and 
other unpredictable health threats. 
As with costs, these numbers on impacts should be regarded 
as best estimates, and there are caveats. Perhaps the most 
important is that these health benefits depend on spending 
the additional money on services that can effectively provide 
high-impact interventions. Low-income countries currently 
vary greatly in the efficiency with which they convert public 
spending on health into health outcomes. To the extent that 
part of the money is not spent at all (for example because 
of absorptive capacity constraints), or part of the additional 
funding goes on services not costed here (such as tertiary 
hospital care), or the quality of service delivery is poor, then 
the realized benefits will be lower. In addition, the evidence 
base for estimating real life impacts is limited, especially with 
respect to some elements of community-based approaches. 
To assess the plausibility of the cost and impact estimates 
presented here, they can be compared with the cost per 
death averted derived from the cost and impact estimates 
calculated for the essential package in the 1993 World 
Development Report (WDR)187. Updated to 2005 prices, 
the cost-per-death averted of the WDR package is $9000. 
This can be compared with the $8000-$10,000 per-death-
averted implied by the calculations presented here. 
Figure 5: Total financing 2008 and 2015
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The costs in this report adequately allow for the health 
systems support needed for interventions to be delivered 
effectively in the longer term, in contrast to the WDR costs 
which focused on the interventions, and yet the above 
cost-effectiveness range is no less cost-effective. While 
very high-impact and low-cost interventions which address 
single causes of the burden (such as immunization) can 
have cost-effectiveness ratios that look very much more 
attractive, the estimates here look plausible for a broad set 
of interventions which addresses the main causes of burden 
of disease and which require broad systems development 
(including buildings, staff and management) to deliver the 
whole set at the same time. Moreover, it is very important 
to emphasize that averted deaths are only one element of 
the broad health gains that would be created by scaling-up 
interventions and the health system platform.
The total costs presented here may appear high. The 
Commission on Macroeconomics for Health, for example, 
calculated the costs of ensuring high coverage of a package 
of 49 interventions in low-income countries, and added 
allowances for increasing health worker salaries and 
strengthening the higher levels of the health system61. The 
additional funding plus current expenditure amounted to 
$38 per capita in 2002 prices, or roughly $41 per capita in 
2005 prices.
In the calculations here, total health expenditure per capita 
would be at most an additional $29 on top of the current 
$25, namely $54, reflecting the much more comprehensive 
costing undertaken of health system strengthening. However, 
the costs are by no means generous. The 2015 inputs would 
still fall short of those available now in lower middle-income 
countries, to deal with a much lower burden of disease. For 
example, the anticipated total health expenditure of $54 per 
capita can be compared with the $74 spent in lower middle-
income countries; hospital beds per 10,000 people would 
be 22 as compared with 24, and nurses/midwives per 1000 
people would be 2.3 as compared with 2.5. And $54 is tiny 
compared with the $4012 per person spent by the rich world 
on health services. 
The hoped-for health benefits may also appear high. The 
deaths averted represent a roughly two thirds average 
reduction in child and maternal mortality from the 2005-
2008 baseline over a six-year period. Rapid reductions are 
Table 9: Selected health benefits in 2015
*  Note that the WHO and MBB proportions of countries achieving the MDGs are not strictly comparable due to different baselines, intervention mixes,  
and methods for calculating deaths averted.
** % of countries halving incidence (malaria and HIV) or mortality (TB).
WHO normative MBB medium
Additional deaths averted in 2015
Under-5 deaths averted (including newborn, infant and neonatal) 3.9m 4.3m
Maternal deaths averted 322,000 259,000
HIV deaths averted 193,000 177,000 (adults)
Tuberculosis deaths averted 265,000 235,000
Examples of other benefits
Decrease in number of births due to increased use of family planning 11m 9m
Total stunting prevented 30m (12-59 mths) 8.3m (12-23 mths)
% progress towards MDG 4 and 5* From 1990/95 baseline
MDG 4: % of countries reaching target 80% 82%
MDG 5: % of countries reaching target 45% 39%
% progress towards MDG 6 From 2008 baseline
Malaria Likely to be reached 87%**
HIV Not available 42%**
TB Met at regional level 72%**
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possible*. For example, Eritrea managed to reduce the under-
five mortality rate from 147 deaths per 1000 live births in 
1990 to 70 in 2007. This represents a reduction of 52% 
over the entire time period, or 6% per year at a linear rate 
of reduction, and should ensure the realization of the MDG 
4 target. The infant mortality rate also declined significantly 
over this period, but at a lower absolute and relative rate, as 
would be expected. Tanzania managed to reduce its rate of 
under-five mortality from 157 to 116 deaths per 1000 live 
births over the same period, a slower rate of progress but 
one that should still allow for the achievement of MDG 4 by 
2015. Rwanda has seen an increase in the use of modern 
methods of family planning from 10% in 2005 to 27% in 
2008188.
Additionally, many countries have been able to improve 
maternal survival dramatically (Figure 6). For example, by 
doubling the proportion of births attended by a doctor or 
nurse and improving access to emergency obstetric care, 
Egypt reduced its maternal mortality by more than 50% in 
eight years, from 174 per 100,000 live births in 1993 to 84 
in 2000. Honduras brought maternal deaths down by more 
than 40%, from 182 to 108 per 100,000 between 1990 
and 1997, by opening and staffing seven referral hospitals 
and 226 rural health centres, and by increasing the number 
of health personnel and skilled attendants. 
Scaling up interventions within strengthened health systems 
will greatly reduce the burden of infectious diseases and 
of reproductive health conditions. In the longer term such 
health improvements will support the process of economic 
growth within countries. The report of the Commission 
on Macroeconomics and Health roughly estimated the 
economic benefits of better health61. Assuming that 
improved health outcomes increase the life-expectancy of 
low-income countries by one half of the existing 19-year 
gap with high-income countries (for example from 59 to 68 
years), economic growth would increase by around 0.5% 
per year. This would mean that the per capita income of 
low-income countries would be 10% higher than otherwise 
after 20 years. Allowing for both faster economic growth 
and the value of lives saved, the Commission estimated that 
economic benefits might be at least $360 billion per year 
about 15 years after the scaling up of services began.
Figure 6: Number of years to halve maternal mortality189
Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births
400 200 100 50
8-9 YEARS:
Malaysia 1951-61
Sri Lanka 1956-65
Bolivia late 1990s
6-7 YEARS:
Sri Lanka 1974-81
Thailand 1974-81
Egypt 1993-2000
Chile 1971-77
Colombia 1970-75
4-6 YEARS:
Honduras 1975-81
Thailand 1981-85
Nicaragua 1973-79
* www.who.int/pmnch/topics/country_region/.
Credit: DFID/Helen Stear
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The calculations above demonstrate that $28-37 billion of 
additional funding per year is needed by 2015 to finance 
guaranteed benefits and the related health system platform in 
low-income countries, and much less if trends between now 
and 2015 are more optimistic. The key characteristic of health 
system strengthening is that it requires long-term expenditure on 
such inputs as staff and drugs. However, expansion in training 
capacity, expansion and renovation of physical infrastructure, 
and improving systems for financing, management and 
information, could benefit from upfront funding. While not 
separately costed here, rapid scaling up and improvement of 
treatment practices, for example for TB and malaria, could help 
counter the growing problems of drug resistance. 
How such funding flows to countries, and what the funds are 
used for, will be critical in ensuring stronger health systems 
and improved health outcomes. Key principles are funding 
a technically and financially sound country strategy whose 
development is led by the country and which focuses on 
the major causes of illness and death, ensuring predictable 
finance and a focus on accountability for results, while also 
making use of all channels for delivering services, building 
capacity for the long term, and tailoring approaches to  
country contexts. 
A technically sound country strategy is crucial for delivering 
on the Paris principles of country ownership, donor alignment 
with strategies, and harmonization of donor actions190. Where 
governments have sufficient planning, management and 
financial capacity the strategy should be financed through 
general or sector budget support, or through basket funding 
managed by multilateral or bilateral donors for those unable to 
provide sector or budget support. Project funding unrelated to 
the country strategy must be avoided. 
The country strategy must include a financing strategy  
that demonstrates how external and domestic resources  
will be used together to finance the health system, and how 
the domestic share of financing and arrangements for pooled 
funding will be increased over time. It must also demonstrate 
government commitment to implement solutions in the areas 
of governance, financing and delivery, and to ensure that these 
solutions benefit the needs of poor and disadvantaged groups. 
Many of the weaknesses in health systems cannot be 
addressed simply by money, but require high-level political 
endorsement and mobilization of the combined efforts of 
governmental and other bodies. Countries with weak capacity 
to develop a technically sound country strategy should be 
supported to build their planning and management  
systems gradually.
Predicable finance will be critical to enable governments 
to address seriously the need to implement improvements 
to health systems. Recipient governments have been 
reluctant to adopt new therapies - such as antiretroviral 
therapy or artemisinin-based combination therapy - when 
they are expensive and funding levels are unpredictable. 
This challenge formed part of the justification for the global 
subsidy for artemisinin-based combination therapy now being 
implemented191,192. Predictable finance should encourage 
the adoption of improved policies; it will also be vital for 
countries to address seriously the effective management of a 
larger health system, especially with respect to public financial 
management and maintenance of the capital stock.
Human resources is another area where policies require 
long-term commitment. In Tanzania, for example, there was 
a large expansion of health workers in the 1980s, only for 
employment to be cut back in the 1990s as part of civil 
service retrenchment193. Then again in the new century the 
same country is called on to expand employment. Such 
policy swings are particularly damaging to human resources 
planning and management, which require a long-term view.
Predictable finance must be complemented by a focus 
on results, for which countries and donors are mutually 
accountable. The evidence is persuasive that focusing on 
results can help engineer a culture change in public services, 
but there are many ways to achieve this and countries must 
find their own solutions tailored to their country contexts. 
Monitoring and evaluating progress and operational  
research are crucial elements in ensuring and maintaining 
good performance. Capacity to generate and use health 
systems research knowledge requires investment within 
countries, in tandem with health systems strengthening,  
so countries can learn while doing. 
Health care is already delivered in low-income countries 
by a wide range of different providers. Given shortages in 
physical and human resources, governments cannot ignore 
the resources available in the non-state sector, and should 
incorporate in their country strategy ways of making use 
of these resources. This will require clear governance and 
regulatory structures, and measures to monitor and improve 
the quality of care of those outlets most used by the  
poorest people.
A focus on building capacity for the long term must 
accompany the implementation of the country strategy.  
The aim should be to use national systems and resources 
as they become stronger. This applies to channeling money, 
purchasing drugs and supplies, purchasing technical  
assistance (as agreed in the Bonn Workshop Consensus*), 
and reporting on use of funds. This should help reduce the 
6. Funding flows to countries 
* http://www.capacity.org/en/journal/policy/the_bonn_workshop_consensus_priorities_and_action, accessed 11/04/09.
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inefficiencies of current arrangements and make much better 
use of both external and domestic resources. More generally, 
the current inefficient approaches to supplying technical 
assistance should be replaced by strategies that promote long-
term institutional capacity development and skill building so 
that countries develop the appropriate skills and capacities.
Whatever combination of financing sources is employed, 
national health financing systems require effective approaches 
for financial accountability, mechanisms to identify and protect 
the poorest from the costs of care, and effective mechanisms 
for purchasing health services, among other things. External 
funding should be used to build up, incrementally over time, 
the core components of strong national health financing 
systems. For example, donor funding can be used to protect 
the poorest under emerging social health insurance schemes. 
By working through government financing systems (being “on 
budget”) donors can help contribute to strengthening financial 
accountability and planning, and use the financing system 
strategically to promote incremental steps towards universal 
access.
Finally, as identified above, approaches must be sensitive 
to the specifics of each country. Countries differ in terms of 
their economic and political contexts, their health system 
design, and their level of capacity. This diversity means that 
there can be no “one-size-fits-all” solution in health systems 
strengthening. Development partners and governments 
must exercise great care in seeking to apply a successful 
intervention in one setting to another country. Strategies that 
are devised and supported by local country actors, and 
respond directly to challenges in-country, are likely to be 
stronger than externally driven approaches. The instruments 
of aid need to be adapted to each country context, and the 
pace of change needs to be agreed locally to ensure effective 
absorption of additional funding into the local health economy, 
and a long-term sustainable approach to strengthening the 
health system.
Despite the importance of the above principles, the reality is 
that many donor governments must work under fiscal and 
legal constraints that limit the types of aid they can provide, 
and recipient countries vary in their ability to put forward a 
clear, coherent and evidence-based country strategy. Given 
the different ways in which aid may flow to countries, it is 
important to identify what types of aid are best suited to 
different health systems strengthening approaches. This 
question has not been widely explored, but Table 10 provides 
some initial thinking.
Reform of aid flows could lead to much greater efficiency 
in the use of both external and domestic resources. While 
difficult to quantify, such efficiencies would magnify the gains 
from investing additional resources in health systems.
Table 10: Suitability of different forms of aid for health system strengthening
Characteristic of aid mechanism Best suited to Should be avoided
Inflexible aid (e.g. project funding) Any project that falls within the government plan, and is 
of high national priority. 
May be particularly effective in supporting long-term 
projects for which political support may wax and wane, 
as it is difficult to reassign resources to other priorities 
(e.g. decentralization, malaria elimination).
Any project that falls outside of the government plan or 
lacks national ownership.
Any project that undermines the government’s role by 
supporting approaches that contravene government 
policies (e.g. bypassing government procurement 
procedures).
Short-term “bursts” of aid (unsustainable in 
the longer term)
Tackling discrete, relatively straightforward health 
system constraints (e.g. developing a new human 
resources plan, instituting a new computerized 
information system for drug ordering, development of 
new infrastructure).
Complex institutional reforms that are likely to require 
sustained support (e.g. packages of health workforce 
reforms, development of social health insurance).
Programmes where temporary suspension may have 
severe adverse effects (e.g. results-based financing 
where cessation of the programme may create negative 
incentives).
Aid that is likely to vary over time and be 
unpredictable
Interventions that can be readily expanded or contracted 
without having excessively adverse effects upon 
the health system. For example, a clinic upgrading 
programme or a health workforce retraining programme.
Programmes where temporary suspension may have 
severe adverse effects (e.g. results-based financing 
where cessation of the programme may create negative 
incentives).
Long-term budget or sector support Channeling large volumes of resources for scaling up 
services.
Where national government systems are too weak to 
account for use of funds.
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This report has sought to:
•	 	make	the	case	for	health	system	strengthening	to	help	
achieve the health MDGs;
•	 	demonstrate	that	enough	is	known	on	how	to	strengthen	
health systems to guide country action;
•	 	estimate	the	likely	costs	and	benefits;
•	 	advise	on	how	increased	funding	should	flow	to	
countries.
In drawing the report to a close, there are key areas that 
demand continuing attention in order to ensure that funds, 
both domestic and external, are spent effectively and in areas 
of greatest need. 
Strengthen the evidence base underpinning 
health systems strengthening
Despite commitments made during the Ministerial Summit on 
Health Research in Mexico, health systems research remains 
relatively neglected and there is scant empirical evidence 
to inform decisions about appropriate strategies to address 
many of the key health systems challenges. Too many 
strategies to strengthen health systems are initiated without 
an adequate information base, and with no simultaneous 
evaluation effort. The differences in this report between the 
WHO and MBB costs and impacts demonstrate that the 
evidence base must be improved on the cost and effects of 
large-scale service delivery expansion. The capacity of low- 
and middle-income countries to commission and conduct 
research needs to be increased; country-level institutions 
able to conduct high quality health systems research need 
sustained support; policy maker capacity to apply evidence 
throughout the policy process needs to be enhanced; and 
more multi-country studies that can provide generalizable 
findings need to be supported.
Act on those elements of health systems 
strengthening where evidence is strong
Although it is neither possible nor desirable to provide a 
blueprint for health systems strengthening, this report has 
identified a number of features of successful health systems 
strengthening efforts and/or strategies that appear particularly 
promising and on which governments and donors should 
act. They include:
•	 	strengthening	governance	and	accountability,	including	
encouraging citizen and user involvement, through 
incremental and flexible initiatives;
•	 	reducing	levels	of	out-of-pocket	payments	whenever	
possible through careful removal of user fees and 
sustained steps towards enhancing social health 
insurance or tax-based financing;
•	 	promoting,	when	possible,	integrated	approaches	to	
service delivery;
•	 	engaging	with	the	private	health-care	sector	in	order	to	
enhance its quality of care, and potentially to expand 
service coverage through contracting; 
•	 	promoting	the	retention	and	motivation	of	health	workers	
particularly in underserved areas.
7. Concluding comments
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Continue to tackle aid fragmentation and 
unpredictability
The extreme fragmentation and unpredictability of health aid, 
combined with weak government management capacity, has 
meant that the scaling up of resources for international health 
has not achieved its full potential. Both SWAps and country 
compacts under the International Health Partnership, along 
with the Paris Declaration, have begun to tackle these issues, 
but much more needs to be done to ensure that development 
partners work within existing framework agreements, and 
that all partners abide by the terms of the Paris Declaration.
Mount a special effort in conflict-affected states
Fragile states contain only 20% of the world’s population 
but they account for one third of maternal mortality and one 
third of HIV cases. While many of the basic principles for 
establishing stronger health systems remain true in fragile 
states, the challenges in conflict-affected contexts are much 
greater: governments are typically weaker and the policy 
environment is more contested, the challenges associated 
with placing staff and getting supplies to conflict-affected 
areas are huge, domestic tax revenues are likely to be low, 
and fragile states have typically been under-funded by 
development partners. In order to achieve the health MDGs a 
special effort is required to strengthen the health systems of 
fragile states and further strengthen the evidence base about 
what works in these contexts.
The role for innovative financing
How innovative financing is raised is of less concern to 
low-income countries than how it is channeled. Additional 
sources of finance should not give rise to additional 
channels of funding, and should enhance predictability and 
help reduce fragmentation. Of special significance to health 
system strengthening is the long-term recurrent support 
needed to ensure continuing access to health services. 
Nonetheless, as is apparent from the costs, substantial 
resources are needed for physical infrastructure, purchase 
of drugs and supplies, and training, and these may lend 
themselves to specific funding mechanisms as long as the 
planning and implementation of service expansion is an 
integral part of the country strategy and does not lead to 
duplication of processes and systems. Physical infrastructure 
and training may also lend themselves to frontloading, which 
in addition may be appropriate to provide catalytic funding 
for improved financing policies and better management and 
information systems.
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ANNEXES
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Annex 1: Terms of Reference 
Working Group 1 will focus on defining the need and clarifying the 
understanding of health systems.
The Working Group will look into the total amount and distribution 
of additional funds required to fill the financing gaps (existing 
and projected) and to deliver results in low-income countries*, 
as identified in national health plans and strategies. This will take 
into account funds expected to come from domestic sources, from 
existing international donor commitments, and from new sources of 
international finance.
The Working Group will look into the types of funding that are 
required (long-term, predictable, sustainable, frontloaded, etc.) for 
what needs.
In understanding the opportunities for resolving constraints to 
scaling up to reach the health MDGs at the country level, the 
Working Group will summarize:
-  current understanding on the priority constraints that prevent 
scaling up, including health financing and social protection 
policies;
-  ways to maximize the contributions of other sectors to 
strengthening health systems;
-  how to ensure absorption and spending of additional external 
funds.
Working Group 1 shall:
(a) Define (i) the health system platform which is needed to 
support achievement of the health MDGs and (ii) the package of 
guaranteed benefits or interventions that is needed to achieve those 
MDGs where least progress is being made, namely MDGs 4, 5 and 
1c, in the light of the Task Force definition of a health system that 
“Within the political and institutional framework for each country, 
a health system is the ensemble of all organizations, institutions, 
and resources mandated to improve, maintain or restore health. 
They encompass both personal and population services and 
activities to influence policies and actions of other sectors to 
address the environmental and economic determinants of health”. 
Key sub-components of health systems include: delivering health 
services through a primary health care approach; financing and 
social protection; health workforce; logistics and supply chains; 
information and knowledge; and governance’†.
(b) In the light of (a), review evidence on the main constraints  
that hamper scaling up, efficient and equitable delivery of services, 
and achievement of health outcomes, including:
-  constraints operating at the various levels of a health system,  
from community to the whole system;
-  constraints with respect to health system components such  
as the availability and productivity of the health workforce,  
and patterns and volumes of domestic financing;
-  constraints that especially relate to fiscal space and absorptive 
capacity;
-  constraints that result from modes of external funding and 
mechanisms for transferring them to countries and within countries;
-  constraints that concern intersectoral action to strengthen  
health systems.
(c) Identify specific policies and approaches which can strengthen 
the overall health system, its various elements and address 
constraints to scaling up; with respect to each policy/approach, 
review:
-  whether there is consensus on the preferred policy;
-  whether there is controversy;
-  whether no promising solutions are available and therefore  
more evidence generation is required.
Possible topics include: the roles that international development 
assistance can play in supporting improved health system 
performance, sources of domestic financing, modes of payment 
e.g. P4P, demand-side financing, contracting NGOs and 
commercial players, franchising, specific ways of reaching poorest 
and most vulnerable, task-shifting, decentralization, improving 
information systems, regulation, and promoting good governance. 
(d) Identify, based on existing evidence including global costings 
and national health plans and strategies, the total amount and 
distribution of additional funds required to fill the financing gaps 
(existing and projected) and to deliver results in low-income 
countries. This will take into account funds expected to come from 
domestic sources, from existing international donor commitments, 
and from new sources of international finance. It will also need to 
take into consideration issues such as scope for productivity gains, 
potential for crowding out or stimulating domestic financing, and 
the need to fund adequately higher level system functions above  
the service delivery level.  
(e) Recommend to Working Group 2 the specific types of  
flows needed (e.g. capital, upfront investments, recurrent flows, 
funding predictability) to support the needs and levels of flows 
identified in (d). 
* See Annex 2.
† http://www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/pdf/IAWG/WG1/Taskforce%20WG1%20TOR%20Jan19%202009.pdf, accessed 16/04/09.
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* World Bank Regional Code.
† IDA: International Development Association.
∆ HIPC: Heavily Indebted Poor Country.
Annex 2: List of low-income countries, July 2008
Country Region* 
Afghanistan South Asia IDA† HIPC∆
Bangladesh South Asia IDA  
Benin Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Burkina Faso Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Burundi Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Cambodia East Asia & Pacific IDA  
Central African Republic Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Chad Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Comoros Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Congo, Dem. Rep. Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Côte d’Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Eritrea Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Gambia, The Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Guinea Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Guinea-Bissau Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Haiti Latin America & Caribbean IDA HIPC
Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa IDA  
Korea, Dem. Rep. East Asia & Pacific ..  
Kyrgyz Republic Europe & Central Asia IDA HIPC
Lao PDR East Asia & Pacific IDA  
Liberia Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Madagascar Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Malawi Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Mali Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Mauritania Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Mozambique Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Myanmar East Asia & Pacific IDA  
Nepal South Asia IDA HIPC
Niger Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa IDA  
Pakistan South Asia Blend  
Papua New Guinea East Asia & Pacific Blend  
Rwanda Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
São Tomé and Principe Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Sierra Leone Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Solomon Islands East Asia & Pacific IDA  
Somalia Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Tajikistan Europe & Central Asia IDA  
Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Togo Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Uzbekistan Europe & Central Asia Blend  
Vietnam East Asia & Pacific IDA  
Yemen, Rep. Middle East & North Africa IDA  
Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa IDA HIPC
Zimbabwe Sub-Saharan Africa Blend  
Source: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS
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Annex 3: Progress towards Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5 for 43 low-income countries*
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Annex 4a: Analysis of total health expenditure (WHO health expenditure data 2006)
G
N
I p
er
 c
ap
ita
To
ta
l h
ea
lth
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 (
TH
E)
  
Pr
iv
at
e 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
  
on
 h
ea
lth
 (
US
$)
Ex
te
rn
al
 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 
US
$*
G
en
er
al
 g
ov
t e
xp
en
di
tu
re
  
on
 h
ea
lth
 U
S$
Po
p.
 
(m
ill
io
ns
)
At
la
s 
m
et
ho
d 
US
$
PP
P 
in
t. 
$
Pe
r c
ap
ita
  
US
 $
Pe
r c
ap
ita
  
PP
P 
in
t. 
$
m
ill
io
ns
 U
S$
Pe
r c
ap
ita
.. 
of
 w
hi
ch
 
ou
t-o
f-p
oc
ke
t 
pe
r c
ap
ita
Pe
r c
ap
ita
.. 
of
 w
hi
ch
 
So
ci
al
 S
ec
ur
ity
 
pe
r c
ap
ita
D
at
a 
so
ur
ce
W
B†
 
W
B
W
H
O
∆
W
H
O
W
H
O
/W
B*
*  
W
H
O
W
H
O
W
H
O
W
H
O
W
H
O
W
H
O
# 
co
un
tri
es
 w
ith
 d
at
a 
44
44
47
48
45
47
47
47
47
36
49
M
ea
n†
†  
 
$4
60
.2
$1
,1
94
.6
$2
4.
7
$6
0.
9
$6
28
.1
$1
3.
0
$1
0.
4
$6
.2
8
$1
1.
8
$0
.3
7
27
.2
6
Af
gh
an
is
ta
n
- ∆
∆
-
$2
7
$9
1
$7
11
$1
8
$1
4.
5
$7
.6
7
$9
$0
.0
0
26
.1
Ba
ng
la
de
sh
$4
50
$1
,2
30
$1
2
$3
7
$1
,9
37
$8
$7
.5
$1
.9
6
$4
$0
.0
0
15
6.
0
Be
ni
n
$5
30
$1
,2
60
$2
6
$6
1
$2
23
$1
3
$1
2.
0
$5
.3
6
$1
3
-
8.
8
Bu
rk
in
a 
Fa
so
$4
20
$1
,0
80
$2
7
$7
3
$3
88
$1
2
$1
0.
6
$8
.8
9
$1
5
$0
.0
4
14
.4
Bu
ru
nd
i
$1
00
$3
20
$1
0
$3
1
$8
3
$9
$5
.3
$4
.8
4
$1
-
8.
2
Ca
m
bo
di
a
$4
90
$1
,5
50
$3
0
$9
6
$4
30
$2
2
$1
9.
0
$6
.7
0
$8
$0
.0
0
14
.2
Ce
nt
ra
l A
fri
ca
n 
Re
pu
bl
ic
$3
70
$7
10
$1
4
$2
7
$6
0
$9
$8
.2
$2
.9
7
$5
-
4.
3
Ch
ad
$4
40
$1
,1
50
$2
9
$7
2
$3
08
$1
4
$1
3.
1
$5
.2
1
$1
6
-
10
.5
Co
m
or
os
$6
70
$1
,1
50
$1
6
$2
7
$1
3
$7
$7
.0
$4
.9
9
$9
$0
.0
0
0.
8
Co
ng
o,
 D
em
. R
ep
.
$1
30
$2
70
$1
0
$1
9
$5
81
$8
$3
.8
$4
.9
8
$2
$0
.0
0
60
.6
Cô
te
 d
’Iv
oi
re
$8
60
$1
,5
60
$3
5
$6
3
$6
62
$2
7
$2
3.
5
$2
.9
0
$8
-
18
.9
Er
itr
ea
$1
90
$5
20
$8
$1
9
$3
9
$5
$4
.5
$3
.1
5
$4
$0
.0
0
4.
7
Et
hi
op
ia
$1
90
$7
00
$7
$2
6
$5
94
$3
$2
.4
$3
.1
4
$4
$0
.0
0
81
.0
G
am
bi
a
$2
70
$1
,0
40
$1
5
$5
7
$2
6
$6
$4
.6
$5
.2
1
$9
$0
.0
0
1.
7
G
ha
na
$5
10
$1
,2
40
$3
3
$7
6
$7
80
$2
2
$1
7.
0
$7
.5
0
$1
1
-
23
.5
G
ui
ne
a
$4
10
$1
,1
40
$2
0
$6
5
$1
80
$1
7
$1
6.
7
$2
.3
2
$3
$0
.0
4
9.
2
G
ui
ne
a-
Bi
ss
au
$1
80
$4
50
$1
2
$2
9
$1
9
$9
$4
.8
$3
.9
4
$3
$0
.0
9
1.
6
H
ai
ti
$4
90
$1
,1
10
$4
2
$8
9
$3
99
$1
4
$1
2.
2
$2
7.
77
$2
9
-
9.
4
Ke
ny
a
$5
80
$1
,4
40
$2
9
$6
7
$1
,0
46
$1
5
$1
2.
0
$4
.2
6
$1
4
$1
.2
0
36
.6
Ko
re
a,
 D
em
. R
ep
.m
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
23
.7
Ky
rg
yz
st
an
$5
00
$1
,7
90
$3
5
$1
15
$1
82
$2
0
$1
8.
6
$3
.4
5
$1
5
$3
.1
1
5.
3
La
os
$5
00
$1
,7
40
$2
4
$8
0
$1
38
$1
9
$1
4.
8
$3
.0
8
$4
$0
.5
1
5.
8
Li
be
ria
$1
30
$2
60
$7
$1
5
$2
8
$6
$3
.6
$3
.7
7
$2
$0
.0
0
3.
8
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
$2
80
$8
70
$9
$2
8
$1
78
$3
$1
.8
$4
.5
8
$6
-
19
.2
M
al
aw
i
$2
30
$6
90
$2
1
$6
2
$2
80
$6
$1
.8
$1
2.
30
$1
4
$0
.0
0
13
.6
M
al
i
$4
60
$1
,0
00
$3
1
$6
7
$3
72
$1
6
$1
5.
6
$5
.4
6
$1
5
-
12
.0
M
au
rit
an
ia
$7
60
$1
,9
70
$1
9
$4
1
$5
8
$6
$5
.8
$3
.4
5
$1
3
$0
.0
0
3.
0
61
G
N
I p
er
 c
ap
ita
To
ta
l h
ea
lth
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 (
TH
E)
  
Pr
iv
at
e 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
  
on
 h
ea
lth
 (
US
$)
Ex
te
rn
al
 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
 
pe
r c
ap
ita
 
US
$*
G
en
er
al
 g
ov
t e
xp
en
di
tu
re
  
on
 h
ea
lth
 U
S$
Po
p.
 
(m
ill
io
ns
)
At
la
s 
m
et
ho
d 
US
$
PP
P 
in
t. 
$
Pe
r c
ap
ita
  
US
 $
Pe
r c
ap
ita
  
PP
P 
in
t. 
$
m
ill
io
ns
 U
S$
Pe
r c
ap
ita
.. 
of
 w
hi
ch
 
ou
t-o
f-p
oc
ke
t 
pe
r c
ap
ita
Pe
r c
ap
ita
.. 
of
 w
hi
ch
 
So
ci
al
 S
ec
ur
ity
 
pe
r c
ap
ita
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e
$3
10
$6
60
$1
6
$3
6
$3
39
$5
$1
.9
$9
.7
4
$1
1
$0
.0
0
21
.0
M
ya
nm
ar
-
-
$5
$2
4
$2
64
$5
$4
.7
$0
.6
1
$1
$0
.0
1
48
.4
N
ep
al
$3
20
$1
,0
10
$1
7
$5
2
$4
60
$1
2
$9
.8
$2
.6
1
$5
$0
.0
0
27
.6
N
ig
er
$2
70
$6
30
$1
6
$3
8
$2
21
$7
$7
.0
$5
.2
6
$9
-
13
.7
N
ig
er
ia
$7
90
$1
,7
10
$3
3
$5
9
$4
,8
41
$2
3
$2
0.
8
$1
.9
1
$1
0
$0
.0
0
14
8.
1
Pa
ki
st
an
$8
00
$2
,4
10
$1
6
$4
7
$2
,5
59
$1
3
$1
3.
0
$0
.5
0
$3
$0
.0
0
16
0.
9
Pa
pu
a 
N
ew
 G
ui
ne
a
$7
30
$1
,7
30
$2
9
$6
2
$1
80
$5
$2
.2
$3
.2
6
$2
4
$0
.0
0
6.
2
Rw
an
da
$2
80
$8
10
$3
3
$8
9
$3
13
$1
9
$7
.3
$1
7.
33
$1
4
$0
.5
7
9.
5
Sã
o 
To
m
é 
an
d 
Pr
in
ci
pe
$8
00
$1
,4
90
$4
9
$9
5
$8
$7
$7
.4
$2
4.
88
$4
2
$0
.0
0
0.
2
Se
ne
ga
l
$7
60
$1
,5
60
$4
4
$9
2
$5
34
$1
9
$1
4.
7
$5
.4
3
$2
5
$1
.0
1
12
.1
Si
er
ra
 L
eo
ne
$2
30
$6
10
$1
2
$2
9
$6
8
$7
$4
.1
$3
.8
7
$4
$0
.0
0
5.
9
So
lo
m
on
 Is
la
nd
s
$6
90
$1
,6
00
$4
4
$1
00
$2
1
$4
$2
.5
$8
.3
2
$4
0
$0
.0
0
0.
5
So
m
al
ia
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
8.
4
Ta
jik
is
ta
n
$3
90
$1
,5
50
$2
1
$8
1
$1
41
$1
6
$1
5.
9
$1
.3
4
$5
$0
.0
0
6.
6
Ta
nz
an
ia
$3
70
$1
,1
20
$2
3
$7
2
$9
11
$1
0
$5
.3
$1
0.
12
$1
3
$0
.1
3
39
.5
To
go
$3
50
$7
80
$2
1
$4
6
$1
32
$1
6
$1
3.
7
$2
.5
4
$4
$0
.7
5
6.
4
Ug
an
da
$3
00
$8
70
$2
4
$7
1
$7
10
$1
8
$9
.0
$7
.4
0
$6
$0
.0
0
29
.9
Uz
be
ki
st
an
$6
10
$2
,1
90
$3
0
$1
02
$8
08
$1
5
$1
4.
5
$0
.5
2
$1
5
-
27
.0
Vi
et
 N
am
$7
00
$2
,3
10
$4
6
$1
51
$3
,9
92
$3
1
$2
8.
3
$1
.0
1
$1
5
$5
.8
1
86
.2
Ye
m
en
$7
70
$2
,1
20
$4
0
$1
02
$8
64
$2
1
$2
0.
4
$9
.8
6
$1
8
-
21
.7
Za
m
bi
a
$6
40
$1
,1
60
$5
8
$7
9
$6
78
$2
3
$1
5.
3
$2
2.
08
$3
5
$0
.0
0
11
.7
Zi
m
ba
bw
e
-
-
$3
8
-
$5
02
$1
9
$9
.8
$6
.5
8
$1
8
$0
.0
0
13
.2
* 
 Ex
te
rn
al
 re
so
ur
ce
s 
flo
w
 th
ro
ug
h 
pr
iv
at
e 
an
d 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t e
xp
en
di
tu
re
. T
ot
al
 h
ea
lth
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 is
 th
e 
su
m
 o
f p
riv
at
e 
an
d 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 o
n 
he
al
th
. 
† 
W
or
ld
 B
an
k,
 d
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
9 
Fe
br
ua
ry
 2
00
9:
 h
ttp
://
dd
p-
ex
t.w
or
ld
ba
nk
.o
rg
.
∆
 W
or
ld
 H
ea
lth
 O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
St
at
is
tic
al
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Sy
st
em
 (
W
H
O
SI
S)
, d
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
7 
Fe
br
ua
ry
 2
00
9:
 h
ttp
://
w
w
w
.w
ho
.in
t/w
ho
si
s/
da
ta
/S
ea
rc
h.
js
p.
**
 D
at
a 
ge
ne
ra
te
d 
by
 c
om
bi
ni
ng
 W
H
O
 v
al
ue
s 
fo
r t
ot
al
 h
ea
lth
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 (
TH
E)
 a
s 
%
 o
f G
D
P 
w
ith
 W
B 
da
ta
 o
n 
G
D
P.
††
 M
ea
ns
 a
re
 w
ei
gh
te
d 
by
 c
ou
nt
ry
, n
ot
 p
op
ul
at
io
n.
∆
∆
 - 
m
is
si
ng
 d
at
a.
m
  V
al
ue
s 
fo
r t
ot
al
, p
riv
at
e,
 e
xt
er
na
l, 
an
d 
ge
ne
ra
l e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 o
n 
he
al
th
 fo
r D
PR
K 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
om
itt
ed
 b
ec
au
se
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
to
 U
S$
 u
si
ng
 th
e 
of
fic
ia
l e
xc
ha
ng
e 
ra
te
 p
ro
du
ce
s 
$0
 v
al
ue
s.
 A
nn
ex
 4
b 
pr
ov
id
es
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 s
ha
re
s.
62
To
ta
l h
ea
lth
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 (
TH
E)
Pr
iv
at
e 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 o
n 
he
al
th
*
Ex
te
rn
al
 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
 
fo
r h
ea
lth
  
as
 %
 T
H
E
G
en
er
al
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 o
n 
he
al
th
†
Pe
r c
ap
ita
 (
US
$)
as
 %
  G
D
P
as
 %
 T
H
E
O
ut
-o
f-p
oc
ke
t a
s 
%
 T
H
E
Pr
iv
at
e 
pr
ep
ai
d 
pl
an
s 
as
 %
 T
H
E
as
 %
 T
H
E
as
 %
 to
ta
l 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
So
ci
al
 s
ec
ur
ity
 a
s 
%
 T
H
E
D
at
a 
so
ur
ce
W
H
O
W
H
O
W
H
O
W
H
O
W
H
O
W
H
O
W
H
O
W
H
O
W
H
O
# 
co
un
tri
es
 w
ith
 d
at
a 
47
48
48
48
41
48
48
48
36
M
ea
n∆
$2
4.
7
5.
18
%
53
.9
1%
46
.3
4%
1.
80
%
24
.9
1%
46
.0
9%
9.
10
%
1.
06
%
Af
gh
an
is
ta
n
$2
3
5.
4%
72
.5
%
70
.5
%
0.
0%
20
.1
%
27
.5
%
4.
4%
0.
0%
Ba
ng
la
de
sh
$1
3
3.
1%
63
.2
%
55
.8
%
0.
1%
14
.6
%
36
.8
%
7.
4%
0.
0%
Be
ni
n
$2
9
5.
3%
46
.7
%
46
.7
%
0.
0%
13
.4
%
53
.3
%
13
.1
%
-
Bu
rk
in
a 
Fa
so
$2
7
6.
4%
43
.1
%
39
.4
%
0.
9%
32
.9
%
56
.9
%
15
.8
%
0.
1%
Bu
ru
nd
i
$4
3.
0%
75
.4
%
75
.4
%
0.
0%
13
.7
%
24
.6
%
2.
3%
-
Ca
m
bo
di
a
$3
0
6.
0%
73
.9
%
62
.4
%
0.
0%
22
.3
%
26
.1
%
10
.7
%
0.
0%
Ce
nt
ra
l A
fri
ca
n 
Re
pu
bl
ic
$1
4
3.
9%
64
.4
%
61
.4
%
0.
0%
22
.1
%
35
.6
%
10
.9
%
-
Ch
ad
$2
2
3.
6%
64
.4
%
62
.0
%
0.
3%
23
.5
%
35
.6
%
9.
5%
-
Co
m
or
os
$1
6
3.
2%
44
.5
%
44
.5
%
0.
0%
31
.7
%
55
.5
%
8.
0%
0.
0%
Co
ng
o,
 D
em
. R
ep
.
$6
4.
3%
62
.9
%
62
.9
%
0.
0%
28
.8
%
37
.1
%
7.
2%
0.
0%
Cô
te
 d
’Iv
oi
re
$3
5
3.
8%
77
.0
%
67
.6
%
9.
4%
8.
3%
23
.0
%
4.
1%
-
Er
itr
ea
$1
0
4.
5%
62
.7
%
45
.5
%
0.
0%
26
.5
%
37
.3
%
4.
2%
0.
0%
Et
hi
op
ia
$7
4.
9%
39
.6
%
32
.0
%
1.
2%
42
.9
%
60
.4
%
10
.6
%
0.
2%
G
am
bi
a
$1
3
4.
3%
41
.7
%
29
.3
%
1.
9%
40
.3
%
58
.3
%
8.
7%
0.
0%
G
ha
na
$3
5
6.
2%
63
.5
%
50
.0
%
3.
9%
22
.4
%
36
.5
%
6.
8%
-
G
ui
ne
a
$2
0
5.
7%
87
.7
%
87
.3
%
0.
0%
11
.6
%
12
.3
%
4.
7%
0.
2%
G
ui
ne
a-
Bi
ss
au
$1
3
6.
2%
75
.3
%
44
.7
%
0.
0%
31
.4
%
24
.7
%
4.
0%
0.
7%
H
ai
ti
$4
2
8.
0%
32
.4
%
29
.0
%
0.
0%
65
.8
%
67
.6
%
29
.8
%
-
Ke
ny
a
$2
9
4.
6%
51
.8
%
41
.4
%
3.
6%
14
.8
%
48
.2
%
6.
1%
2.
5%
Ko
re
a,
 D
em
. R
ep
.
-
3.
5%
14
.4
%
14
.4
%
0.
0%
48
.1
%
85
.6
%
6.
0%
-
Ky
rg
yz
st
an
$3
4
6.
4%
56
.7
%
54
.1
%
0.
0%
6.
1%
43
.3
%
8.
7%
9.
0%
La
os
$2
2
3.
6%
79
.2
%
74
.1
%
0.
4%
14
.1
%
20
.8
%
4.
1%
2.
7%
Li
be
ria
$1
0
5.
6%
36
.1
%
35
.7
%
0.
0%
42
.3
%
63
.9
%
16
.4
%
0.
0%
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
$9
3.
2%
37
.2
%
19
.5
%
4.
0%
50
.3
%
62
.8
%
9.
2%
-
M
al
aw
i
$2
0
12
.3
%
27
.9
%
8.
5%
4.
5%
43
.2
%
72
.1
%
18
.0
%
0.
0%
M
al
i
$3
0
6.
0%
48
.3
%
48
.1
%
0.
2%
18
.3
%
51
.7
%
12
.2
%
-
M
au
rit
an
ia
$1
9
2.
2%
31
.4
%
31
.4
%
0.
0%
17
.8
%
68
.6
%
5.
3%
0.
0%
Annex 4b: Distribution of total health expenditure (WHO health expenditure data 2006)
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Annex 5: Distribution of ODA to health, population and reproductive health and to specific  
purposes 2006* 
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Estimates produced by:
1. WHO and partners (Futures Institute and USAID/DELIVER project) 
with collaboration from UNFPA and UNAIDS
2. UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank, Partnership for Maternal, Newborn 
and Child Health
1. Introduction 
This report summarizes the results of the costs, financing and 
impact analyses conducted for Working Group 1 for 49 low-income 
countries†. Two parallel streams of work were undertaken, one 
based on the WHO normative approach and one based on the 
Marginal Budgeting for Bottlenecks (MBB) costing methodology.  
2. Methods 
2.1. WHO Normative Approach
WHO and partners (Futures Institute and USAID /DELIVER PROJECT) 
utilized a normative approach, with collaboration from UNFPA 
and UNAIDS. The normative approach considers the amount of 
resources required to scale up country health systems to a level 
that is considered “best practice” by experts and practitioners. This 
approach is based on reaching universal coverage and utilizing 
proven interventions (listed in Appendix 1) to reach the health 
MDGs between now and 2015. This approach is consistent with 
international commitments and builds on previously published 
global costing on the health MDGs. Missing data meant that a few 
specific countries were excluded from some cost models.
2.2. Marginal Budgeting for Bottlenecks 
The World Bank and UNICEF built on the Marginal Budgeting for 
Bottlenecks (MBB) costing methodology, with collaboration from 
UNFPA and the Partnership on Maternal Newborn and Child Health 
(PMNCH). The methodology identifies the critical constraints 
of existing health systems (bottlenecks) for scaling up effective 
interventions, and then identifies the strategies to overcome them. It 
finally estimates the consequent health outcomes and costs related 
to health system strengthening and increase in coverage. It has 
been applied in 39 countries. In addition, it was used in the recent 
development of investment cases for health MDGs in the Asia-
Pacific Region, and in the WHO-UNICEF-WB Strategic framework 
for reaching MDG 4 and other health MDGs in Africa. The MBB 
approach identifies impacts, incremental funding needs and gaps 
based on three implementation scenarios:
-  Maximum scenario: reaching the health MDGs and beyond;
-  Medium scenario: reaching the health MDGs (4, 5, and 6) and 
contributing substantially to MDGs 1 and 7;
-  Minimum scenario: focusing on the highest impact and lowest 
cost interventions and strategies to accelerate progress towards 
the neglected MDGs, namely 4 and 5.
Interventions are listed in Appendix 2. 
3. Results
3.1. Costs
Table 1 presents the estimates of additional resources needed 
according to the different scenarios (i.e. WHO normative approach 
and MBB Maximum, Medium and Minimum scenarios) for the 
49 countries. The additional costs are presented both in absolute 
values (in billion US$) for the period 2009-2015 and for 2015, 
and in per capita terms. Capital costs are entered when incurred 
and not annualized.
The WHO normative approach and the MBB Maximum scenario 
lead to comparable results in terms of the additional resources 
needed to reach universal coverage with a basic package of 
services. The MBB Medium and MBB Minimum scenarios require 
fewer additional resources as their aims are less comprehensive. 
These results also highlight that, as one would expect, SSA 
countries need a larger share of the additional resources than 
non-SSA countries, although the total populations assessed in the 
SSA group and non-SSA group are similar. In the case of the WHO 
normative approach, it is estimated that 60% of the total additional 
resources need to flow to SSA. This share is higher (over 70%) in 
the MBB scenarios.  
With regard to the breakdown by input, Table 1 shows that in 
the WHO normative approach, 40% of total costs would be 
allocated to capital investment and 60% to recurrent costs. MBB 
Medium and Minimum scenarios show comparable allocation to 
capital investment at 48% and 38%, respectively. In contrast, the 
MBB Maximum scenario shows a greater emphasis on capital 
expenditure (58% of total costs).
In the WHO normative approach and MBB Maximum scenario, 
the share of traded and non-traded costs are comparable (38% 
traded). However, in the MBB Medium and Minimum scenario, 
46% and 53% of the costs respectively are traded. 
Finally, comparing the costs between programme and disease 
and health systems, the difference is significant for both the WHO 
normative approach and the MBB scenarios. In the case of the 
WHO approach, three-quarters of total costs would be allocated to 
health systems. The MBB allocation by specific programme and 
health system involves 52% of the total costs going to programme 
and disease in the Maximum scenario, 38% in the Medium 
scenario and finally 52% in the Minimum scenario. 
Tables 2-4 present the additional costs by capital and recurrent 
expenditure for the 49 countries, and for SSA countries and non SSA 
countries, both in absolute numbers and in per capita values. The 
share of recurrent and capital spending in SSA countries and non-
SSA countries follows the trend observed above for the 49 countries 
under the WHO normative approach and MBB scenarios. Profiles 
over time, including with respect to capital and recurrent, show 
marked differences between WHO and MBB scenarios, with capital 
costs incurred earlier under WHO than under MBB.
* This summary puts together two exercises that were run in parallel. These are reported in greater detail in two separate technical papers (Ref. nos. 185 & 186). 
Questions related to the WHO exercise can be directed to Dr Tessa Tan-Torres Edejer at tantorrest@who.int. Questions related to the MBB scenarios can be directed 
to Dr Agnes Soucat at asoucat@worldbank.org.
† As defined by the World Bank, through the Atlas methodology.
Annex 6:  Summary of methods and data related to cost, financing and impact estimates*
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Table 1: Main costs and main cost breakdowns
 
WHO Normative 
Approach
MBB Maximum 
Scenario
MBB Medium 
Scenario
MBB Minimum 
Scenario
Total Additional Costs (2009-2015) US$ billion $251.44 $227.24 $111.62 $67.46
Total Additional Costs (2009-2015) US$per capita $172 $151 $74 $45
Total Additional Costs in 2015 US$ billion $45.16 $57.99 $36.48 $18.61
Total Additional Costs in 2015 US$per capita $29 $38 $24 $12
Breakdown by input (2009-2015) US$ billion (%)
Capital $100.73 (40%) $132.45 (58%) $53.94 (48%) $25.95 (38%)
Recurrent $150.70 (60%) $94.79 (42%) $57.68 (52%) $41.51 (62%)
Personnel $55.46 (22%) $20.72 (9%) $13.35 (12%) $10.18 (15%)
Drugs and supplies $31.86 (13%) $41.1 (18%) $23.87 (21%) $19.81 (29%)
Other $63.38 (25%) $32.97 (15%) $20.46 (19%) $11.52 (18%)
Traded Costs (2009-2015) US$ billion (%) $95.91 (38%) $87.16 (38%) $51.54 (46%) $35.51 (53%)
Non Traded Costs (2009-2015) US$ billion (%) $155.21 (62%) $140.08 (62%) $60.09 (54%) $31.95 (47%)
Breakdown by specific programmes and health system elements 2009-2015 US$ billion (%) 
Programme and Disease* $65.70 (26%) $117.47 (52%) $42.69 (38%) $34.81 (52%)
Management of childhood illness $2.53 (1%) $5.93 (3%) $3.64 (3%) $3.31 (5%)
Immunization $6.27 (2%) $8.8 (4%) $4.9 (4%) $3.45 (5%)
Maternal health $11.82 (5%) $7.51 (3%) $5.62 (5%) $3.72 (6%)
Family planning $8.43 (3%) $3.02 (1%) $2.81 (3%) $2.19 (3%)
HIV/AIDS $15.13 (6%) $12.73 (6%) $9.07 (8%) $7.34 (11%)
TB† $4.78 (2%) $2.38 (1%) $1.82 (2%) $1.41 (2%)
Malaria $7.25 (3%) $12.84 (6%) $10.67 (10%) $10.67 (16%)
Essential drugs (NCD, MH, Parasitic Diseases) $9.48 (4%) $11.22 (5%) $0 (0%) $0 (0%)
Water and Sanitation $49.12 (22%) $0.73 (1%) $0.03 (0%)
Nutrition $3.92 (2%) $3.44 (3%) $2.69 (4%)
Health Systems $185.73 (74%) $109.77 (48%) $68.93 (62%) $32.65 (48%)
Human resources $62.28 (25%) $26.21 (12%) $21.19 (19%) $14.64 (22%)
Infrastructure, transport and equipment $91.23 (36%) $50.04 (22%) $28.83 (26%) $9.43 (14%)
Supply chain / logistics $12.82 (5%) $20.41 (9%) $8.75 (8%) $3.42 (5%)
Health information systems $4.52 (2%) $2.09 (1%) $1.49 (1%) $1.11 (2%)
Governance, accreditation and regulation $5.56 (2%) $7.83 (3%) $6.36 (6%) $4.05 (6%)
Health financing $9.34 (4%) $3.19 (1%) $2.3 (2%) $0 (0%)
Breakdown by region (2009-2015) US$ billion (%)
SSA Costs (2009-2015) US$ billion (%) $150.81 (60%) $172.47 (76%) $89.19 (80%) $48.29 (72%)
Non SSA Costs (2009-2015) US$ billion (%) $100.62 (40%) $54.77 (24%) $22.43 (20%) $19.17 (28%)
* Generic human resources and infrastructure costs included under health systems.
† The TB cost estimates in the MBB scenarios are only for TB drugs. HR, programme and equipment costs are included with health systems.
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Table 2: Additional costs by year for the 49 countries (total and per capita)
Total (in US$ billions)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014    2015 Total
WHO Normative Approach $19.34  $27.47 $36.01 $41.79 $39.56 $42.11 $45.16 $251.44
Capital $12.80 $17.58 $22.88 $23.34 $13.60 $8.28 $2.25 $100.73
Recurrent $6.54 $9.88 $13.12 $18.45 $25.96 $33.84 $42.91 $150.70
MBB Maximum Scenario $12.73 $16.7 $23.57 $24.43 $27.66 $64.17 $57.99 $227.24
Capital $9.73 $10.63 $13.47 $11.35 $10.79 $43.2 $33.28 $132.45
Recurrent $3 $6.06 $10.09 $13.08 $16.87 $20.97 $24.71 $94.79
MBB Medium Scenario $4.3 $5.65 $7.31 $12.64 $18.61 $26.62 $36.48 $111.62
Capital $2.49 $2.45 $2.69 $5.61 $8.29 $13.06 $19.36 $53.94
Recurrent $1.81 $3.21 $4.62 $7.03 $10.32 $13.56 $17.13 $57.68
MBB Minimum Scenario $2.95 $4.42 $6.57 $8.47 $10.78 $15.65 $18.61 $67.46
Capital $1.82 $2.03 $2.51 $2.84 $3.05 $6.26 $7.45 $25.95
Recurrent $1.14 $2.4 $4.06 $5.63 $7.73 $9.39 $11.17 $41.51
Per capita (in US$)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014    2015 Total
WHO Normative Approach $14.20  $19.75 $25.35 $28.82 $26.72 $27.87 $29.30 $172.01
Capital $9.40 $12.64 $16.11 $16.10 $9.18 $5.48 $1.46 $70.37
Recurrent $4.80 $7.11 $9.24 $12.72 $17.54 $22.40 $27.84 $101.64
MBB Maximum Scenario $8.9 $11.67 $16.47 $16.41 $18.58 $41.61 $37.6 $151.24 
Capital $6.8 $7.43 $9.42 $7.62 $7.25 $28.01 $21.58 $88.11 
Recurrent $2.1 $4.24 $7.06 $8.79 $11.33 $13.6 $16.02 $63.14 
MBB Medium Scenario $3 $3.95 $5.11 $8.49 $12.51 $17.26 $23.66 $73.98 
Capital $1.74 $1.71 $1.88 $3.77 $5.57 $8.47 $12.55 $35.69 
Recurrent $1.26 $2.24 $3.23 $4.73 $6.94 $8.79 $11.11 $38.30 
MBB Minimum Scenario $2.06 $3.09 $4.59 $5.68 $7.22 $10.1 $12.01 $44.75 
Capital $1.27 $1.42 $1.76 $1.9 $2.05 $4.04 $4.8 $17.24 
Recurrent $0.79 $1.68 $2.84 $3.78 $5.18 $6.06 $7.21 $27.54 
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Table 3: Additional costs by year for sub-Saharan Africa (total and per capita)
Total (in US$ billions)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014    2015 Total
WHO Normative Approach $11.14 $16.05 $21.01 $24.72 $24.11 $25.82 $27.96 $150.81 
Capital $6.79 $9.53 $12.59 $12.90 $7.75 $4.81 $1.50 $55.89 
Recurrent $4.35 $6.52 $8.41 $11.82 $16.36 $21.00 $26.46 $94.93 
MBB Maximum Scenario $9.96 $13.25 $18.99 $18.71 $21.06 $47.03 $43.47 $172.47
Capital $7.84 $8.91 $11.64 $9.28 $9.05 $32.31 $26.47 $105.51
Recurrent $2.11 $4.34 $7.35 $9.43 $12 $14.72 $17 $66.96
MBB Medium Scenario $3.19 $4.07 $5.15 $9.96 $15.27 $21.4 $30.15 $89.19
Capital $1.88 $1.8 $1.93 $4.78 $7.32 $10.98 $17.07 $45.75
Recurrent $1.31 $2.27 $3.22 $5.18 $7.95 $10.42 $13.09 $43.44
Per capita (in US$)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014    2015 Total
WHO Normative Approach $15.84 $22.25 $28.41 $32.61 $31.05 $32.45 $34.32 $196.92 
Capital $9.66 $13.21 $17.03 $17.02 $9.98 $6.05 $1.84 $74.79 
Recurrent $6.18 $9.03 $11.38 $15.60 $21.06 $26.40 $32.48 $122.13 
MBB Maximum Scenario $13.38 $17.8 $25.51 $24.05 $27.07 $58.11 $53.71 $219.63 
Capital $10.54 $11.97 $15.64 $11.93 $11.64 $39.92 $32.71 $134.35 
Recurrent $2.84 $5.83 $9.87 $12.13 $15.43 $18.19 $21 $85.29 
MBB Medium Scenario $4.28 $5.47 $6.92 $12.81 $19.63 $26.44 $37.26 $112.81 
Capital $2.52 $2.42 $2.59 $6.15 $9.4 $13.57 $21.09 $57.74 
Recurrent $1.76 $3.05 $4.33 $6.66 $10.22 $12.87 $16.17 $55.06 
MBB Minimum Scenario $2.69 $4.17 $6.44 $7.69 $9.82 $13.78 $16.44 $61.03 
Capital $1.74 $2 $2.56 $2.55 $2.65 $5.63 $6.96 $24.09 
Recurrent $0.95 $2.17 $3.89 $5.14 $7.16 $8.15 $9.48 $36.94 
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3.2. Financing gap
Additional financing has been estimated based on WHO calculations*. Baseline expenditures estimated for 2008, from which projections 
were made, are presented in Table 5.
Table 4: Additional costs by year for non sub-Saharan African countries (total and per capita)
Total (in US$ billions)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014    2015 Total
WHO Normative Approach $8.20 $11.42 $15.00 $17.07 $15.45 $16.30 $17.19 $100.62 
Capital $6.01 $8.05 $10.29 $10.44 $5.84 $3.46 $0.75 $44.85 
Recurrent $2.19 $3.37 $4.71 $6.63 $9.60 $12.83 $16.45 $55.78 
MBB Maximum Scenario $2.77 $3.45 $4.58 $5.72 $6.6 $17.14 $14.51 $54.77
Capital $1.88 $1.72 $1.83 $2.07 $1.74 $10.89 $6.8 $26.93
Recurrent $0.89 $1.73 $2.75 $3.65 $4.87 $6.25 $7.71 $27.84
MBB Medium Scenario $1.11 $1.58 $2.17 $2.68 $3.35 $5.22 $6.33 $22.43
Capital $0.61 $0.65 $0.76 $0.83 $0.98 $2.08 $2.29 $8.19
Recurrent $0.5 $0.93 $1.4 $1.85 $2.37 $3.14 $4.04 $14.24
MBB Minimum Scenario $0.95 $1.32 $1.77 $2.46 $3.11 $4.38 $5.18 $19.17
Capital $0.52 $0.53 $0.61 $0.84 $0.98 $1.66 $1.76 $6.9
Recurrent $0.43 $0.79 $1.16 $1.62 $2.13 $2.73 $3.42 $12.27
Per capita (in US$)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014    2015 Total
WHO Normative Approach $12.45 $17.05 $22.03 $24.66 $21.95 $22.79 $23.66 $144.60 
Capital $9.13 $12.03 $15.11 $15.09 $8.30 $4.84 $1.03 $65.53 
Recurrent $3.32 $5.03 $6.92 $9.57 $13.65 $17.95 $22.63 $79.07 
MBB Maximum Scenario $4.04 $5.02 $6.67 $8.05 $9.29 $23.38 $19.8 $76.25 
Capital $2.75 $2.51 $2.67 $2.91 $2.44 $14.86 $9.28 $37.42 
Recurrent $1.3 $2.52 $4 $5.13 $6.85 $8.53 $10.52 $38.85 
MBB Medium Scenario $1.62 $2.31 $3.16 $3.77 $4.71 $7.12 $8.64 $31.33 
Capital $0.89 $0.95 $1.11 $1.16 $1.37 $2.84 $3.13 $11.45 
Recurrent $0.73 $1.36 $2.04 $2.61 $3.34 $4.28 $5.51 $19.87 
MBB Minimum Scenario $1.39 $1.92 $2.58 $3.46 $4.37 $5.98 $7.07 $26.77 
Capital $0.76 $0.78 $0.89 $1.18 $1.38 $2.26 $2.4 $9.65 
Recurrent $0.63 $1.11 $1.57 $2.19 $2.97 $3.8 $4.91 $17.18 
Table 5: 2008† baseline expenditure data (billion US$) (48 countries)
All countries 30.65 SSA 16.16 Non SSA 14.49
Government 7.99 Government   3.88 Government 4.12
External 5.02 External   3.78 External 1.24
Private 17.64 Private   8.50 Private 9.14
* See Technical Background Report for details. Additional financing was estimated for 48 countries only, due to lack of information on Somalia.
† 2008 data are estimated based on 2006 data.
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Table 6: Assumptions for the additional financing scenarios
WHO scenarios (all in 2005 constant US$)
 Scenario 1: No change Scenario 2: Optimistic Scenario 3: Pessimistic
GDP, 2008 WEO, IMF April 2009 update WEO, IMF April 2009 update WEO, IMF April 2009 update
Annual GDP growth WEO, IMF April 2009 update WEO, IMF April 2009 update 1% less than that predicted in WEO, 
IMF April 2009 update
Health as % of Total Government 
Expenditure 
Constant 2007 GGHE (only that which 
is domestically funded*) as a share 
of GDP  
Reaches 15% GGHE/GGE in 2015 for 
sub Saharan African (SSA) countries†, 
and  12% for others
Constant to GDP, except for 
2009-2010,where there is a 10% 
decrease of the share to GDP
Official Development Assistance for 
health (multilateral, bilateral and 
general budget support; does not 
include debt relief)
Constant proportion of ODA to donor’s 
GDP; constant patterns of allocation to 
countries and sector based on 2007 
OECD-CRS data
ODA target as % of GNI from OECD 
DAC∆; 50% of additional EU resources 
up to 2010 allocated to SSA
Doubling of Japan ODA to Africa by 
2012**
63B US$ from the USA  
by 2014††
Constant to GDP, except for 2009-
2010, where there is a 10% decrease 
of the share to GDP; then returns to 
2008 ratios and kept constant starting 
from 2011 to 2015
Private expenditure for health 50% of constant proportion of private 
health expenditures to GDP
50% of projected private funds, which 
were projected using elasticity to GDP
50% of constant proportion of private 
health expenditures to GDP 
* GGHE general government expenditure on health; external funds flowing through the government are removed using shares obtained from NHA reports from the countries.
† General government expenditure based on Abuja Declaration of African Union. 
∆ Table 4 in www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/56/42458719.pdf. 
** http://www.ticad.net/presskit2008/Japan-initiatives-TICAD-IV.pdf.
†† http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-Global-Health-Initiative/.
Two scenarios were chosen to project the available additional financing by 2015: a no change scenario in which public, private, and 
external sources of funds would evolve in line with country GDP, and a commitments met scenario, in which countries would abide by the 
various pledges they have made.
Table 7: Available additional financing for 48 countries (million constant 2005 US$) (2009-2015)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total  
(’09-’15)
No change scenario 441 1,142 2,266 3,556 4,953 6,453 8,039 26,850
Government 303 643 1,114 1,651 2,237 2,873 3,546 12,368
External -186 -193 -74 74 219 351 496 688
Private 324 692 1,226 1,832 2,496 3,228 3,998 13,795
Optimistic scenario 5,076 9,084 13,595 19,137 25,930 34,008 44,366 151,196
Government 1,574 3,577 6,311 9,923 14,698 21,105 29,686 86,875
External 2,876 4,176 5,031 5,905 6,741 7,084 7,411 39,224
Private 625 1,330 2,254 3,309 4,491 5,820 7,268 25,097
Pessimistic scenario -879 -1,308 511 1,685 2,955 4,317 5,757 13,039
Government -529 -1,002 -625 -195 274 783 1,321 27
External -670 -990 -77 69 213 343 486 -627
Private 320 684 1,213 1,812 2,468 3,191 3,950 13,639
Table 7 presents the additional financing by year under the three scenarios for low-income countries.
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2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total  
(’09-’15)
No change scenario 142 451 1,032 1,678 2,367 3,085 3,853 12,607
Government 135 287 516 768 1,039 1,329 1,637 5,712
External -141 -147 -58 51 160 258 366 490
Private 147 310 574 858 1,168 1,498 1,849 6,405
Optimistic scenario 3,614 6,114 8,688 11,823 15,604 19,847 25,285 90,975
Government 828 1,885 3,358 5,294 7,853 11,250 15,788 46,255
External 2,494 3,612 4,262 4,962 5,628 5,863 6,091 32,913
Private 293 617 1,068 1,567 2,123 2,734 3,406 11,807
Pessimistic scenario -627 -941 184 774 1,405 2,059 2,759 5,613
Government -267 -507 -324 -122 95 326 573 -226
External -506 -741 -61 48 155 253 359 -492
Private 146 307 568 849 1,155 1,480 1,827 6,332
Table 8: Available additional financing for sub-Saharan African countries (million constant 2005 US$)  (2009-2015)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total  
(’09-’15)
No change scenario 299 691 1,234 1,879 2,586 3,368 4,187 14,243
Government 168 356 598 883 1,198 1,545 1,909 6,656
External -45 -46 -15 22 59 93 129 197
Private 176 381 651 973 1,328 1,731 2,149 7,389
Optimistic scenario 1,461 2,970 4,907 7,314 10,326 14,162 19,081 60,221
Government 746 1,692 2,953 4,629 6,845 9,855 13,898 40,620
External 382 564 768 942 1,113 1,221 1,320 6,311
Private 333 713 1,186 1,742 2,368 3,086 3,863 13,290
Pessimistic scenario -252 -367 327 911 1,550 2,258 2,998 7,426
Government -261 -495 -301 -73 179 457 748 253
External -165 -249 -16 21 58 91 127 -134
Private 174 377 645 963 1,314 1,711 2,123 7,307
Table 9: Available additional financing for non-SSA countries (million constant 2005 US$) (2009-2015)
Table 8 and Table 9 present the same data, broken down for SSA and non-SSA countries.
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Table 10 presents the funding gap in 2015, for the WHO normative costs and the MBB scenarios. 
Table 10: Funding requirements and funding gap for 2015 for each group of countries and under the three financing 
scenarios (billion constant 2005 US$)
 Sources of additional funding WHO scenario MBB Maximum 
Scenario
MBB Medium 
Scenario
MBB Minimum 
Scenario
All countries Gov’t DAH Private Total Cost Gap Cost Gap Cost Gap Cost Gap
Optimistic 30 7 7 44 45 1 58 14 36 -8 19 -26
No change 4 0.5 4 8 45 37 58 50 36 28 19 11
Pessimistic 1.32 0.5 4 6 45 39 58 52 36 31 19 13
 Sources of additional funding WHO scenario MBB Maximum 
Scenario
MBB Medium 
Scenario
MBB Minimum 
Scenario
SSA Gov’t DAH Private Total Cost Gap Cost Gap Cost Gap Cost Gap
Optimistic 16 6 3 25 28 3 43 18 30 5 13 -12
No change 2 0.4 2 4 28 24 43 40 30 26 13 10
Pessimistic 0.6 0.4 2 3 28 25 43 41 30 27 13 11
 Sources of additional funding WHO scenario MBB Maximum 
Scenario
MBB Medium 
Scenario
MBB Minimum 
Scenario
Non-SSA Gov’t DAH Private Total Cost Gap Cost Gap Cost Gap Cost Gap
Optimistic 14 1 4 19 17 -2 15 -5 6 -13 5 -14
No change 2 0 2 4 17 13 15 10 6 2 5 1
Pessimistic 0.7 0 2 3 17 14 15 12 6 3 5 2
Table 11: Funding requirements and funding gap for 2009-2015 for each group of countries and under the three 
financing scenarios (billion constant 2005 US$)
 Sources of additional funding WHO scenario MBB Maximum 
Scenario
MBB Medium 
Scenario
MBB Minimum 
Scenario
All countries Gov’t DAH Private Total Cost Gap Cost Gap Cost Gap Cost Gap
Optimistic 87 39 25 151 251 100 227 76 112 -40 67 -84
No change 12 0.7 14 27 251 225 227 200 112 85 67 41
Pessimistic 0.03 -0.6 14 13 251 238 227 214 112 99 67 54
 Sources of additional funding WHO scenario MBB Maximum 
Scenario
MBB Medium 
Scenario
MBB Minimum 
Scenario
SSA Gov’t DAH Private Total Cost Gap Cost Gap Cost Gap Cost Gap
Optimistic 46 33 12 91 151 60 172 81 89 -2 48 -43
No change 6 0.5 6 13 151 138 172 160 89 77 48 36
Pessimistic -0.2 -0.5 6 6 151 145 172 167 89 84 48 43
 Sources of additional funding WHO scenario MBB Maximum 
Scenario
MBB Medium 
Scenario
MBB Minimum 
Scenario
Non-SSA Gov’t DAH Private Total Cost Gap Cost Gap Cost Gap Cost Gap
Optimistic 41 6 13 60 100 40 55 -5 22 -38 19 -41
No change 7 0 7 14 100 86 55 41 22 8 19 5
Pessimistic 0.3 0 7 7 100 93 55 47 22 15 19 12
Table 11 presents a similar funding gap analysis but for the seven-year period from 2009 to 2015.
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3.3. Additional facilities and health workers
Table 12 shows that almost 97,000 new or renovated facilities would be operating by 2015 according to the WHO normative approach. 
The large majority (92%) would be health centres. During this period, some 3.5 million additional health workers would be required. The 
majority of all new positions would be either nurses/midwives (49%) or community health workers (27%).
Table 12: Additional facilities and health workers, WHO normative scenario
 Total  % 
Health Facilities 96,838 100 
Health Centre 88,960 92
District Hospital 6,718 7
Regional Hospital 1,160 1
Additional Health Personnel 3,476,569 100 
Physicians 349,953 10
Nurses/Midwives 1,699,107 49
Clinical Officers 233,302 7
Radiology Technicians 47,697 1
Lab Technicians 37,656 1
Pharmacy Aides 20,083 1
Orderlies 75,311 2
Pharmacists 16,317 0.5
Laboratory Technologists 16,317 0.5
Dental Technicians 30,125 1
Community Health Workers 950,701 27
Table 13: Additional facilities and health workers, MBB maximum scenario
 Total  % 
Health Facilities 92,451 100.0
Health Post 72,923 78.9
Health Centre 14,675 15.9
District Hospital 3,848 4.2
Regional Hospital 1,005 1.1
Health Workers 2,933,739 100
Community based health & nutrition promoters 1,599,479 55
Health extension workers 247,224 8
Junior, assistant, assistant midwife nurse (1 year training) 249,092 8
Technicians (lab, x-ray, pharmacy) 166,082 6
Registered nurses/midwives (at least 3 years’ training) 237,816 8
Health officer 20,694 1
Physician/MD 41,599 1
Specialist 12,713 0
Administrative staff 359,039 12
Table 13 describes the additional facilities and health workers under the MBB Maximum scenario and Table 14 the Medium scenario.  
In the Medium scenario, during the seven-year period more than 73,000 facilities are proposed for construction or rehabilitation. A large 
majority of the facilities would be health posts (79%) and health centres (17%). During the same period over 2.6 million additional health 
workers would be required. Seven of every ten new positions would be either a community health worker (56%), health extension worker 
(8%) or junior nurse (6%).
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Table 14: Additional facilities and health workers, MBB medium scenario
 Total  % 
Health Facilities 73,695 100.0
Health Post 57,816 78.5
Health Centre 12,307 16.7
District Hospital 2,828 3.8
Regional Hospital 744 1.0
Health Workers 2,585,894 100
Community based health & nutrition promoters 1,441,929 56
Health extension workers 200,147 8
Junior, assistant, assistant midwife nurse (1 year training) 160,478 6
Technicians (lab, x-ray, pharmacy) 158,790 6
Registered nurses/midwives (at least 3 years’ training) 203,013 8
Health officer 23,226 1
Physician/MD 35,879 1
Specialist 6,236 0
Administrative staff 356,195 14
Table 15: Additional facilities and health workers, MBB minimum scenario
 Total  % 
Health Facilities 64,069 100.0
Health Post 50,468 78.8
Health Centre 10,354 16.2
District Hospital 2,757 4.3
Regional Hospital 490 0.8
Health Workers 1,299,680 100
Community based health & nutrition promoters 372,228 29
Health extension workers 170,561 13
Junior, assistant, assistant midwife nurse (1 year training) 176,222 14
Technicians (lab, x-ray, pharmacy) 116,988 9
Registered nurses/midwives (at least 3 years’ training) 167,238 13
Health officer 14,597 1
Physician/MD 29,020 2
Specialist 8,954 1
Administrative staff 243,873 19
Finally, Table 15 describes the additional facilities and health workers under the MBB Minimum scenario. During the period more than 
64,000 facilities would be constructed or rehabilitated. A large majority of the facilities would be health posts (78%) and health centres 
(16%). During this period, some 1.3 million additional health workers would be required. More than 60% of all new positions would be 
community health workers (29%), health extension workers (13%) or junior nurses (14%).
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3.4. Health outputs
The tables below provide examples of the additional outputs produced by the health system for the WHO approach and for the MBB 
scenarios. In the WHO approach, more than 22 million additional women will gain access to safe birth attendance and antenatal care,  
with their children receiving quality of care at birth and neonatal care. More than 40 million additional children will have their pneumonia 
treated according to standard guidelines.
Table 16: Additional outputs in WHO approach, 2015 (millions)
SSA Non-SSA Total
Additional women obtaining access to SBA and ANC 14.95 7.10 22.05
Additional newborns getting quality of care at birth and neonatal care 14.95 7.10 22.05
Number of new users (both women and men) receiving contraceptive services 26.10 16.53 42.63
Additional number of children with pneumonia managed according to standard guidelines 24.32 15.78 40.09
Number of lives prolonged due to ART (= total number of persons on ART in 2015 ) 5.02 0.18 5.20
Table 17: Additional health outputs for different MBB scenarios in 2015 (millions)
MBB Maximum MBB Medium MBB Minimum
Additional # of pregnant women receiving ANC 19.51 17.22 13.51
Additional # of deliveries by SBA 18.21 16.23 10.20
Additional # neonatal Infections treated 1.13 1.29 1.48
Additional # of WRA with access to FP 106.57 87.25 67.04
Additional # of episodes of ARI in under-5 treated 178.79 212.46 241.58
Additional # episodes of malaria in under-5 treated 57.90 82.42 146.39
Additional # episodes of diarrhoea in U5 receiving zinc 66.24 126.81 228.81
Additional # of infants exclusively breastfed 6 months 20.17 17.95 14.25
Additional # of children (12 Mo) fully immunized 17.36 15.22 11.37
Additional # of severely malnourished children under-5 receiving therapeutic feeding 11.95 10.72 8.96
Additional # of children under-5 receiving 2 doses of vitamin A per year 225.11 196.99 165.06
Total # of people receiving first-line ART 2.71 2.26 1.84
Additional # of people with receiving DOTS 4.18 3.78 2.99
Total # of long lasting ITNs distributed (2009-2015) 353.29 313.56 232.23
Additional # of people with access to improved source of drinking water 468.97 - -
Additional # of people with access to improved sanitation 866.88 569.65 306.11
In the MBB Maximum scenario more than 19 million additional women will have access to ANC, and 18 million will deliver  
with skilled attendants. Nearly 179 million* additional episodes of acute respiratory infections will be treated by an adequate caregiver. 
In the MBB Medium scenario more than 17 million additional women will have access to ANC, and 16 million will deliver with skilled 
attendants. Over 212 million additional episodes of acute respiratory infections will be treated by an adequate caregiver. In the MBB 
Minimum scenario nearly 14 million additional women will have access to ANC, and over 10 million will deliver with skilled attendants. 
More than 242 million additional episodes of acute respiratory infections will be treated by an adequate caregiver.
* fewer cases are treated in the maximum scenario because greater preventive efforts reduce the numbers of cases needing treatment.
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3.5 Health impact
Both the WHO normative approach and the MBB maximum 
scenario aim to strengthen all building blocks of health systems 
to provide universal coverage with a set of essential services 
which would dramatically improve health outcomes in developing 
countries, providing basic care for most frequent health ailments. 
Both encompass the most complete set of interventions including 
basic care for non-communicable diseases and relief of symptoms 
for patients with unspecified illnesses. In addition, the MBB 
Maximum scenario includes substantial water and sanitation 
investments.
Table 16 provides the impact estimates for WHO and MBB 
scenarios for the year 2015. It should be noted that the modelling 
methods to obtain these numbers are not strictly comparable 
between WHO and MBB estimates, and hence that some differences 
are due to differing methods of estimation. In addition, as indicated 
in Appendices 1 and 2, there are differences in the intervention 
mixes which give rise to differing impacts.
In the WHO Normative scenario, in 2015:
-  Nearly 4 million child and infant deaths would be averted, and 
MDG 4 would be achieved in 80% of countries.
-  Over 300,000 maternal deaths would be averted in 2015 and 
MDG 5 would be achieved in 45% of the countries.
-  Nearly 200,000 HIV deaths and 265,000 TB deaths would be 
averted.
-  According to the Global Plan to Stop TB, MDG target 6c will be 
met at the regional level in all regions, as TB incidence rates will 
fall by 2015; the MDG 6 malaria target is likely to be reached, 
since incidence and mortality would decline by 2015.
-  11 million births would be averted and the MDG target for unmet 
demand for family planning would be met in all countries.
-  30 million children (aged 12-59 months) would be protected 
from stunting.
In the MBB Maximum scenario, in 2015:
-  4.7 million child and infant deaths would be averted, and MDG4 
would be achieved in 86% of countries.
-  Nearly 300,000 maternal deaths would be averted in 2015 and 
MDG 5 would be achieved in 55% of the countries.
-  Nearly 200,000 HIV deaths and 283,000 TB deaths would be 
averted.
-  16 million births would be averted and the MDG target for unmet 
demand for family planning would be met in all countries
-  9.9 million children (aged 12-23 months) would be protected 
from stunting.
-  There would be 100% access to an improved source of drinking 
water and sanitation and an additional improvement in the quality 
of drinking water through household water treatment in 37% of 
households. MDG 7 would be fully achieved in all countries. 
In the MBB medium scenario, in 2015:
-  Over 4 million child and infant deaths would be averted,  
and MDG 4 would be achieved in 82% of countries.
-  259,000 maternal deaths would be averted in 2015 and MDG 5 
would be achieved in 39% of the countries.
-  Nearly 177,000 HIV deaths and 235,000 TB deaths would  
be averted.
-  11.9 million births would be averted and the MDG target for unmet 
demand for Family Planning would be met in all countries.
-  8 million children (aged 12-23 months) would be protected  
from stunting.
-  There would be an increase of three quarters in access to 
improved sanitation and improvement in the quality of drinking 
water through household water treatment in 18% of households. 
The sanitation goal of MDG 7 would be fully achieved in 48 of the 
49 countries.
In the MBB minimum scenario, in 2015:
-  3.5 million child and infant deaths would be averted, and MDG 4 
would be achieved in 45% of countries.
-  200,000 maternal deaths would be averted in 2015 and MDG 5 
would be achieved in 12% of the countries.
-  Over 116,000 HIV deaths and 169,000 TB deaths would be 
averted.
-  7 million births would be averted and 73% of countries would 
meet the MDG family planning target.
-  6 million children (aged 12-23 months) would be protected from 
stunting.
-  There would be an increase of nearly two thirds in access to 
improved sanitation.
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Table 18: Comparative impact of different scenarios on reaching the health related MDGs (values for year 2015 
as compared with a year-specific [1990/2005] baseline)
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Preventive interventions
Communication and behaviour change
Condom promotion and distribution
Control of tobacco use
Counselling for improved complementary feeding
Counselling for promotion of exclusive and continued breastfeeding
Family planning interventions: oral contraceptives, injectables, 
condom (male and female), intrauterine device (IUD), implant, 
sterilization (female and male)
Harm reduction among intravenous drug users
HIV prevention among female sex workers
HIV prevention among male sex workers
HIV prevention among men who have sex with men
HIV prevention: mass media
Immunizations (all routine immunizations including BCG, DPT, 
OPV, Hib, pneumococcus, two-dose measles, hepatitis B, 
yellow fever, rubella, rotavirus, and meningitis A, and Japanese 
encephalitis for populations at risk)
Implementation of the international code of marketing of breast  
milk substitutes
Insecticidal mosquito nets, long-lasting, or other malaria vector 
control intervention
Intermittent preventive therapy for malaria
Male circumcision
Newborn care, routine (immediate postnatal care, breastfeeding 
support, resuscitation, small baby care and kangaroo mother care, 
care for minor problems, presumptive sepsis care, eye prophylaxis, 
presumptive treatment for syphilis, pre-referral care for seriously  
ill neonate)
Post-exposure prophylaxis
Postnatal care
Postpartum administration of anti-D immunoglobulin to rhesus-
negative women with a rhesus-positive foetus
Postpartum care in the maternity ward, routine (examination of 
the mother, information and counselling, recording and reporting, 
administration of iron and folate supplements, administration of 
vitamin A supplements)
Postpartum care, follow-up visit (postpartum examination of the 
mother, information and counselling on home care, care seeking, 
counselling on family planning methods)
Postpartum counselling on family planning (counselling on family 
planning methods, voluntary tubal ligation, intrauterine device, 
combined oral contraceptives, combined injectables)
Prevention and control of malaria epidemics
Prevention of mother to child transmission of HIV by antiretroviral 
prophylaxis and infant feeding counselling
Salt reduction in processed foods
Screening all pregnant women for blood group isoimmunization
Social marketing
Sexually transmitted infection management
Universal salt iodization
Vitamin A supplementation to children under five, routine
Voluntary counselling and testing
Treatment interventions
Antibiotic treatment for dysentery
Antiretroviral therapy
Antiretroviral therapy (plus co-trimoxazole preventive therapy for HIV 
positive TB patients)
Basic care package for HIV positive people
Case management of diarrhoea
Case management of malaria (artemisinin-based combination 
therapies and rapid diagnostic tests)
Case management of pneumonia
Case management of severe malnutrition
Case management of neonatal infections
Co-trimoxazole preventive therapy for HIV positive TB patients
Diagnostic testing (HIV)
HIV care and support in TB patients
HIV surveillance in TB patients tested
HIV testing and counselling of TB patients
Home-based care for people living with HIV
Isoniazid preventive therapy, following tuberculin skin test
Isoniazid preventive therapy, no tuberculin skin test
Management of breathing difficulty 
Management of congenital syphilis 
Management of convulsions
Management of mastitis
Management of neonatal tetanus 
Management of postpartum depression
Management of severe hypothermia 
Management of severe jaundice 
Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis patients treated 
Nutritional support
Palliative care for people living with HIV
Prophylaxis for opportunistic infections
Regular deworming
Routine offer of counselling and testing
Safe abortions/management of abortion complications
Sepsis management
Severe and complicated malaria, case management
Special general care for seriously ill neonate
Supporting breastfeeding (maternal stay for baby care)
Appendix 1:  List of health interventions costed in WHO normative approach*
* Investments required to ensure scale-up of HIV activities related to blood safety, safe injections and universal precautions are included in the costs for health 
systems investments
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TB smear positive/ negative / extrapulmonary treatment 
TB screening among people living with HIV
Treatment of bacterial vaginosis or trichomoniasis infection in 
pregnancy
Treatment of chlamydia in pregnancy
Treatment of chronic diseases including asthma, cardiovascular 
disease, mental illness and neglected tropical diseases and 
symptomatic treatment
Treatment of complications during childbirth (ultrasound, 
promote foetal maturation before preterm delivery, management 
of pre-labour rupture of membranes or infection, management 
of antepartum haemorrhage, management of puerperal sepsis, 
management of obstructed labour, management of prolonged 
labour, management of foetal distress, episiotomy, avoid breech 
presentation at birth [with external cephalic version], vaginal breech 
delivery, craniotomy or embryotomy, management of postpartum 
haemorrhage, management of perineal infection, repair of vaginal 
or perineal tear, repair of cervical tear, symphysiotomy)
Treatment of eclampsia
Treatment of gonorrhoea in pregnancy
Treatment of hookworm infection (antenatal care)
Treatment of lower urinary tract infection in pregnancy
Treatment of measles and measles complications
Treatment of moderate anaemia in pregnancy
Treatment of opportunistic infections
Treatment of severe anaemia
Treatment of severe hypertension in pregnancy
Treatment of severe pre-eclampsia 
Treatment of syphilis in pregnancy
Treatment of upper urinary tract infection
Treatment of upper urinary tract infection in pregnancy
Treatment of vaginal candida infection in pregnancy
Very small baby care and kangaroo mother care  
Complicated interventions
Antenatal care, routine (assessment of maternal and foetal well-
being, information and counselling, recording and reporting, 
screening for hypertensive disorders of pregnancy [pre-eclampsia], 
screening for anaemia, prevention of anaemia, specialist care for 
pregnant women with diabetes, syphilis testing, tetanus toxoid 
immunization)
Childbirth care, routine (initial assessment and recognition of 
delivery complications, surveillance and regular monitoring of 
labour and delivery, social support throughout labour and delivery, 
prevention and control of infections, assistance during childbirth, 
active management of the third stage of labour, care and support  
of the mother)
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Appendix 2: List of interventions costed in MBB*
Interventions to reduce under-5 mortality
Diarrhoea
Antibiotics (diarrhoea)
Breastfeeding, children 6-11 months 
Complementary feeding
Exclusive breastfeeding 0-5 months
Oral rehydration therapy
Vitamin A supplement (child)
Hand washing with soap by mother
Use of sanitary latrine
Supply of safe drinking water
Quality of drinking water
Multiple water/sanitation/hygiene interventions
Zinc supplements (child)
Zinc therapy
Rotavirus vaccine
Management of severe dehydration and complicated enteric fevers 
at referral level
HIV / AIDS
Condom use
Male circumcision
Sexually transmitted infection management
Preventing mother-to-child transmission of HIV, (testing and 
counselling, AZT + single dose nevirapine and infant feeding 
counselling)
First-line antiretroviral therapy for pregnant women with HIV/AIDS
Co-trimoxazole prophylaxis for children of HIV-positive mothers
Antiretroviral therapy for children with AIDS
Management of complicated AIDS 
Management of first-line antiretroviral therapy failures
Malaria
Complementary feeding
Therapeutic feeding
Insecticide-treated mosquito nets for under-5 children
Vitamin A
Zinc
Chloroquine for malarial treatment
Antimalarial combination treatment at primary health care level
Management of complicated malaria at referral level
Intermittent presumptive treatment for children
Measles
Complementary feeding
Therapeutic feeding
Measles immunization
Vitamin A - supplementation
Vitamin A - treatment for measles
Management of severe measles at referral level
Neonatal prematurity
Calcium supplementation in pregnancy
Detection and management of (pre) eclampsia (magnesium 
sulphate)
Additional antenatal care: detection and treatment of asymptomatic 
bacteriuria
Additional intrapartum: antenatal steroids
Universal skilled maternal and immediate neonatal care 
Community support to low birth weight babies
Universal emergency neonatal care (asphyxia aftercare, 
management of serious infections, management of the very low 
birth weight infant) 
Balanced protein energy supplements for pregnant women
Supplementation in pregnancy with multi-micronutrients
Neonatal severe infection
Clean delivery
Community support to low birth weight babies
Early breastfeeding
Universal case management for pneumonia 
Intermittent presumptive treatment of malaria (IPT) for pregnant women
Skilled delivery and neonatal care 
Detection and treatment of syphilis in pregnancy
Additional intrapartum: antibiotics for premature and prolonged 
rupture of membranes
Additional emergency newborn care (management of serious 
infections) 
Universal emergency neonatal care (asphyxia aftercare, 
management of serious infections, management of the very low 
birth weight infant) 
Neonatal tetanus
Skilled delivery
Tetanus toxoid
Clean delivery
Asphyxia
Universal antenatal care 
Skilled delivery and immediate neonatal care 
Resuscitation of asphyctic newborns at birth
Asphyxia aftercare at referral level
Assisted delivery or vacuum extraction at basic emergency obstetric 
care level
Caesarean section at comprehensive emergency obstetric care level
Pneumonia
Complementary feeding
Therapeutic feeding
Breastfeeding for children 0-5 months
Breastfeeding for children 6-11 months
Zinc
Hib immunization
Antibiotics for under-5 children with pneumonia
Management of severe pneumonia at referral level
Pneumococcal immunization
* Interventions included vary by scenario.
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Interventions to reduce stunting
Balanced protein energy supplements for pregnant women
Intermittent preventive treatment (IPTp) for malaria in pregnancy
Supplementation in pregnancy with multi-micronutrients
Complementary feeding
Zinc preventive
Hand washing by mother
Interventions to reduce maternal mortality
Tetanus toxoid
Screening for pre-eclampsia
Screening and treatment of asymptomatic bacteriuria
Normal delivery by skilled attendant
Active management of the third stage of labour
Initial management of post-partum haemorrhage
Drugs for preventing malaria-related illness in pregnant women and 
death in the newborn
Treatment of severe pre-eclampsia or eclampsia 
Assisted delivery and vacuum extraction at basic emergency 
obstetric care level
Management of obstructed labour, breech and fetal distress at 
comprehensive obstetric care level (caesarean section)
Referral care for severe post-partum haemorrhage
Management of maternal sepsis 
Medical termination of pregnancy / management of complicated 
abortions
Family planning
Iron/folic acid supplements
Multi micronutrients
Deworming
Calcium supplements
Interventions to reduce deaths from AIDS, TB and malaria in 
adults and during pregnancy
Co-trimoxazole prophylaxis for adults with HIV/AIDS
ART for adults with AIDS
Management of first-line ART failures
Management of complicated AIDS 
DOTS
DOTS retreatment 
Treatment of multidrug-resistant TB
Artesunate combination treatment
Management of complicated malaria with second-line drugs
Credit: DFID/Helen Stear
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